Monday, January 26, 2026

Yemen in 2026: Rivalries and Ruptures




ICDI - After more than a decade of war, Yemen stands as an example of a profound failure of strategy and reason by domestic leadership, regional intervention, and international diplomacy. In 2025, Yemen’s war became increasingly entangled with broader Middle East geopolitical recalibrations — especially around Red Sea security and changing Gulf relations — which have posed major challenges for diplomacy.

The end of 2025 marked a decisive rupture in the partnership in Yemen between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), as years of concealed rivalry gave way to open political and military confrontation. Yemen’s conflict pits the Iran-backed Houthi armed group, which controls much of the north after toppling the internationally recognized government, against a fractured, Saudi-supported internationally recognized government located in the south, with both sides fighting for control over the Yemeni state. Complicating this divide, the UAE has long backed the separatist Southern Transitional Council (STC), seeking autonomy or independence for southern Yemen. Saudi Arabia’s direct intervention against the UAE-backed STC in eastern Yemen last December signaled a broader escalation, with Riyadh now actively moving to curb and roll back Emirati influence across the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa. Saudi Arabia now views Abu Dhabi’s proxy-based expansion as a direct threat to its strategic security belt. In parallel, Saudi Arabia has moved to reclaim stewardship over the southern issue, shifting it from an Emirati-managed proxy arena to a Saudi-supervised political track centered on dialogue by Riyadh convening southern leaders. This breakdown of relations between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi is almost certainly going to be a defining factor shaping Yemen’s conflict dynamics in 2026.

Three factors that could shape the conflict in 2026


It is difficult to predict with confidence what Yemen’s trajectory will be in 2026. Still, a few dynamics are likely to weigh more heavily than others: a conflict that remains stuck in a stalemate and fragmentation, deeper regional entanglements, and the humanitarian fallout of both. There is little indication that the war will move beyond this impasse. If anything, division itself now seems to function as the organizing principle of Yemen’s political landscape. With the Houthis firmly entrenched in the north and the anti-Houthi camp increasingly fractured across the south and east, it is hard to see what incentives exist for compromise rather than continued entrenchment.

The second uncertainty lies in regional geopolitics. With Red Sea security concerns, intensifying Gulf rivalries, and the possibility of a United States military strike on Iran, all converging, Yemen risks being treated as a secondary arena in wider strategic contests. Saudi Arabia’s pursuit of de-escalation in Yemen usually fails to translate into diplomatic engagement. At the same time, the proxy forces that the UAE has built in the south will not simply dissolve overnight. In this context, the Houthis may seek to exploit the situation by launching military offensives in areas they aim to expand. Whether they can do so, however, remains an open question, hinging largely on the level of support they continue to receive from Iran — and on Iran’s own fate should a US military confrontation materialize.

The final—and most unsettling—question is how long Yemen’s humanitarian catastrophe can continue to sit on the political sidelines. More than half of the population, an estimated 19.5 million people, now depend on humanitarian assistance, including 4.8 million internally displaced persons and over 61,000 refugees and asylum seekers. Yet even at this scale, the crisis no longer provokes urgency among donors, international institutions, or regional mediators. Aid is increasingly constrained and politicized through funding cuts, obstruction of aid, Houthis’ detentions of civil society and UN agency workers, donor conditionality, and access restrictions, while economic collapse and institutional decay deepen in the background. Ordinary Yemenis pay the price, day after day. And yet, history shows that desperation is rarely passive. One day, the pressure it creates may spill over in ways that no strategy, no negotiation, can contain.

Possible scenarios


These three dynamics create a context in which a range of outcomes is possible. How the conflict unfolds will depend on a number of moving parts: whether the Saudi-UAE rivalry escalates or stabilizes, whether the Houthis decide to push into new territory, and whether the international community steps in—or stays on the sidelines. Seen in this light, Yemen’s path over the coming year could follow two very different directions.

Scenario one: fragmentation vs stabilization


In the most optimistic scenario, Saudi Arabia manages to reassert itself as the dominant external broker in Yemen, reining in rival armed actors and nudging the fractured Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) toward at least a semblance of cohesion—a trajectory Riyadh has already begun to signal through its recent announcement of large-scale financial support for Yemen’s security and development sectors, particularly in southern areas previously dominated by UAE-backed forces.

A reduction in Emirati interference — whether due to shifting priorities or external pressure — would ease southern tensions and allow the council to exercise authority over its previously independent military units. In this scenario, the PLC would not suddenly transform into a fully functioning government, but it could begin to regain credibility, present a united front in negotiations with the Houthis, and establish clearer chains of command that make governance possible rather than purely reactive.

Yet even here, the gains would be fragile. Any stabilization would depend on Riyadh’s continued engagement, the council members’ willingness to subordinate personal ambitions, and the ability to balance external influence without appearing to cede sovereignty. Also, it depends on confronting Israel’s increasing entanglement in Gulf rivalries, aligning quietly with the UAE, and expanding its presence in the Red Sea and Horn of Africa — developments that Riyadh views as a strategic threat and factor in regional competition.

If all goes well, for the first time in years, Yemen could move from a state of pure paralysis to one where decisions are made, priorities set, and the country is at least minimally steered rather than drifting. It would not be a solution to Yemen’s deeper fractures, but a conditional stabilization that offers a space for peace talks.

Scenario two: entrenched fragmentation


The more likely — and more dangerous — scenario is one in which Saudi Arabia cannot fully assert control over southern armed groups, while the UAE quietly backs separatist and local forces in the south and east – a dynamic that risks escalating local violence and undermining the PLC’s authority — a pattern already evident in the large, recurrent pro-STC protests in Aden, which signal persistent popular legitimacy for the separatists despite Saudi-backed military gains.

In this trajectory, competition over territory, resources, and external patronage will intensify, particularly in regions such as Hadramout, where long-standing grievances are increasingly framed in autonomist or separatist terms. Fragmentation will become self-reinforcing, as armed groups resist any political settlement that threatens their economic lifelines or local dominance. National peace talks will likely stall, not only because of the Houthis, but because no unified counterpart exists on the other side. Frustrated by Saudi Arabia’s recent moves, the Houthis could respond with a military push toward areas they intend to advance into, framing Riyadh — not the UAE — as Yemen’s chief adversary. Houthi official, Mohammed al-Bukhaiti, has already accused Saudi Arabia of steering the war for its own strategic and territorial gain, manipulating regional actors, and placing its interests above Yemeni unity. While Houthis remain wary of the UAE and its ties to Israel, the Houthis portray Saudi actions as the greater threat — tools of a broader agenda serving American and Israeli ambitions under the veneer of religion.

In this context, Yemen drifts further toward a Libya- or Somalia-style model: a formally recognized government with shrinking authority, multiple competing power centers, and a conflict that no longer moves toward resolution.

Ultimately, 2026 is unlikely to be a year of resolution for Yemen. The question is not whether the war will end, but whether it will continue to be managed through fragmentation, external bargaining, and humanitarian containment. As regional actors recalibrate their priorities and Yemeni institutions remain hollowed out, Yemen risks slipping further into a conflict that no one is actively trying to win — or end. What happens next will depend less on new peace initiatives than on whether those with power, inside and outside Yemen, are willing to accept the costs of continued division as the status quo.


*This article was first written for and published on ICDI's website on 26 January. Original link is here

Monday, January 19, 2026

Women and Peacebuilding in Yemen


The following is a feature by Australia Assists, the Australian Government’s humanitarian civilian deployment program, about my work. The interview was done in June 2025 during my former work with the Office of the UN Special Envoy for Yemen in Amman. The original link to the feature is here


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Afrah supports the advancement of women and peacebuilding in Yemen, championing women’s leadership in inclusive peace processes through her Australia Assists deployment.

Growing Up in Sana’a


Growing up in Sana’a, the capital city of Yemen, Afrah became deeply aware of the challenges women faced in her community. As a young child, she had already witnessed the everyday realities of gender-based discrimination.

As a young girl, Afrah witnessed her mother dedicate 5 years of her life to secure a divorce in a system where Yemen’s Personal Status Laws allows men to end a marriage alone, but forces women to seek judicial approval.

‘I gained a deeper understanding of the gender disparities embedded in Yemen’s Personal Status Laws,’ recalled Afrah. ‘My mother’s struggle to secure a divorce illustrated the challenges many Yemeni women encounter in accessing justice.’

This life-changing experience and the realities she faced of gender discrimination sparked her lifelong passion for equality and justice. This passion was further ignited during the Arab Spring and has now led to supporting the United Nations Office of the Special Adviser to the UN Secretary-General on Yemen (OSEGY) deployed through Australia Assists.

From Blogging to Advocacy


In the heat of the Arab Spring, Afrah started sharing her thoughts through her personal blog. As thousands of Yemeni people took to the streets to demand a better Yemen, Afrah’s words found an online audience that resonated within Yemen and across the Middle East. This sparked the moment when her writing became a powerful platform for Yemeni advocacy, where she helped shine a light on the resilience and struggles of Yemeni women.

‘I recognised the responsibility of being an emerging voice for Yemeni women on a global stage,’ said Afrah. ‘It was a unique opportunity that shed light on their resilience, struggles, and contributions… it also deepened my commitment to advocating for gender equality and women’s rights in Yemen.’

After more than a decade of conflict, Yemen remains in a multi-faceted humanitarian crisis, with nearly 20 million people (roughly 60% of the population) requiring urgent humanitarian assistance this year alone. Women and girls are facing the brunt of it. ‘This dire situation is exacerbated by prolonged conflict, economic collapse, and climate-induced disasters… while access to essential services, such as healthcare, education and clean water remains severely limited,’ noted Afrah.

Afrah’s Life Mission


For Afrah, her work is her “life mission”, reflecting a deep and personal commitment to advancing human rights, particularly women’s rights, in Yemen and beyond. Today, as a Programme Officer within the Inclusion Unit at OSEGY, she is helping to advance the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda, where women’s voices are fully integrated into all aspects of the peace process. ‘Every decision I make, both professionally and personally, is aligned with these values, understanding that true peace is built on inclusivity and respect for all.’

In her deployment, she helps design and deliver initiatives that push for women’s participation in the peacebuilding process for Yemen – using her expertise in advocacy, research and partnership building. ‘Each day brings a blend of strategic planning, program oversight, stakeholder engagement and communication efforts,’ explains Afrah.

Women At the Centre of Peacebuilding


Historically, women have been excluded from peacebuilding processes. For Afrah and the broader OSEGY mandate, however, women’s involvement in peacebuilding is not optional – it is essential.

‘Women are essential to the process of building sustainable peace, as they bring unique perspectives and solutions that are critical for addressing the root causes of conflict and fostering long-term stability,’ noted Afrah. ‘Women are central to social cohesion in their communities, and their involvement ensures that peace agreements are more comprehensive, inclusive, and resilient.’

Despite the dire humanitarian situation in Yemen, Afrah remains steadfast.

She draws upon the strength and resilience of the countless activists and Yemeni women who continue to fight for a better future. ‘The strength and determination of Yemeni women, who continue to fight for basic rights in a context of extreme adversity, give me faith that a better future is possible.’

Most importantly, she also draws inspiration from those closest to her. ‘What keeps me going is the deep sense of responsibility I feel towards my mother, cousins, relatives, friends, and relatives of my friends all inside Yemen,’ said Afrah. ‘I feel a deep sense of responsibility towards those on the ground – especially the “forgotten women” of Yemen who bear the brunt of this conflict yet remain unheard.’

‘No matter how difficult this is, it’s worth it – because it holds the potential to create long-lasting impact.’ 

Wednesday, December 31, 2025

From Yemen to the World. Carrying Yemen's stories with me, always.




My article, “Ten Years After Saudi Arabia's Intervention in Yemen, There Is Only Irreparable Loss,” has been featured among Democracy in Exile’s Most Popular Articles of 2025.

Do you know what it means for a young woman from a humble neighborhood in Sana’a—حارة الرقاص—to see her work stand out alongside articles by Harvard- and Oxford-educated writers? Even now, I am still amazed. More than anything, it reaffirms my belief in the power and necessity of telling Yemen’s stories to the world.

I was inspired to write this piece after a gathering with Yemeni friends, when a mother pointed to her nine-year-old son and said:
“I gave birth to him in a hospital while coalition bombs were falling on the funeral hall. Remember that day? That’s when he was born.”

My heart breaks when I think of Yemen’s collective pain. And as I resist falling into despair, I carry that pain with me—and turn it into words. 

Wednesday, June 11, 2025

In Love with Writing




I see my life in fragments, scattered like pages torn from a book. I gather them up, read them in no particular order, and the through-line is always there: writing.

I was a child in Sana’a when I first understood that the world would not save me. I watched my mother fight battles she was destined to lose. A woman, wanting a divorce, trapped inside the machinery of Yemeni law—an apparatus built by men, for men, where women are nothing but footnotes. The discriminatory laws against women hindered my mother from having her freedom from her abusive partner. There was no justice for her. We all suffered. There was no escape. So I made my own. I wrote. Writing was my escape.

At fourteen, my journal became my confessional, my shield, my secret doorway into another world. A world where I could name things as they were. A world where I was not powerless. I wrote feverishly, obsessively, as if my life depended on it. Maybe it did.

Later, when it was time for me to go to college, everyone around me tried to make me choose another life. A reasonable life. A job in a bank, a degree in commerce, something stable, something practical. But what they didn’t understand—what they never understood—was that writing was not something I did. Writing was something I was.

I became a journalist. I fought for it. I fought my family. I fought the expectations of my culture. I fought during the 2011 revolution. I wrote when they told me to be silent. I wrote when it meant writing would lead me to a life in exile. I wrote when it meant losing everything I had known.

Even in Sweden, I kept writing. Through war, through pandemic, through solitude so deep it felt like drowning, I wrote. The words carried me forward. They placed me in rooms and panel discussions with

people who had studied at Harvard and Oxford, men and women who had walked smooth, untroubled paths to success, while I was just me, a young lady with a humble background. But none of that mattered. Writing was the great equalizer. Writing was the only passport I ever needed.

They gave me an international award for it once, by the Committee to Protect Journalists in New York. A beautiful, weighty thing. Recognition. Proof that the words I wrote mattered. But awards mean nothing. Not really. People tell me I’m a star. They look at me with admiration, with awe, as if I’ve transcended something.

But Yemen is the star.

I do not write about fashion, about fleeting pleasures, about things meant to dazzle and distract. I write about a people whose suffering is infinite. A people who bleed, who grieve, who endure.

My identity—half Yemeni, half Ethiopian—was supposed to be a liability. Something to be hidden, something to erase. But I wrote it into existence. I turned it into a strength. I wrote about my mother’s cancer, about the pain that lived in my bones, about every truth I was told not to speak.

And in the end, it was always the same: writing was the center. The anchor. The compass.

Everything else changes. Everything else slips through my fingers.

But writing remains.

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*This article was first written for Yemen Platform in February 2025. 

Friday, April 4, 2025

From Revolution to Shadow: How has war redefined the existence of Yemeni women?





4 April - Jeem - The National Dialogue Conference (2012-2014) was a spark of light in the long night of women in Yemen. After the Yemeni revolution in 2011 and the popular movement advocating for the overthrow of President Ali Abdullah Saleh's regime and the establishment of a civil state with equal citizenship, women found themselves, for the first time, in front of an open door, albeit timidly. The 30 percent quota they secured allowed them a chance to sneak into the conference halls and negotiate the country's fate and the constitution with a boldness never before seen in the country.

This women’s quota—guaranteed seats for women—was an unprecedented step to ensure women's participation in the political process after their prominent role in the revolution.

Under the rule of former President Ali Abdullah Saleh, the women's quota was symbolically set at 15 percent, but the reality was very different; only two women were elected out of 301 members in parliament, instead of the 45 women that should have been elected according to this percentage. The 30 percent quota at the National Dialogue Conference was not a privilege women received automatically; it came as a result of continuous pressure from the Yemeni feminist movement, with support from the international community.

During the conference, and after intense discussions, a document was produced that included hundreds of recommendations, upon which the draft of the new constitution was based. Unlike previous constitutions, the proposed constitution recognized women's full citizenship and independent legal personality, and it stipulated a 30 percent quota for women in decision-making positions. This achievement would have placed Yemen second only to Tunisia in terms of the legal representation of women in power.

However, as is often the case in the country, not many dreams are allowed. The coup of 2014 came like an arch breaking in a storm, and the Houthis pulled everything into darkness. Politics retreated, rights scattered, and what had been built in months crumbled in an instant, like a house of cards blown away by the wind.

Yemen, a country that has always known nothing but wars, entered another whirlpool: a civil war eating the souls of its people from the inside, and the war of the Arab coalition led by Saudi Arabia tearing apart what remained of its bare flesh. Between all this, there were the women. Women were always there, but now with heavier shadows and more brutal pain.

The war was not just a war; it was another lust for violence, adding more wounds on top of old ones. The men were not content with blood; they wanted more... more control and more power. Women not only lost the rights they were promised, but they also lost their space of existence. They lost the idea that they had a place in public or even in private; violence against them became another part of the chaos, a natural extension of the wreckage.

Here, unavoidable questions arise: Is this just another end to their long story of injustice? Or is it a turning point that will leave deep impacts on their choices, their role in society, and their space in both public and private life? Will they fade into silence? Or will they create a new path from the rubble?

These are fundamental questions about the future of women in Yemen, where revolutions rise from beneath the ruins.

Violence in the War Zones and Private Life


Amid the war, the parties involved in the conflict sought to gain further advantages at the expense of women, striving to suffocate them and impose strict restrictions on their active roles in resistance and in maintaining the social fabric.

Before the conflict, there were laws that acted as holes in the wall, swallowing women one by one. According to the Yemeni Personal Status Law (issued in 1992 and amended several times), women cannot marry without the permission of a male guardian, nor can they divorce without humiliation. They do not have the same rights as men in divorce, and they cannot retain custody of their children unless a man allows it.

Then came the Houthis, the Yemeni government, and the "Southern Transitional Council" supported by the UAE, tightening these restrictions. They decided that women could only move with permission and travel only with a male relative (a "mahram"). A woman needs written consent from her guardian to be allowed to travel—as if she were a commodity permitted to pass from one checkpoint to another. It is worth noting that the requirement for women to travel with or obtain permission from a male guardian was not imposed before the conflict began.

Young girls and minors, who barely understood the meaning of love and the nature of their own bodies, suddenly found themselves in the beds of men much older than them—by twenty, thirty, or even forty years. There is no minimum age for marriage in Yemen, and there never has been. But the war has made child marriages more widespread, more miserable, and more accepted by hungry families. Nothing protects a girl from poverty and famine except the possibility that a man older than her will bear her expenses.

There were threats, smear campaigns, beatings, and retaliatory detention. Yet, all of this was not enough for the parties to the conflict, who went further, ensuring that women were humiliated in prisons, subjected to sexual violence, and accused of prostitution and debauchery in degrading terms that left a social stigma on the victimized women.

As for the migrants from the Horn of Africa traveling to Saudi Arabia, they have another story. They leave countries ravaged by famine only to find another kind of hunger in Yemen—hunger for power and control. They are subjected to rape and torture at the hands of human traffickers. At the heart of this swamp, violence does not stop at the doors of the war zones; it sneaks into homes, bedrooms, and into the corners of kitchens where mothers cook meals for children who may later kill them.

In recent years, news of women being killed by their male relatives has become routine. A woman is burned in Lahj, another is slaughtered in Hodeidah by her ex-husband, a third is stabbed in Aden by her husband, and a fourth is suffocated with a poisoned needle because she said "no," and mothers are killed by their sons' hands. Death repeats itself like a hymn with new faces and names, all sharing the same fate.

We have seen justice take its course in only a few of these crimes. In February of this year, the Court of Appeal in Aden sentenced the accused, Mohsen Ahmed, to death after proving his involvement in the murder of the victim, Fatima Doman, in August 2023 inside a commercial center in Aden. The perpetrator stabbed his victim several times with a white weapon (a dagger), causing severe bleeding that led to her death.

Thus, the violence against women was not confined to the war zones; it also extended to private life. Domestic violence escalated dangerously as economic and social pressures increased, making women more vulnerable to being killed by family members. In light of the collapse of livelihoods, some men resorted to violence as a means of control and venting their frustration—a behavior that no circumstance can justify. Instead of addressing the real causes of the crisis, violence is directed at women, reflecting the entrenchment of a culture of impunity and the use of force to impose control in the midst of chaos and economic collapse.

In an interview with women’s rights defenders inside Yemen, they confirmed that divorce rates are on the rise, along with increased physical violence against women and children, including continuous beatings and harm. Thus, homes, which should be a safe haven, have turned into other arenas of violence and oppression. Despite this, Yemen still lacks a clear law to protect women from domestic violence.

The Legacy of Violence


Despite all of this, women in Yemeni society hold a special place, rooted in traditions and customs that grant them social respect within the family and community, making the contrast between this respect and the oppressive laws and the painful reality of women’s lives more evident. The duality in how women are treated—between social esteem and legal marginalization—stems from a complex intersection of customs, traditions, and legal structures derived from religious and tribal interpretations.

On one hand, women are seen as the backbone of the family, surrounded by respect and care, but this respect is conditional upon their adherence to strictly defined traditional roles. On the other hand, this view is translated into laws that reinforce male control over their lives, seeing this control as part of “protecting” them, rather than diminishing their rights.

The violence that has increased during the war against women is not just a physical blow to their bodies, but a deep crack in the fabric of society. Women have become the focal point of political and military conflict through systemic violence, including killing, detention, torture, and forced marriages as a means of survival amidst economic collapse.

The restrictions on freedom of movement, such as the "mahram" (male guardian) requirement for travel, are not merely regulatory measures but tools to enforce the control of armed groups over both public and private spheres, thereby strengthening traditional masculine authority in an even more repressive context.

Violence against women has not only erased the limited space for their political and social participation but has also turned their mere presence in public spaces into a direct threat. The targeting of activists and human rights defenders—through threats, slander, and assassinations—further isolates them from the public sphere, reinforcing that the repression of women is not merely a consequence of war, but an integral part of control strategies.

The psychological trauma, with the escalation of violence and systemic repression, has transformed into a daily legacy, with women carrying invisible scars in their bodies and memories, scars that are as painful as physical wounds. However, excessive repression often generates reactions that the perpetrators do not anticipate.

For example, many women have had to rearrange their personal priorities, not based on their desires or ambitions, but according to the harsh necessities imposed by the war.

Although there are no precise statistics on women's participation in the labor market, indicators suggest an increase in their involvement in the workforce in recent years. Some women have even started to take on jobs that were once considered reserved for men. For instance, women never drove taxis before the war; this was the exclusive domain of male drivers. However, young Ghadeer Al-Kholani launched the "Mashwari Hawa" app in Sana’a a year and a half ago to enable women to drive taxis for transporting women and children. The app started with five female drivers and has expanded to include 20 drivers today.

It is widely believed that the years of armed conflict have contributed to a relative increase in women’s employment, with many men losing their income sources or dying, being detained, or injured in the war. As a result, women found themselves forced to take on new roles as breadwinners for their families. While this development may be seen as a positive step, it has been driven by necessity, not as part of an economic liberation planned by the women themselves. There is always the danger of economic exploitation, low wages, and increasing risks to their lives accompanying this step.

In the context of war, the available choices for women are no longer built on desires or dreams; they have become constrained by the harsh realities and the ongoing state of emergency. Priorities have shifted to survival and securing the bare minimum of life, rather than achieving personal fulfillment or ambition.

When Will Change Happen?


The current conflict in Yemen did not create discrimination against women, but it has amplified it and given it new legitimacy, whether through restrictive laws or systemic violence. The war not only erased the few gains women had made since 2011, but it has completely redefined their existence—from active participants to marginalized individuals, from political claimants to victims of escalating violence. The war was also a revelation of the extent of injustice, the depth of exclusion, and the ferocity of those who fear that women might have a voice and a place.


Despite all this repression, there are signs that these forced changes may, in the future, create the impetus for a more radical feminist movement, drawing on the harsh experiences women have endured in the war. With the increasing number of women entering the workforce and becoming self-reliant, and with the growing awareness of different forms of oppression, a new feminist consciousness could emerge, one capable of challenging this reality, whether through human rights struggles or by reconstructing social roles after the war ends. History shows that major crises often serve as a precursor to radical transformations. The question here is not whether change will happen, but when, and what its features will look like.

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*This essay was first written in Arabic for Jeem website (source: here)