Listening to Yemen's Forgotten Voices

  

DAWN - Seventeen years ago, I embarked on a journey as a journalist, driven by a desire to uncover the complexities of Yemen, my homeland, for an international audience. Over the years, I have witnessed the ebb and flow of Yemen's tumultuous history—uprisings, wars, humanitarian crises—and with each event, I have found myself grappling not just with the challenges of reporting on the country, but also with the glaring inconsistencies in how the world perceives Yemen.

Time and again, I have seen international narratives reduce my country to a chessboard for global powers, sidelining the intricacies of Yemen's internal struggles and the voices of its people. The lack of comprehensive and contextual reporting, the marginalization of Yemeni voices in favor of outside ones, and the unbalanced focus on external actors without equal attention to internal dynamics and accountability all contribute to misunderstanding and misinformation. Those narratives eventually shape policies, influence public opinion and ultimately determine whose suffering is deemed worthy of attention.

I was born into a Yemen that was already making global headlines—but never on its own terms. During the long, authoritarian rule of former President Ali Abdullah Saleh, international news was dominated by U.S. drone strikes targeting al-Qaida in Yemen, with little focus on or interest in the Yemeni civilians who were also killed in those strikes. The international media framed Yemen primarily as a battleground in the so-called war on terror, focusing solely on counterterrorism, with little or no accountability for those human rights violations.

Those drone strikes are associated perhaps most of all with Anwar al-Awlaki, the American-born cleric and jihadist who fled to Yemen and joined al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula and was killed in a targeted strike in 2011. As the first American citizen ever targeted and killed in a U.S. drone strike, his death set off a debate about the legality of the strikes—but one that still largely avoided non-American casualties. (Under President Barack Obama, who ordered the strike on Awlaki, the U.S. conducted nearly 200 drone strikes on Yemen, killing up to 100 Yemeni civilians, according to New America. The U.S. government has never provided figures on civilian casualties from drone strikes.)

When the popular uprising against Saleh came in 2011, I watched as people took to the streets across Yemen demanding change, only to see their peaceful democratic movement reduced to a story about Saleh himself. International reports painted him as a "witty, sharp, defiant leader," a characterization that did not just overshadow the voices of the many protesters, but distorted the narrative of Yemen's popular revolution. The framing was clear: one man's political survival was more compelling than an entire nation's call for democracy.


When the Houthi insurgency advanced out of Yemen's northern highlands and captured the capital, Sana'a, in 2014, driving out the government of Saleh's successor, Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi, the pattern continued. Once the Saudi-led coalition intervened to try and oust the Houthis and restore Hadi to power, international media shifted its focus primarily to the coalition's airstrikes, which killed thousands of Yemeni civilians. But Yemenis were often portrayed solely as victims of foreign aggression. Meanwhile, domestic actors—from the Houthis themselves to Yemen's internationally recognized government to the separatist Southern Transitional Council and various other armed groups—were barely scrutinized, even though tens of thousands of civilians are estimated to have been killed in their civil war.

And then, when the Houthis began attacking ships in the Red Sea in 2023, which they portrayed as a campaign to defend Palestinians and force Israel to end its war in Gaza, the war in Yemen was no longer covered as a civil war. Now it was seen primarily through the lens of geopolitics and global security. The Houthis effectively took control of the Bab al-Mandab strait, a key maritime chokepoint at the mouth of the Red Sea, disrupting vital shipping routes in the Strait of Hormuz and the Suez Canal, with ramifications for global trade. However, most news coverage still only focused on the Houthis' strategic gains, with little attention to their abusive tactics toward their own people. Yemen's ongoing internal struggles—its fractured governance, its economic collapse, the daily suffering of its people—were pushed further into the background.

Through all these phases, the world's view of Yemen has been dictated by selective narratives—ones that elevate external interests, prominent figures or geopolitical conflicts, while ignoring the complexities of life within the country itself, its broader societal and political dynamics, and local Yemeni voices that could explain them. For too long, I have watched Yemenis struggle not only to survive their reality but to have it properly understood outside Yemen—and to have their voices heard.

Such a narrow view of Yemen perpetuates injustice by creating a hierarchy of suffering. The most attention, it seems, is given to those harmed by external actors, like the Saudi-led coalition, while abuses by Yemeni forces themselves, whether the Houthis or their various rivals, receive less coverage. This selective focus implies that Yemeni lives are only significant when their victimhood serves an external narrative, leaving countless civilians who suffer at the hands of local oppressors invisible. By ignoring or downplaying internal abuses, international coverage fails to hold armed groups in Yemen accountable and also indirectly empowers them, enabling their ongoing violations to continue unchallenged or under-reported.

Moreover, the way Yemen is analyzed internationally often fails to capture its full reality, reducing complex dynamics to simplistic narratives that do more harm than good. How often do international experts on Yemen engage with Yemeni scholars—citing their work, amplifying their voices or collaborating with them? Yemenis themselves recognize and deeply value the few that do; however this pervasive exclusion further marginalizes local perspectives and reinforces a distorted, outsider-driven understanding of Yemen.


I have worked with local media in Yemen, international media, local and international human rights organizations, and think tanks inside and outside the country. In every situation, there were obstacles in place against Yemeni voices. Beyond the language barriers—since I am not a native English speaker, I worked twice as hard to write and publish in English—the biggest problem I faced was the perception that I was not "objective." I was often told I could not quote Arabic media reports and could only cite English-language sources because English-speaking audiences might get "confused," even though Yemen's official language, of course, is Arabic. It explains why international outlets often reinforce their own narratives by quoting predominantly Western sources, rather than incorporating Yemeni perspectives.

There is also a tendency to dismiss Yemeni local media as somehow unreliable. While it is true that every country has both credible and non-credible media outlets, it is frustrating to see Yemeni media disregarded outright. There seems to be little effort to explore local Arabic-language media or collaborate with them (perhaps owing to language barriers and the lack of Arabic skills among Western journalists and editors). This exclusion does not just distort Yemen's story, it also marginalizes the very people who understand it best.

All the while, the lives of ordinary Yemenis go largely unnoticed, as if their stories are not worthy of attention unless they fit the contours of a global narrative. Some underreported local stories include those of civil workers, who once held the machinery of the state together but now live in a constant state of destitution, having gone without full salaries for years. Their struggle seems to fade into the background of a crisis that prioritizes more dramatic headlines. Millions of internally displaced people, forced to leave their homes in search of safety, face dire conditions that most cannot imagine. But their suffering goes largely unnoticed, a forgotten chapter in a larger, more complex tale. And then there is the corruption. Aid meant to help the most vulnerable has often been diverted, leaving those in desperate need without support. Successive crackdowns on journalists, United Nations staff, activists, lawyers, businessmen and others add another layer of oppression. The bombing of dissidents' homes, a tactic used to silence those who dare to speak out, terrorizes the population. These acts of violence are hardly mentioned by international media, as the focus shifts to more familiar narratives of war and politics.

Yemen's children bear the especially brutal weight of a war they did not choose. Forced into combat, they become soldiers before they are even old enough to dream of their future. Their innocence stolen, they are sent to fight in a war that promises nothing but pain. Their stories are often buried beneath the weight of political agendas. As the war drags on, education has become a casualty. Schools have been destroyed, and those that remain struggle to provide even the most basic education. The dropout rates climb higher, as children are pulled away from their classrooms to help their families survive. The dreams of a generation vanish, but the world hardly takes notice.

Yemen's most renowned poet, the late Abdullah al-Baradouni, has often captured Yemen's dynamic spirit in his poems. As he writes in his poem "Why I Am Silent About the Lament," "I am silent, not because I lack words, but because the words will not capture what is left behind." In the face of relentless suffering, Yemenis have chosen silence over despair. Yemen's resilience endures in unspoken acts of survival and resistance. Like al-Baradouni's refusal to lament, Yemen persists: "For how can I lament when grief has become the air I breathe?" If the world is to understand Yemen, it must listen to these quiet voices of resilience, who tell the true story of their country.


* This essay was first written for and published by DAWN here. 

Yemen at Risk of Descending into Full-scale Civil War

Yemen’s 2024 unfolded as a pivotal year for regional power dynamics, with the Houthi armed group cementing its role as both a disruptive force and a significant player on the global stage. This development was heavily influenced by actions that began in late 2023. Leveraging their control of northern Yemen, the Houthis weaponized the Red Sea’s strategic shipping lanes, targeting vessels passing the Bab al-Mandab Strait since November 2023. As an expression of solidarity with Palestine in Israel’s war on Gaza, the Houthis’ actions were meant to pressure Israel and its allies to end the war, declaring all ships headed for Israeli ports fair game.

The response from Washington was swift, setting the stage for ongoing tensions in 2024. In December 2023, President Joe Biden rallied a coalition, named Operation Prosperity Guardian — composed of forces from the United States, United Kingdom, Australia, Bahrain, Canada, the Netherlands and other nations — launching military attacks on Houthi military infrastructure inside Yemen, to degrade the group’s capabilities. Yet, instead of retreating, the Houthis doubled down, launching drone strikes on Israeli cities multiple times, signaling their operational capabilities had reached unprecedented levels. Israel’s retaliatory strikes on Yemen’s Hodeidah port in July and September only deepened the cycle of escalation. U.S. and U.K. forces conducted airstrikes targeting Houthi weapons stockpiles, adding to the escalating tensions. Meanwhile, geopolitical opportunism surfaced elsewhere. In June, the United Arab Emirate’s push to lease Aden’s international port to Abu Dhabi Ports Authority sparked an outcry among Yemeni political figures and activists.

Houthis and Iran’s waning influence

By late 2024, the “Axis of Resistance” was in disarray. The assassinations of Hamas and Hezbollah leaders, along with the collapse of Assad’s regime delivered a major blow to Iran’s regional influence. For the Houthis in Yemen, Iran’s diminished capacity to support its allies highlights the fragility of their position and poses profound challenges for the group.

Iran’s declining capacity to project power and resources in Yemen could leave the Houthis vulnerable, creating potential power vacuums that might destabilize the already fragile conflict dynamics. While this shift could present an opportunity for de-escalation, particularly if Iran is forced to scale back its support, it might also encourage the Houthis to double down on militaristic posturing or seek alternative alliances, further complicating peace efforts.

In light of recent events, Houthi leaders have focused their rhetoric on external enemies which mirrors Iran’s strategy of deflection and scapegoating, revealing their precarious position. Similarly, just as the Assad regime ignored the demands of its populace, the Houthis continue to dismiss Yemenis’ grievances while focusing on external actors. This approach risks alienating the Yemeni people further and reinforcing the perception that the group prioritizes external agendas over domestic stability.

Yemen’s economic and humanitarian needs in 2025

By 2025, Yemen’s economic and humanitarian crises are projected to worsen, fueled by protracted conflict, economic fragmentation, and regional instability. Approximately 19.5 million people are projected to need aid in 2025, marking a roughly seven percent increase from 2024. Currently, over 17 million Yemenis face food insecurity, including 3.5 million suffering from severe malnutrition. In addition, nearly 18 million lack access to safe drinking water and sanitation, while preventable diseases like cholera, diphtheria, and dengue fever continue to plague the population.

The economy remains in freefall, with Gross Domestic Product shrinking further after a one percent contraction in 2024. Oil export blockades and a depreciating Yemeni Rial have crippled government finances, leaving essential services unfunded and exacerbating the humanitarian crisis. Rising inflation and disrupted supply chains, aggravated by Houthi attacks on Red Sea shipping, are pushing the nation to the brink.

Fragile prospects for peace

Despite the 2022 truce between the Houthis and Yemen’s Internationally Recognized Government (IRG) and the announcement of a Roadmap one year ago, no substantial progress has been made toward a lasting peace settlement. In fact, Yemen’s peace prospects remain precarious. Over the past three weeks, UN Special Envoy Hans Grundberg’s outlook on Yemen has taken a sharp turn—from cautious optimism to urgent alarm. Three weeks ago, he outlined a path to peace in 2025, hinging on international unity and a clear ceasefire roadmap. Now, his message, stated yesterday, is grimmer: escalating violence, a collapsing economy, and blatant human rights violations — like Houthi detentions and Red Sea insecurity — are destabilizing Yemen further. The window for diplomacy is closing fast. Grundberg warned that these developments have shrunk the space for mediation and risk derailing progress, urging immediate action to prevent Yemen from sliding further into instability.

This sense of urgency is compounded by broader regional shifts, including the decline of Iran’s influence following Assad’s fall. Previously, the Houthis defined peace as a scenario where they held absolute power, excluding Yemen’s internationally recognized government and other political factions. However, with their primary backer weakened, the Houthis may be forced to reassess their stance. Diminished external support could compel them to lower their demands, engage more seriously in negotiations, and participate in inclusive peace talks, creating a potential opening for progress — if the international community acts decisively.

However, intensified confrontation between the Houthi armed group and Israel might ignite the resumption of Yemen’s civil war 2.0. The Yemeni anti-Houthi camp has been drumming for war with the Houthis since Israel started attacking Yemen in July 2024. For example, Hameed Al-Ahmar, a prominent leader of the Islah political party, stated that recent regional and international developments must be leveraged to ‘end the abhorrent Houthi coup and restore the state.’ He emphasized that the Houthis have repeatedly demonstrated their lack of commitment to peace, having squandered Saudi Arabia’s genuine efforts to reach a peaceful settlement. Al-Ahmar also highlighted growing public outrage in Houthi-controlled areas, describing it as having reached ‘unprecedented levels,’ warning that the Houthis’ reliance on military escalation and repression will only deepen this unrest.

Al-Ahmar’s message underscores a broader sentiment among anti-Houthi factions that the time is ripe to decisively confront the group militarily, a stance that could escalate Yemen’s conflict further in 2025. However, the Houthi group does not appear to fear or care about any of this, even if subjected to heavy strikes by the U.S. and Israel and their consequences. They seem confident that the internal anti-Houthi camp remains fragmented and weak, no longer receiving the same level of military support it once did from the Saudi-led Coalition to restore Yemen’s government’s legitimacy. If the anti-Houthi camp were to receive significant military backing from its former supporters, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, or new external allies, the resumption of Yemen’s civil war would become almost inevitable. Ultimately, one of the gravest threats to Yemen’s peace prospects in 2025 is the looming possibility of a full-scale return to civil war, a scenario that would not only devastate Yemen further but also ripple across regional security and global shipping routes.

International community’s role in facilitating peace in 2025

To facilitate peace in Yemen by next year, the international community should leverage Iran’s waning influence to encourage the Houthis to reconsider their hardline stance and engage in inclusive dialogue. This requires pressuring all parties to engage productively, ensuring the meaningful participation of diverse Yemeni factions, women, youth, and civil society groups in peace talks.

Addressing Yemen’s economic fragility is crucial, including providing urgent aid to stabilize the economy, alleviate food insecurity, and rebuild infrastructure. Concurrently, efforts should focus on reconstructing state institutions to restore services and uphold the rule of law. By prioritizing humanitarian needs, empowering local peace initiatives, and fostering regional cooperation, the international community can create conditions for sustainable peace and stability in Yemen. As much as international involvement is crucial, it must be done without undermining Yemen’s sovereignty, perpetuating the perception that peace is being imposed by foreign powers rather than achieved organically by Yemenis themselves.

Final thoughts

A durable peace agreement could unlock Yemen’s recovery. Without immediate intervention, Yemen faces deepening poverty, displacement, and instability, jeopardizing its future. Yemen’s trajectory in 2024 wasn’t just about conflict—it was a case study of how power vacuums and fragmented authority invite external actors to reshape the rules of engagement. The Houthis’ actions have redefined them as a regional force capable of altering the global shipping landscape but at a profound cost to Yemen’s stability. The country’s future now hinges on whether these competing interests can find equilibrium—or if Yemen will remain a proxy battleground in a broader geopolitical contest.

*This article was first written for and published on the International Center for Dialogue Initiatives' website. 

Recalibrating US Engagement in Yemen Under a New Trump Administration

The military escalation between the United States and the Iran-backed Houthi movement in Yemen has significant implications for Yemen’s future. As the Houthis continue to consolidate control in the capital Sanaa, US involvement will play a crucial role in Yemen’s political and military trajectory. For the incoming Trump administration, the challenges posed by Yemen loom large, presenting a complex array of geopolitical risks with direct implications for US strategic interests. But the path forward should be clear: the Trump White House should not cling to Biden’s failed approach to Yemen.

The Houthi Challenge

To signal support for Palestine, less than two weeks after Israel began its assault on Gaza in October 2023, the Houthis began to attack maritime shipping in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, targeting American and international vessels supposedly linked to Israel, and launched strikes on Israel itself. Beyond the symbolic gestures of support for Palestinians, these actions placed global trade at risk, as the Red Sea—a vital lifeline for international commerce—became a dangerous battleground, and threatened to expand Israel’s war on Gaza. The Houthis’ moves were not only a political statement to the United States: they challenged its strategic interests. With the stability of maritime routes at risk, the situation in Yemen had suddenly become a far-reaching global crisis. Yemen’s future, and the future of international commerce, now seemed inextricably linked to the actions of the Houthis and the international response.

Determined to stem the growing threat, the United States responded with force. In November 2023, the US and UK militaries started military operations against key Houthi positions across Yemen, conducting numerous other such attacks since then. But despite the immense effort, the results have been far from decisive. The unyielding Houthis have continued to be a source of concern for the United States and its allies.

Indeed, US policies have failed to curb the Houthis’ power and activities in the Red Sea and internally. Instead, US efforts have contributed to the persistence of the Yemen conflict and exacerbated the suffering of the country’s civilians.

Yemen is afflicted by one of the world’s most severe humanitarian crises, which is compounded by internal political paralysis and by external interventions that have failed to address the underlying causes of the war. These causes include long-standing political grievances, particularly the historic marginalization of certain groups (such as the Houthis, historically, and people of the South). Deep socio-economic disparities have been exacerbated by high levels of unemployment, poverty, and corruption, as well as by the regional power struggle between Saudi Arabia and Iran that fueled proxy wars in Yemen. Moreover, the failure to implement the outcomes of previous peace talks, including the Gulf Cooperation Council Initiative and the United Nations-led talks, left a vacuum that only intensified the violence. The Yemeni anti-Houthi coalition, fragmented by competing Saudi and Emirati interests, has undermined the internationally recognized Yemeni government’s ability to challenge the Houthi insurgency. All this has enabled the Houthis to consolidate control, deepening the crisis.

Biden’s Policy in Yemen

The Biden administration’s Yemen policy has been marked by inconsistency: first it focused on humanitarian relief and diplomacy, then prioritized military engagement and sanctions. Initially, it shifted from the first Trump administration’s hardline policy by ending US support for the Saudi-led coalition’s offensive military actions in Yemen. The stakes were high, and President Joe Biden knew it. To guide the United States through the change, he appointed a US special envoy for Yemen, Tim Lenderking, entrusting him with working with the United Nations to end the war and improve the humanitarian situation. The Biden administration also revoked Trump’s designation of the Houthis as a “Foreign Terrorist Organization” and as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT). Biden’s goal was clear: to reset American priorities, steering the course toward a more balanced, diplomatic approach to Yemen’s devastating conflict. Despite these efforts, the Houthis remained uncooperative, refusing to make concessions. The Houthis’ October 2023 escalation through Red Sea shipping attacks caught the Biden administration off guard and forced it to reconsider its approach. In December 2023, the United States announced the establishment of an international coalition—Operation Prosperity Guardian—to disrupt the Houthis’ maritime attacks. US and allied militaries then launched airstrikes on key Houthi military targets, aiming to cripple their ability to carry out attacks. In January 2024, the administration took another significant step and officially redesignated the Houthis as a SDGT. The Treasury Department expanded its sanctions, targeting individuals and entities connected to the Houthis’ procurement and smuggling networks.

Thus, the Biden administration shifted its approach to embracing military engagement. In October 2024, US Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III declared a new strategy of “deter and degrade.” The message was clear—the United States was now focused on dismantling the Houthis’ military capabilities. The first step was a series of targeted strikes on Houthi-controlled underground weapons facilities.

Trump’s second administration needs a strategy to address the deeper issues at play and provide a stable foundation for US interests in the Middle East. But the new administration is likely to face a challenge in balancing the need to secure freedom of navigation in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden and addressing Yemen’s humanitarian crisis and political instability. This challenge, faced by the United States in Yemen since 2011, has been complicated by the Houthis’ Red Sea attacks. But prioritizing military solutions risks worsening the humanitarian crisis and deepening regional instability. This requires a diplomatic strategy to address Houthi power while avoiding further destabilization.

Critiques of American Policy

The US militarization of the Red Sea has not only failed to limit the Houthis’ capabilities but inadvertently emboldened them. In October 2024, the UN Panel of Experts on Yemen reported that the Houthis had launched at least 134 attacks from areas under their control on commercial vessels from many countries claiming that the ships were headed toward or otherwise linked to Israel, as well as against US and UK warships. These were not minor skirmishes—some of the attacks used new, extremely sophisticated missiles, marking a stunning advancement in the Houthis’ military capabilities. The UN report also revealed that the Houthis had begun charging illegal fees to shipping agencies. Allegedly coordinated through a company linked to a senior Houthi leader, the fees allowed vessels to pass through the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden without being attacked. In this way, the Houthis turned the waterways into a lucrative enterprise, collecting an estimated $180 million a month from their illegal tolls. While the UN could not independently verify these earnings, its report offered a troubling suggestion of how the Houthis had found ways to profit from the very conflict that the United States had set out to contain.

As the US military became more committed against the Houthis in Yemen, it became apparent that the primary focus was safeguarding Israel’s security interests. But as the months passed, it became increasingly clear that this militarized approach came at a cost. Yemen’s deep-rooted political, social, and economic issues were neglected in favor of short-term military objectives. Instead of alleviating the suffering or bringing the warring factions to the negotiating table, the US military presence fueled a cycle of violence. The airstrikes and military interventions, while aimed at protecting strategic interests, seemed to disregard the humanitarian principles that the United States had previously championed. In the end, the strategy offered no clear path to peace.

Challenges for US Strategy in Yemen

The Houthis had been a growing force in Yemen for years, but in 2024, their military capabilities have reached new heights. No longer isolated, they have formed powerful new alliances. Their deepening contacts with Russia are particularly notable: Moscow has begun providing military intelligence and satellite data to the Houthis, and discussions also involved potential Russian arms transfers, including anti-ship missiles. But the Houthis did not stop with Moscow. Their alliances expanded to Iraqi armed groups such as the Islamic Resistance in Iraq and even reached groups like Al-Shabab in Somalia. These connections were not just about weapons: they were about shared interests and coordinated efforts to challenge regional powers.

Policy Directions for the Next Trump Administration

Given the constraints on US military action—due to the American public’s lack of appetite for further conflicts, the weakened state of the internationally recognized Yemeni government, and the potential for a military campaign to inadvertently strengthen the Houthis—the Trump administration should focus on diplomacy, negotiation, and political solutions as the only viable means to resolve the Red Sea crisis and stabilize Yemen.

To effectively address the challenges, the United States must adopt a strategy that transcends narrow military actions against Houthi infrastructure. The real work lies in addressing the broader causes fueling the violence. The first crucial step would be in Gaza, as a ceasefire there would reduce actions that inflame tensions.

Then, the United States should adopt a new approach in Yemen to tackle the root of Houthi power. Iran, Russia, Al-Shabab, and Iraqi militias were all playing a role in bolstering the Houthi insurgency. The Trump administration should apply diplomatic and economic pressure on these external actors to halt their military and financial support for the Houthis. But that will not be enough. The United States must recognize the urgency of cutting off the Houthis’ weapons supply lines that rely on smuggling. It should focus on key smuggling routes in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, where weapons are slipping through the cracks. Both maritime and land-based interdictions should be stepped up, making it harder for the Houthis to continue receiving military resources.

Addressing Yemen’s internal divisions is equally crucial. The United States must focus on an integrated approach that balances counter-Houthi measures with efforts to assist Yemen to rebuild its governance and reconcile its rival factions. This is necessary to avoid exacerbating the country’s fragmentation. Otherwise, Yemen risks becoming permanently entrenched as a proxy battleground, caught between external powers, with no hope of internal resolution. The United States should support Yemen’s political and economic stabilization, which in turn can ensure the foundation for Yemen’s recovery while promoting regional security.

For the incoming Trump administration, the lessons from the past are clear. The United States should no longer rely on piecemeal strategies that only treat the symptoms of Yemen’s crisis. To truly shift the trajectory in Yemen, the United States needs to address the deeper forces behind the conflict.

The key to success is collaboration. The United States should work alongside international and regional partners to develop a unified framework for peace—a framework that is inclusive and responsive to the needs of all Yemeni factions. This means ensuring that the internationally recognized government of Yemen is not a figurehead, but a functioning, capable authority with a mandate to lead. The United States should also press key regional actors, particularly Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, to align their efforts in Yemen. Their rivalry has long been a major obstacle to any meaningful unity in Yemen. Only by putting aside their differences and coordinating their efforts can they help stabilize the country. With American diplomatic leverage, these actors could form a cooperative framework that tackles Yemen’s political, economic, and security challenges.

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This policy analysis paper was first written for and published on the Arab Center DC's website. 

How Will A Second Trump Presidency Affect Yemen?

Stimson Center - U.S. presidential elections were closely watched throughout the world, including in Yemen, a nation ravaged by a decade of conflict.

Yemen, the poorest country in the Arab world, is home to one of the Middle East’s most significant non-state actors: the Iran-backed Houthi group, controlling nearly half of Yemen’s population. Over the past year, the Houthis have increasingly disrupted vital global maritime routes, exacerbating tensions in the region.

In a show of solidarity with the Palestinian people, the group has pledged to retaliate against Israel until it ceases its military operations in Gaza, targeting and hijacking vessels the Houthis claim are linked to Israel. This aggressive stance has prompted the United States and the United Kingdom to conduct airstrikes on Houthi military positions inside Yemen. The U.S. has also taken the lead in an international military operation known as Operation Prosperity Guardian, shooting down drones that target ships as well as launching airstrikes to counter Houthi military capabilities. Meanwhile, the Houthis have also launched limited missile strikes on Israeli cities, prompting Israel to retaliate with multiple attacks on Yemen. In this complex theater of geopolitics, U.S. foreign policy decisions will be crucial in shaping Yemen’s future.

Vice President Kamala Harris, the unsuccessful Democratic presidential nominee, had maintained President Joe Biden’s approach to Yemen, which tended to overlook the connection between the Houthis’ attacks and the ongoing war in Gaza. In the past, Harris had aligned with more progressive members of her party by co-sponsoring legislation to end U.S. support for Saudi Arabia’s military operations in Yemen. However, that was before the Houthi threat to international shipping escalated in the Red Sea.

For his part, Trump backed the Saudi-led war on Yemen during his administration and vetoed a bipartisan effort to pull U.S. support for Riyadh. As he was leaving office in January 2021, he went further, designating the Houthis as a foreign terrorist organization. This move was meant to further isolate the Houthis and cut off international humanitarian relief for Yemenis under Houthis control. Under pressure from humanitarian organizations, which warned that it could make the dire situation in Yemen even worse, the designation was lifted by the Biden administration. At the same time, Trump criticized his successor for launching military strikes against the Houthis, claiming that Biden was “dropping bombs all over the Middle East.” This is not to say that Trump would not continue these actions should he return to office or put Houthis back on the terrorism list.

In 2022, with strong backing from the Biden administration, a UN-brokered truce managed to pause the long-running conflict between the Houthis and Saudi Arabia, offering some hope for a peaceful settlement. Though that truce technically expired after being renewed twice, both sides have largely stuck to it, holding off on major offensives and opening the door for a series of quiet talks. The two sides are still struggling to reach agreements over border security and economic matters, among other issues. Following the outbreak of the Gaza war last year, peace efforts have halted due to the escalating Houthi attacks in the Red Sea. Reports in May indicated that the U.S. has given Saudi Arabia an informal go-ahead to revive peace efforts with the Houthis. But the Biden administration’s efforts to support peace while degrading Houthi military capabilities and reducing attacks on Red Sea shipping made it difficult to achieve diplomatic progress.

The second Trump administration will play a critical role in determining the future of Yemen. Decisions made in the coming months will not only impact Yemen’s trajectory but also resonate throughout the broader Middle East.

Yemen plays a significant role due to its strategic location along the Red Sea, a crucial global trade route. Its proximity to U.S. interests raises concerns when the Houthis threaten American assets, including military bases in Djibouti and Eritrea. Recent Houthi attacks have put global supply chains and regional stability at risk. Supported by Iran, the Houthis challenge Yemen’s government and neighboring countries, particularly U.S.-allies Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Meanwhile, the Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula group (AQAP) in Yemen poses a direct threat by planning attacks on military and diplomatic targets, recruiting extremists, and spreading anti-U.S. propaganda that can inspire global terrorism.

U.S. policy on Yemen has been largely reactive. A bolder, more visionary strategy must lean into the art of diplomacy, grappling with the root causes of Yemen’s relentless turmoil as well as regional rivalries and proxy wars.

The next U.S. administration should adopt a multifaceted approach focused on two key areas: First, it is crucial to acknowledge the link between Houthi attacks in the Red Sea and the conflict in Gaza. This recognition should prompt a shift toward facilitating a comprehensive resolution that begins with a ceasefire in Gaza.

Second, the administration must support the establishment of a politically and militarily unified Yemeni government to strengthen the Yemeni state, enabling it to effectively address various threats, including Houthi influence, both domestically and regionally. In tandem, the administration should prioritize and facilitate an inclusive peace process that engages all relevant stakeholders.

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This article was first written for and published on the website of Stimson Center. 

Redefining a U.S. Path in Yemen

DAWN - In a televised speech days after the U.S. presidential election, the leader of Yemen's Houthi militia, Abdul Malik al-Houthi, declared that the group's attacks on shipping in the Red Sea and against Israel would persist until a cease-fire in Gaza and Lebanon is secured. "Neither Trump, nor Biden, nor any criminal in this world will be able to sway us from our firm and principled position," he said.

While the rhetoric was not surprising, it was a reminder of the realities in Yemen that awaited either Kamala Harris or Donald Trump in the White House. With U.S. foreign policy once again at a turning point with Trump's return to power, the prospect for a better U.S. approach to Yemen may be lost. What Yemen really needs is a strategy beyond rival power plays—a call for genuine partnership in the pursuit of peace and stability.

For too long, going back to Barack Obama's presidency and extending through Trump's first term and Joe Biden's administration, the U.S. has seen Yemen almost exclusively through the lens of Saudi Arabia's security interests. This narrow perspective allowed Saudi Arabia to effectively shape Yemen's political trajectory following the Arab Spring in 2011, through the Gulf Cooperation Council's initiative for a flawed political transition after the fall of longtime President Ali Abdullah Saleh. With its Saudi-centric view of Yemen, Washington later empowered the Saudi-led military intervention in Yemen in 2015.

When Houthi attacks on Red Sea shipping erupted last year in response to Israel's punishing war in Gaza, the U.S. took a reactive stance, narrowly targeting Houthi military interests rather than addressing the broader, underlying issues: the need for a cease-fire in Gaza to reduce tensions across the region and a resolution to Yemen's deepening political fragmentation. Washington should not keep sidelining Yemen's unique political and economic realities, but there is little hope that the new Trump administration will change anything.

After years of inconsistent and, at times, contradictory policies—including an ambivalent approach to Yemen's long-stalled peace process and involvement in escalatory military operations under initiatives like Operation Prosperity Guardian, the U.S.-led naval coalition in the Red Sea—the U.S. has deeply compromised its standing in Yemen. Amid U.S. support for Israel's war in Gaza, where American-made weapons contribute to a plausible genocide, Yemenis see little reason to trust U.S. intentions. This perception of U.S. complicity in violence only fuels anti-American sentiment, playing directly into the hands of groups like the Houthis and al-Qaida in Yemen, which leverage this distrust to recruit and spread their own narratives of U.S. aggression. The U.S. would have struggled to regain credibility in Yemen under a Harris administration, and the chances will be even less under Trump.

U.S. policy in Yemen must exist beyond mere military might. Presidents going back to Obama have struggled to balance U.S. interests in Yemen with the need to recognize Yemen's sovereignty and prioritize long-term stability. Washington has been too focused on short-term security goals—again, often shaped by Saudi Arabia's own interests—over a longer view that addresses the root causes of instability and attempts to build a more sustainable partnership with Yemeni parties.

Ongoing Houthi attacks in the Red Sea pose significant risks to U.S. interests, regional stability and the U.S. Navy itself. These attacks threaten maritime security by jeopardizing freedom of navigation through the Bab al-Mandab Strait, a crucial chokepoint for international trade and energy supply routes, and with it U.S. interests in safe shipping lanes. The attacks have led to increased shipping costs and longer transit times, disrupting not only U.S. businesses but global supply chains, with broader economic repercussions around the world. With near-daily Houthi attacks, the U.S. Navy's mission in the Red Sea "has turned into the most intense running sea battle the Navy has faced since World War II," as Naval leaders and experts told the Associated Press. The threat to U.S. forces is particularly intense given the Houthis' growing arsenal of missiles and drones, as evidenced by large-scale engagements like the Houthi attack on the USS Laboon last January. Houthi forces claim that all U.S. bases and naval fleets in the region are now within range of their missiles.

The costs of U.S. military efforts to deter these attacks are adding up. Since October 7, 2023, the U.S. has spent $4.86 billion on military operations in Yemen and the wider region in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. And still, Houthi attacks continue; they have not been "deterred," as the U.S. set out to do. Meanwhile, the Houthis' ability to facilitate safe passage for Red Sea shipping aligned with China and Russia, while targeting vessels from U.S.-aligned countries, could shift regional economic alliances by undermining a key pillar of U.S. policy in the Middle East: freedom of navigation through the region's waterways.

The Houthis' attacks against Israel over the war in Gaza have amplified their influence in Yemen and beyond, aligning them with regional anti-U.S. and anti-Israel sentiments. By directly attacking U.S. and British vessels in response to Israel's war, the Houthis have boosted their role within the so-called "resistance" bloc of regional militias backed in varying degrees by Iran, with the Houthis possibly supplanting even Hezbollah. In short, the Houthis have positioned themselves as a central player against U.S.-aligned regional interests.

To address both the Houthi threats and the security of the Red Sea, the U.S. must build credibility in Yemen that isn't simply about rolling back military interventions or distancing itself from conflicts; it's also about understanding and supporting Yemen's internal sociopolitical landscape. A new approach would include investing in localized peacebuilding efforts, supporting Yemeni-led initiatives, and addressing economic issues that fuel support for groups like the Houthis and al-Qaida. The U.S. could regain some trust by respecting Yemen's autonomy and facilitating solutions that recognize Yemen's rich, complex historical context and its capacity for self-determination. To navigate all these issues, Washington would need to engage in Yemen with humility, acknowledging the harm of past policies. Repairing this fractured relationship requires a sincere commitment to fostering peace, not furthering conflict, if the U.S. hopes to regain any semblance of respect or influence in Yemen and the broader region.

If the U.S. wants to show a sincere commitment to fostering peace, it has to apply its policies uniformly across the region. That's why the first step would be to support a long overdue cease-fire in Gaza. The next administration should recognize the limits of American power; whether Trump will is another matter. But it is clear that in Yemen, U.S. airstrikes and naval deployments in the Red Sea to "deter" Houthi attacks have proven ineffective.

It is unlikely that the incoming Trump administration will reckon with these longstanding problems in U.S. policy, given its other priorities, as well as the likelihood that Trump will be even more beholden to Saudi Arabia than any other American president. Yemen, and Yemenis, will suffer. Instead of a more balanced U.S. approach to Yemen that could involve supporting Yemeni-led peacebuilding efforts and addressing economic hardships that fuel Houthi support, we may see even deeper U.S. military entanglement, given Trump's track record during his first term, including vetoing a bipartisan resolution to end U.S. involvement in the Saudi-led war in Yemen.

Under Trump 2.0, there is little chance that the U.S. will seek to restore its credibility in Yemen and prioritize Yemen's own sovereignty over the interests of regional powers like Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, both of which have appeared to strongly favor Trump over Biden or Harris. To redefine its role in Yemen, the U.S. must redefine its Yemen policy, one that aims for a sustainable path of stability, instead of more military intervention that only feeds further unrest and misery for Yemenis. But any chance of changing U.S. policy will now probably have to wait another four years.

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This article was first written for and published on the DAWN website.