Recalibrating US Engagement in Yemen Under a New Trump Administration

The military escalation between the United States and the Iran-backed Houthi movement in Yemen has significant implications for Yemen’s future. As the Houthis continue to consolidate control in the capital Sanaa, US involvement will play a crucial role in Yemen’s political and military trajectory. For the incoming Trump administration, the challenges posed by Yemen loom large, presenting a complex array of geopolitical risks with direct implications for US strategic interests. But the path forward should be clear: the Trump White House should not cling to Biden’s failed approach to Yemen.

The Houthi Challenge

To signal support for Palestine, less than two weeks after Israel began its assault on Gaza in October 2023, the Houthis began to attack maritime shipping in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, targeting American and international vessels supposedly linked to Israel, and launched strikes on Israel itself. Beyond the symbolic gestures of support for Palestinians, these actions placed global trade at risk, as the Red Sea—a vital lifeline for international commerce—became a dangerous battleground, and threatened to expand Israel’s war on Gaza. The Houthis’ moves were not only a political statement to the United States: they challenged its strategic interests. With the stability of maritime routes at risk, the situation in Yemen had suddenly become a far-reaching global crisis. Yemen’s future, and the future of international commerce, now seemed inextricably linked to the actions of the Houthis and the international response.

Determined to stem the growing threat, the United States responded with force. In November 2023, the US and UK militaries started military operations against key Houthi positions across Yemen, conducting numerous other such attacks since then. But despite the immense effort, the results have been far from decisive. The unyielding Houthis have continued to be a source of concern for the United States and its allies.

Indeed, US policies have failed to curb the Houthis’ power and activities in the Red Sea and internally. Instead, US efforts have contributed to the persistence of the Yemen conflict and exacerbated the suffering of the country’s civilians.

Yemen is afflicted by one of the world’s most severe humanitarian crises, which is compounded by internal political paralysis and by external interventions that have failed to address the underlying causes of the war. These causes include long-standing political grievances, particularly the historic marginalization of certain groups (such as the Houthis, historically, and people of the South). Deep socio-economic disparities have been exacerbated by high levels of unemployment, poverty, and corruption, as well as by the regional power struggle between Saudi Arabia and Iran that fueled proxy wars in Yemen. Moreover, the failure to implement the outcomes of previous peace talks, including the Gulf Cooperation Council Initiative and the United Nations-led talks, left a vacuum that only intensified the violence. The Yemeni anti-Houthi coalition, fragmented by competing Saudi and Emirati interests, has undermined the internationally recognized Yemeni government’s ability to challenge the Houthi insurgency. All this has enabled the Houthis to consolidate control, deepening the crisis.

Biden’s Policy in Yemen

The Biden administration’s Yemen policy has been marked by inconsistency: first it focused on humanitarian relief and diplomacy, then prioritized military engagement and sanctions. Initially, it shifted from the first Trump administration’s hardline policy by ending US support for the Saudi-led coalition’s offensive military actions in Yemen. The stakes were high, and President Joe Biden knew it. To guide the United States through the change, he appointed a US special envoy for Yemen, Tim Lenderking, entrusting him with working with the United Nations to end the war and improve the humanitarian situation. The Biden administration also revoked Trump’s designation of the Houthis as a “Foreign Terrorist Organization” and as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT). Biden’s goal was clear: to reset American priorities, steering the course toward a more balanced, diplomatic approach to Yemen’s devastating conflict. Despite these efforts, the Houthis remained uncooperative, refusing to make concessions. The Houthis’ October 2023 escalation through Red Sea shipping attacks caught the Biden administration off guard and forced it to reconsider its approach. In December 2023, the United States announced the establishment of an international coalition—Operation Prosperity Guardian—to disrupt the Houthis’ maritime attacks. US and allied militaries then launched airstrikes on key Houthi military targets, aiming to cripple their ability to carry out attacks. In January 2024, the administration took another significant step and officially redesignated the Houthis as a SDGT. The Treasury Department expanded its sanctions, targeting individuals and entities connected to the Houthis’ procurement and smuggling networks.

Thus, the Biden administration shifted its approach to embracing military engagement. In October 2024, US Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III declared a new strategy of “deter and degrade.” The message was clear—the United States was now focused on dismantling the Houthis’ military capabilities. The first step was a series of targeted strikes on Houthi-controlled underground weapons facilities.

Trump’s second administration needs a strategy to address the deeper issues at play and provide a stable foundation for US interests in the Middle East. But the new administration is likely to face a challenge in balancing the need to secure freedom of navigation in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden and addressing Yemen’s humanitarian crisis and political instability. This challenge, faced by the United States in Yemen since 2011, has been complicated by the Houthis’ Red Sea attacks. But prioritizing military solutions risks worsening the humanitarian crisis and deepening regional instability. This requires a diplomatic strategy to address Houthi power while avoiding further destabilization.

Critiques of American Policy

The US militarization of the Red Sea has not only failed to limit the Houthis’ capabilities but inadvertently emboldened them. In October 2024, the UN Panel of Experts on Yemen reported that the Houthis had launched at least 134 attacks from areas under their control on commercial vessels from many countries claiming that the ships were headed toward or otherwise linked to Israel, as well as against US and UK warships. These were not minor skirmishes—some of the attacks used new, extremely sophisticated missiles, marking a stunning advancement in the Houthis’ military capabilities. The UN report also revealed that the Houthis had begun charging illegal fees to shipping agencies. Allegedly coordinated through a company linked to a senior Houthi leader, the fees allowed vessels to pass through the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden without being attacked. In this way, the Houthis turned the waterways into a lucrative enterprise, collecting an estimated $180 million a month from their illegal tolls. While the UN could not independently verify these earnings, its report offered a troubling suggestion of how the Houthis had found ways to profit from the very conflict that the United States had set out to contain.

As the US military became more committed against the Houthis in Yemen, it became apparent that the primary focus was safeguarding Israel’s security interests. But as the months passed, it became increasingly clear that this militarized approach came at a cost. Yemen’s deep-rooted political, social, and economic issues were neglected in favor of short-term military objectives. Instead of alleviating the suffering or bringing the warring factions to the negotiating table, the US military presence fueled a cycle of violence. The airstrikes and military interventions, while aimed at protecting strategic interests, seemed to disregard the humanitarian principles that the United States had previously championed. In the end, the strategy offered no clear path to peace.

Challenges for US Strategy in Yemen

The Houthis had been a growing force in Yemen for years, but in 2024, their military capabilities have reached new heights. No longer isolated, they have formed powerful new alliances. Their deepening contacts with Russia are particularly notable: Moscow has begun providing military intelligence and satellite data to the Houthis, and discussions also involved potential Russian arms transfers, including anti-ship missiles. But the Houthis did not stop with Moscow. Their alliances expanded to Iraqi armed groups such as the Islamic Resistance in Iraq and even reached groups like Al-Shabab in Somalia. These connections were not just about weapons: they were about shared interests and coordinated efforts to challenge regional powers.

Policy Directions for the Next Trump Administration

Given the constraints on US military action—due to the American public’s lack of appetite for further conflicts, the weakened state of the internationally recognized Yemeni government, and the potential for a military campaign to inadvertently strengthen the Houthis—the Trump administration should focus on diplomacy, negotiation, and political solutions as the only viable means to resolve the Red Sea crisis and stabilize Yemen.

To effectively address the challenges, the United States must adopt a strategy that transcends narrow military actions against Houthi infrastructure. The real work lies in addressing the broader causes fueling the violence. The first crucial step would be in Gaza, as a ceasefire there would reduce actions that inflame tensions.

Then, the United States should adopt a new approach in Yemen to tackle the root of Houthi power. Iran, Russia, Al-Shabab, and Iraqi militias were all playing a role in bolstering the Houthi insurgency. The Trump administration should apply diplomatic and economic pressure on these external actors to halt their military and financial support for the Houthis. But that will not be enough. The United States must recognize the urgency of cutting off the Houthis’ weapons supply lines that rely on smuggling. It should focus on key smuggling routes in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, where weapons are slipping through the cracks. Both maritime and land-based interdictions should be stepped up, making it harder for the Houthis to continue receiving military resources.

Addressing Yemen’s internal divisions is equally crucial. The United States must focus on an integrated approach that balances counter-Houthi measures with efforts to assist Yemen to rebuild its governance and reconcile its rival factions. This is necessary to avoid exacerbating the country’s fragmentation. Otherwise, Yemen risks becoming permanently entrenched as a proxy battleground, caught between external powers, with no hope of internal resolution. The United States should support Yemen’s political and economic stabilization, which in turn can ensure the foundation for Yemen’s recovery while promoting regional security.

For the incoming Trump administration, the lessons from the past are clear. The United States should no longer rely on piecemeal strategies that only treat the symptoms of Yemen’s crisis. To truly shift the trajectory in Yemen, the United States needs to address the deeper forces behind the conflict.

The key to success is collaboration. The United States should work alongside international and regional partners to develop a unified framework for peace—a framework that is inclusive and responsive to the needs of all Yemeni factions. This means ensuring that the internationally recognized government of Yemen is not a figurehead, but a functioning, capable authority with a mandate to lead. The United States should also press key regional actors, particularly Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, to align their efforts in Yemen. Their rivalry has long been a major obstacle to any meaningful unity in Yemen. Only by putting aside their differences and coordinating their efforts can they help stabilize the country. With American diplomatic leverage, these actors could form a cooperative framework that tackles Yemen’s political, economic, and security challenges.

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This policy analysis paper was first written for and published on the Arab Center DC's website. 

How Will A Second Trump Presidency Affect Yemen?

Stimson Center - U.S. presidential elections were closely watched throughout the world, including in Yemen, a nation ravaged by a decade of conflict.

Yemen, the poorest country in the Arab world, is home to one of the Middle East’s most significant non-state actors: the Iran-backed Houthi group, controlling nearly half of Yemen’s population. Over the past year, the Houthis have increasingly disrupted vital global maritime routes, exacerbating tensions in the region.

In a show of solidarity with the Palestinian people, the group has pledged to retaliate against Israel until it ceases its military operations in Gaza, targeting and hijacking vessels the Houthis claim are linked to Israel. This aggressive stance has prompted the United States and the United Kingdom to conduct airstrikes on Houthi military positions inside Yemen. The U.S. has also taken the lead in an international military operation known as Operation Prosperity Guardian, shooting down drones that target ships as well as launching airstrikes to counter Houthi military capabilities. Meanwhile, the Houthis have also launched limited missile strikes on Israeli cities, prompting Israel to retaliate with multiple attacks on Yemen. In this complex theater of geopolitics, U.S. foreign policy decisions will be crucial in shaping Yemen’s future.

Vice President Kamala Harris, the unsuccessful Democratic presidential nominee, had maintained President Joe Biden’s approach to Yemen, which tended to overlook the connection between the Houthis’ attacks and the ongoing war in Gaza. In the past, Harris had aligned with more progressive members of her party by co-sponsoring legislation to end U.S. support for Saudi Arabia’s military operations in Yemen. However, that was before the Houthi threat to international shipping escalated in the Red Sea.

For his part, Trump backed the Saudi-led war on Yemen during his administration and vetoed a bipartisan effort to pull U.S. support for Riyadh. As he was leaving office in January 2021, he went further, designating the Houthis as a foreign terrorist organization. This move was meant to further isolate the Houthis and cut off international humanitarian relief for Yemenis under Houthis control. Under pressure from humanitarian organizations, which warned that it could make the dire situation in Yemen even worse, the designation was lifted by the Biden administration. At the same time, Trump criticized his successor for launching military strikes against the Houthis, claiming that Biden was “dropping bombs all over the Middle East.” This is not to say that Trump would not continue these actions should he return to office or put Houthis back on the terrorism list.

In 2022, with strong backing from the Biden administration, a UN-brokered truce managed to pause the long-running conflict between the Houthis and Saudi Arabia, offering some hope for a peaceful settlement. Though that truce technically expired after being renewed twice, both sides have largely stuck to it, holding off on major offensives and opening the door for a series of quiet talks. The two sides are still struggling to reach agreements over border security and economic matters, among other issues. Following the outbreak of the Gaza war last year, peace efforts have halted due to the escalating Houthi attacks in the Red Sea. Reports in May indicated that the U.S. has given Saudi Arabia an informal go-ahead to revive peace efforts with the Houthis. But the Biden administration’s efforts to support peace while degrading Houthi military capabilities and reducing attacks on Red Sea shipping made it difficult to achieve diplomatic progress.

The second Trump administration will play a critical role in determining the future of Yemen. Decisions made in the coming months will not only impact Yemen’s trajectory but also resonate throughout the broader Middle East.

Yemen plays a significant role due to its strategic location along the Red Sea, a crucial global trade route. Its proximity to U.S. interests raises concerns when the Houthis threaten American assets, including military bases in Djibouti and Eritrea. Recent Houthi attacks have put global supply chains and regional stability at risk. Supported by Iran, the Houthis challenge Yemen’s government and neighboring countries, particularly U.S.-allies Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Meanwhile, the Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula group (AQAP) in Yemen poses a direct threat by planning attacks on military and diplomatic targets, recruiting extremists, and spreading anti-U.S. propaganda that can inspire global terrorism.

U.S. policy on Yemen has been largely reactive. A bolder, more visionary strategy must lean into the art of diplomacy, grappling with the root causes of Yemen’s relentless turmoil as well as regional rivalries and proxy wars.

The next U.S. administration should adopt a multifaceted approach focused on two key areas: First, it is crucial to acknowledge the link between Houthi attacks in the Red Sea and the conflict in Gaza. This recognition should prompt a shift toward facilitating a comprehensive resolution that begins with a ceasefire in Gaza.

Second, the administration must support the establishment of a politically and militarily unified Yemeni government to strengthen the Yemeni state, enabling it to effectively address various threats, including Houthi influence, both domestically and regionally. In tandem, the administration should prioritize and facilitate an inclusive peace process that engages all relevant stakeholders.

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This article was first written for and published on the website of Stimson Center. 

Redefining a U.S. Path in Yemen

DAWN - In a televised speech days after the U.S. presidential election, the leader of Yemen's Houthi militia, Abdul Malik al-Houthi, declared that the group's attacks on shipping in the Red Sea and against Israel would persist until a cease-fire in Gaza and Lebanon is secured. "Neither Trump, nor Biden, nor any criminal in this world will be able to sway us from our firm and principled position," he said.

While the rhetoric was not surprising, it was a reminder of the realities in Yemen that awaited either Kamala Harris or Donald Trump in the White House. With U.S. foreign policy once again at a turning point with Trump's return to power, the prospect for a better U.S. approach to Yemen may be lost. What Yemen really needs is a strategy beyond rival power plays—a call for genuine partnership in the pursuit of peace and stability.

For too long, going back to Barack Obama's presidency and extending through Trump's first term and Joe Biden's administration, the U.S. has seen Yemen almost exclusively through the lens of Saudi Arabia's security interests. This narrow perspective allowed Saudi Arabia to effectively shape Yemen's political trajectory following the Arab Spring in 2011, through the Gulf Cooperation Council's initiative for a flawed political transition after the fall of longtime President Ali Abdullah Saleh. With its Saudi-centric view of Yemen, Washington later empowered the Saudi-led military intervention in Yemen in 2015.

When Houthi attacks on Red Sea shipping erupted last year in response to Israel's punishing war in Gaza, the U.S. took a reactive stance, narrowly targeting Houthi military interests rather than addressing the broader, underlying issues: the need for a cease-fire in Gaza to reduce tensions across the region and a resolution to Yemen's deepening political fragmentation. Washington should not keep sidelining Yemen's unique political and economic realities, but there is little hope that the new Trump administration will change anything.

After years of inconsistent and, at times, contradictory policies—including an ambivalent approach to Yemen's long-stalled peace process and involvement in escalatory military operations under initiatives like Operation Prosperity Guardian, the U.S.-led naval coalition in the Red Sea—the U.S. has deeply compromised its standing in Yemen. Amid U.S. support for Israel's war in Gaza, where American-made weapons contribute to a plausible genocide, Yemenis see little reason to trust U.S. intentions. This perception of U.S. complicity in violence only fuels anti-American sentiment, playing directly into the hands of groups like the Houthis and al-Qaida in Yemen, which leverage this distrust to recruit and spread their own narratives of U.S. aggression. The U.S. would have struggled to regain credibility in Yemen under a Harris administration, and the chances will be even less under Trump.

U.S. policy in Yemen must exist beyond mere military might. Presidents going back to Obama have struggled to balance U.S. interests in Yemen with the need to recognize Yemen's sovereignty and prioritize long-term stability. Washington has been too focused on short-term security goals—again, often shaped by Saudi Arabia's own interests—over a longer view that addresses the root causes of instability and attempts to build a more sustainable partnership with Yemeni parties.

Ongoing Houthi attacks in the Red Sea pose significant risks to U.S. interests, regional stability and the U.S. Navy itself. These attacks threaten maritime security by jeopardizing freedom of navigation through the Bab al-Mandab Strait, a crucial chokepoint for international trade and energy supply routes, and with it U.S. interests in safe shipping lanes. The attacks have led to increased shipping costs and longer transit times, disrupting not only U.S. businesses but global supply chains, with broader economic repercussions around the world. With near-daily Houthi attacks, the U.S. Navy's mission in the Red Sea "has turned into the most intense running sea battle the Navy has faced since World War II," as Naval leaders and experts told the Associated Press. The threat to U.S. forces is particularly intense given the Houthis' growing arsenal of missiles and drones, as evidenced by large-scale engagements like the Houthi attack on the USS Laboon last January. Houthi forces claim that all U.S. bases and naval fleets in the region are now within range of their missiles.

The costs of U.S. military efforts to deter these attacks are adding up. Since October 7, 2023, the U.S. has spent $4.86 billion on military operations in Yemen and the wider region in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. And still, Houthi attacks continue; they have not been "deterred," as the U.S. set out to do. Meanwhile, the Houthis' ability to facilitate safe passage for Red Sea shipping aligned with China and Russia, while targeting vessels from U.S.-aligned countries, could shift regional economic alliances by undermining a key pillar of U.S. policy in the Middle East: freedom of navigation through the region's waterways.

The Houthis' attacks against Israel over the war in Gaza have amplified their influence in Yemen and beyond, aligning them with regional anti-U.S. and anti-Israel sentiments. By directly attacking U.S. and British vessels in response to Israel's war, the Houthis have boosted their role within the so-called "resistance" bloc of regional militias backed in varying degrees by Iran, with the Houthis possibly supplanting even Hezbollah. In short, the Houthis have positioned themselves as a central player against U.S.-aligned regional interests.

To address both the Houthi threats and the security of the Red Sea, the U.S. must build credibility in Yemen that isn't simply about rolling back military interventions or distancing itself from conflicts; it's also about understanding and supporting Yemen's internal sociopolitical landscape. A new approach would include investing in localized peacebuilding efforts, supporting Yemeni-led initiatives, and addressing economic issues that fuel support for groups like the Houthis and al-Qaida. The U.S. could regain some trust by respecting Yemen's autonomy and facilitating solutions that recognize Yemen's rich, complex historical context and its capacity for self-determination. To navigate all these issues, Washington would need to engage in Yemen with humility, acknowledging the harm of past policies. Repairing this fractured relationship requires a sincere commitment to fostering peace, not furthering conflict, if the U.S. hopes to regain any semblance of respect or influence in Yemen and the broader region.

If the U.S. wants to show a sincere commitment to fostering peace, it has to apply its policies uniformly across the region. That's why the first step would be to support a long overdue cease-fire in Gaza. The next administration should recognize the limits of American power; whether Trump will is another matter. But it is clear that in Yemen, U.S. airstrikes and naval deployments in the Red Sea to "deter" Houthi attacks have proven ineffective.

It is unlikely that the incoming Trump administration will reckon with these longstanding problems in U.S. policy, given its other priorities, as well as the likelihood that Trump will be even more beholden to Saudi Arabia than any other American president. Yemen, and Yemenis, will suffer. Instead of a more balanced U.S. approach to Yemen that could involve supporting Yemeni-led peacebuilding efforts and addressing economic hardships that fuel Houthi support, we may see even deeper U.S. military entanglement, given Trump's track record during his first term, including vetoing a bipartisan resolution to end U.S. involvement in the Saudi-led war in Yemen.

Under Trump 2.0, there is little chance that the U.S. will seek to restore its credibility in Yemen and prioritize Yemen's own sovereignty over the interests of regional powers like Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, both of which have appeared to strongly favor Trump over Biden or Harris. To redefine its role in Yemen, the U.S. must redefine its Yemen policy, one that aims for a sustainable path of stability, instead of more military intervention that only feeds further unrest and misery for Yemenis. But any chance of changing U.S. policy will now probably have to wait another four years.

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This article was first written for and published on the DAWN website. 

A Decade On, Assessing Shared Responsibility for Yemen’s Tragedy

The Arab Center Washington DC -  On September 21, 2014, Yemen’s capital Sanaa awoke to an unexpected turn of events that would reshape the country’s destiny. The Houthi armed group, officially known as Ansar Allah, had seized the city after a prepared march. The takeover had unfolded against the backdrop of popular grievances over the failure of President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi’s transitional government to address economic hardship, corruption, and a pervasive sense of marginalization. Seeking to exploit this widespread discontent, the Houthis had forged a strategic alliance with former President Ali Abdullah Saleh, a move that merged their interests with his deep-rooted political influence. Government buildings fell swiftly after the Houthis entered Sanaa as they occupied the parliament, ministries, and military installations, one after another. Media outlets broadcast new messages under Houthi control, signaling a dramatic shift in power.

The rapid takeover sent shockwaves throughout the region. Saudi Arabia watched with mounting concern, seeing the Houthis’ ascendancy as an extension of Iranian influence and a growing threat on its southern border. In March 2015, determined to stop the group, the kingdom—leading a coalition of regional allies backed by the United States and the United Kingdom—launched Operation Decisive Storm. Years of intense conflict ensued, as air raids and ground battles became a grim reality for Yemenis. Despite the coalition’s relentless military campaign, the Houthis gained and held control over significant territory, showcasing resilience and tactical acumen. Currently some 70-80 percent of the population lives under Houthi control.

Today, Yemen finds itself deeply fragmented, embroiled in a protracted conflict marked by fragile truces, escalating tensions, and a worsening humanitarian crisis. What began as an internal power struggle has evolved into a complex web of regional rivalries and proxy wars. Saudi Arabia backed Hadi’s internationally recognized government, while United Arab Emirates (UAE), nominally part of the Saudi-led coalition, began to pursue its own strategic interests by supporting southern secessionists and controlling critical infrastructure. Meanwhile, whispers of Iran’s hand in the conflict grew louder. Tehran’s support of the Houthis—through arms, training, and political backing—served its objective of expanding its regional influence and challenging Saudi dominance. The intricate dance of these competing powers has worsened the conflict and deepened internal divisions, turning Yemen into a battleground for broader geopolitical contests.

With no clear resolution in sight, the prospect of a unified Yemen remains dim. As internal fragmentation and contesting regional ambitions continue, the dream of lasting peace also has slipped further out of reach. The decade-long conflict is a shared tragedy in which all parties—domestic factions and regional powers alike—have prioritized political dominance over peace, perpetuating unending violence that has caused immense humanitarian suffering.

Houthi Strategy and Consequences

Long before the world took notice in 2014, the Houthi group was already deeply entrenched in a cycle of conflict. Between 2004 and 2010, the Houthis engaged in six fierce wars against the Sanaa government in a series of confrontations collectively known as the Saadah Wars. These were not mere skirmishes, but protracted conflicts fueled by a complex web of political disenfranchisement, economic neglect, and religious grievances. These years of relentless warfare honed the Houthis’ military strategies and solidified their organizational structure.

Since 2014, the Houthis have systematically consolidated power through strategic governance and military tactics. The group adopted a more calculated approach of entrenching themselves in state institutions instead of dismantling them. They also established a governance system in which real authority is held by a network of loyalist supervisors behind a façade of technocratic officials. Through this approach, the Houthis were able to centralize control, marginalize traditional actors like tribal leaders, and tighten their grip on power. The group’s alliance with former President Saleh and elements of Yemen’s weakened state apparatus facilitated this consolidation.

The Houthis faced the daunting task, however, of financing a prolonged military campaign. To cover the costs of war and those of governing, they imposed new taxes and levies across the territories under their control, burdening businesses and citizens. Militarily, they capitalized on the power vacuum, gaining territory in northern Yemen while facing resistance in areas like the oil-rich region of Marib. As part of their advance, the Houthis took over the national army’s arsenal, significantly strengthening their military capabilities. But amidst their military advances, a darker aspect of the Houthis’ strategy emerged. The group, like other actors in the Yemeni conflict, has recruited boys as young as twelve and thrust them into the front lines.

The Houthis also have made major changes to the education system. They reformed the school curricula by incorporating their religious and political ideologies into lessons on history, literature, and social studies, influencing the younger generation.

The group is motivated by a profound desire to protect and promote Zaydi Shia traditions, which they believe Yemen’s previous rulers have marginalized. For the Houthis, these traditions represent their religious and political heritage, which they claim has eroded since the fall of the Zaydi Imamate in 1962. In response to Wahhabi influence backed by Saudi Arabia, they view their movement as a defense of their identity, using Zaydi practices to assert leadership and to legitimize their resistance to marginalization. Their refusal to compromise on core ideological principles, especially on the absolute authority of their leader, Abdelmalek al-Houthi, has been a barrier to wider acceptance among the population. This uncompromising stance made it difficult to build bridges with other factions and hindered efforts toward sustainable governance.

A major trigger for the Houthis’ decision to seize the capital a decade ago was their opposition to a 2013 decentralization proposal being discussed by the Gulf Cooperation Council-backed National Dialogue Conference, a reform roadmap developed in the wake of Yemen’s 2011 popular uprising that ousted President Saleh. The Houthis perceived the adoption of a federal system as a direct threat by limiting their influence and access to vital resources. Determined to avoid being sidelined, the Houthis embarked on their campaign to expand their territorial control to Sanaa and beyond, disrupting what was supposed to be a transition from Saleh’s regime to a more inclusive government.

Government Coalition Dynamics

After Sanaa fell and President Hadi and his cabinet fled to Saudi Arabia, the exiled Yemeni government struggled to assert authority from abroad. Stripped of their stronghold in the capital, officials had to operate from the southern city of Aden as well as Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. The distance from Sanaa, where centralized authority had resided, further weakened Hadi’s ability to govern effectively and to provide essential services to a nation already teetering on the brink of collapse.

Internal divisions surfaced as government factions clashed over strategies, and rampant corruption eroded public trust. Meanwhile, the reconstituted national army, which was supposed to be a unified front against the Houthi insurgency, splintered into factions with divided loyalties. This fragmentation left the Yemeni government vulnerable to the relentless advances of the Houthis and other rival factions vying for power.

When the Saudi-led coalition intervened in the conflict, its mission was to strengthen the Yemeni government with military, financial, and logistical support. Yemeni officials initially welcomed the coalition hoping it would restore stability and repel the advancing Houthis. But the situation quickly deteriorated as extensive coalition airstrikes targeted Houthi-held areas, causing significant civilian casualties and severe infrastructure damage. As communities suffered, resentment grew, and the promise of peace faded. Ironically, the coalition’s actions inadvertently strengthened the Houthis by diminishing trust in their adversaries. In April 2022, the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) was announced from Riyadh, with the backing of Saudi Arabia and the UAE, established to unify anti-Houthi factions. However, internal coalition divisions seeped into the council itself, causing friction among its members, each influenced by their backers’ agendas, and fracturing the anti-Houthi front.

The Role of Regional Actors

The involvement of regional powers—Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Iran—deepened Yemen’s conflict. Determined to limit the Houthi-Iran threat, Saudi Arabia launched a campaign with hopes of a swift military victory. The conflict, however, dragged on far longer than Riyadh anticipated, eventually forcing Saudi Arabia to recalibrate its strategy. No longer solely focused on defeating the Houthis on the battlefield, Riyadh began to negotiate for a truce with them and to forge new alliances with other factions, help form new specialized forces, and back select PLC members to counterbalance the UAE’s growing influence.

The UAE, initially a key coalition player, pivoted to prioritize strategic interests in southern Yemen, a region rich in resources and dotted with strategic ports. Recognizing the economic and geopolitical value of these areas, the UAE extended its support to the Southern Transitional Council (STC), a group fervently seeking the secession of southern Yemen due to historical grievances and a desire to restore the independence of South Yemen, which existed before the unification in 1990. The STC, empowered by the UAE, swiftly gained control over significant territory and revenue sources, including key ports, such as in Aden and Mayoun, that served as lifelines for international trade and maritime routes. The STC’s rise was meteoric and it established a stronghold that directly challenged the PLC’s authority. The UAE also backed select PLC members.

Thus, supposed coalition partners Saudi Arabia and the UAE backed different factions within Yemen, each pursuing their own interests with little regard for the unified front they once presented. As they created a fragmented military landscape, clashes between their proxy forces became common. Since 2017, UAE-backed forces have been controlling key military positions on Yemen’s Socotra Island in the Arabian Sea, adjacent to Saudi-supported forces. STC-affiliated forces seized the presidential palace in Aden in 2019 and 2023. In 2021, divergent UAE-Saudi approaches contributed to tribal clashes and deepening security troubles in Shabwa governorate.

For their part, the Houthis found a close ally in Iran, which starting in 2014 boosted its military support to the group. Iran provided advanced weaponry, training, and strategic guidance, significantly enhancing the Houthis’ capabilities and resilience. Iran’s backing transformed the Houthis from a regional insurgent group into a formidable force capable of sustaining prolonged military pressure. Despite facing numerous setbacks on the battlefield, the Houthis’ strengthened arsenal and tactical prowess has allowed them to withstand assaults that might have broken a less-equipped group.

Collectively, these regional dynamics have helped shape the war, with each actor pursuing its own agenda—and prolonging conflict and the suffering of the Yemeni people.

The Human Toll

Indeed, the conflict has triggered one of the most devastating humanitarian crises in recent history, with all parties responsible for the collapse of vital services and for widespread human rights abuses. The destruction of infrastructure has crippled access to essential resources, leaving millions without healthcare, clean water, or education. Blockades and supply disruptions have exacerbated food shortages, pushing large segments of the population into acute food insecurity. All warring parties’ recruitment of child soldiers and the enduring violence have inflicted deep psychological trauma, with lasting consequences for Yemeni society. International relief efforts face access restrictions, security risks, and chronic underfunding, significantly hampering the delivery of aid. Warring factions’ manipulation of humanitarian assistance has further undermined the humanitarian response leaving the most vulnerable populations without the support they urgently need.

Policy Recommendations

A path to peace requires more than just ceasefires—it calls for a strategy that addresses both the political and humanitarian dimensions of the crisis. The international community must come together with a unified purpose, pressing Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Iran to end their support for rival factions. If there is to be any hope of stability, these powers must be urged to step back from their narrow interests. To move forward, the international community must push for a cohesive strategy that refocuses efforts on stabilizing Yemen as a whole, not fragmenting it further.

But unity on the international front is not enough: the Yemeni factions themselves must come to the table. The Houthis, the PLC, the STC, and others need to engage in an inclusive dialogue, one that does not merely shuffle power among leaders but addresses core grievances driving the war. Only by fostering consensus can a viable roadmap for Yemen’s future emerge—one that reflects the aspirations of all its people, not just those in power.

Webinar: How to Improve Access to Climate Information and Curb Misinformation in the MENA Region

I co-participated in a panel discussion organized by Earth Journalism Network, which launched its study on improving access to climate information in the MENA region. You may download the study here.