tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-78663302485673337832024-03-16T02:12:18.471+01:00Afrah Nasser's BlogAfrah Nasser's Bloghttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05429782314834231913noreply@blogger.comBlogger1173125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7866330248567333783.post-87098425180771924032024-02-28T09:00:00.001+01:002024-03-04T09:17:30.611+01:00Instead of Houthi Designation, the United States Should Embrace a Comprehensive Approach<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEiaGIF2TexpwA1c576fAvd8bQchsutM1zf4tfxkFqcbQpJLEDALSiG9dkuzHvMaXyZXDxgXQ6Vnr24_BCf_CR9ehKJdiJIN_Aoym7HjINTnqApUBMjvuYbHkSJLAjV4p9w2p3ajBEu3GR2dV9K7YcPHE0m4dANCIjyHFptSU4-PgXxC2WkKZh9ISxhMFDU" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img alt="" data-original-height="440" data-original-width="768" height="366" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEiaGIF2TexpwA1c576fAvd8bQchsutM1zf4tfxkFqcbQpJLEDALSiG9dkuzHvMaXyZXDxgXQ6Vnr24_BCf_CR9ehKJdiJIN_Aoym7HjINTnqApUBMjvuYbHkSJLAjV4p9w2p3ajBEu3GR2dV9K7YcPHE0m4dANCIjyHFptSU4-PgXxC2WkKZh9ISxhMFDU=w640-h366" width="640" /></a></div><br /><br /><a href="https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/instead-of-houthi-designation-the-united-states-should-embrace-a-comprehensive-approach/">Arab Center Washington DC</a> - On January 17, the United States <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2024/01/17/statement-from-national-security-advisor-jake-sullivan-on-the-terrorist-designation-of-the-houthis/#:~:text=Today%2C%20in%20response%20to%20these,a%20Specially%20Designated%20Global%20Terrorist.">designated</a> the Houthis in Yemen, also known as Ansar Allah, as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) in response to the armed group’s missile and drone attacks on American and international commercial vessels traveling off Yemen’s Red Sea coastline. The designation took effect on February 16. In a <a href="https://www.saba.ye/en/news3287207.htm">show of solidarity</a> with the Palestinian people, the Houthis vowed to retaliate against Israel until it ends its war on Gaza by <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/11/19/yemens-houthi-rebels-seize-cargo-ship-in-red-sea-israel-blames-iran">attacking and hijacking</a> ships that <a href="https://www.saba.ye/en/news3291741.htm">the group claims</a> are connected to Israel, although many of the targeted vessels have no Israeli ties and some are even carrying <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-02-21/houthis-fire-at-ship-carrying-humanitarian-aid-to-yemen-us-says">humanitarian aid</a> for Yemen. Along with the terrorist designation, since December the United States has led an international military operation entitled <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/us-red-sea-taskforce-gets-limited-backing-some-allies-2023-12-20/">Operation Prosperity Guardian</a> and has conducted airstrikes on Houthi military targets in Yemen. In February, the European Union followed suit and <a href="https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2024/02/19/eu-launches-mission-aspides-to-protect-red-sea-vessels-from-houthi-attacks">initiated a naval force operation</a>, named Aspides, to protect Red Sea commercial vessels from Houthi attacks.<br /><br />The United States asserts that <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2024/01/17/statement-from-national-security-advisor-jake-sullivan-on-the-terrorist-designation-of-the-houthis/#:~:text=Today%2C%20in%20response%20to%20these,a%20Specially%20Designated%20Global%20Terrorist.">the designation</a>’s main aim is to obstruct terrorist funding for the Houthis and to restrict their access to financial markets without harming the people of Yemen, as Washington has provided allowances in the designation for humanitarian organizations to deliver essential aid. Despite this assurance, however, the US move has raised concerns about negative repercussions on Yemen’s humanitarian and economic situation. “We fear there may be an effect on the economy, including commercial imports of essential items on which the people of Yemen depend on more than ever,” <a href="https://www.unocha.org/news/yemen-ocha-urges-security-council-choose-path-de-escalation-and-peace">warned</a> the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. <br /><br />The designation aims to exert pressure on the Houthis, but it appears incongruent with the group’s operational structure—they have very limited financial connections to the United States—and thus is unlikely to impede its activities. Indeed, the Houthis operate with localized and unconventional funding sources, do not rely on the global market, and remain isolated from their neighbors and the international community, except for Iran. Thus, the decision to label the Houthis as a terrorist group is unlikely to achieve its intended objectives—and may have a severe negative impact on the Yemeni population, especially by <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/un-fears-us-designation-houthis-could-harm-yemens-economy-2024-02-14/">restricting</a> the import of essential commercial items.<div><br /><h3 style="text-align: left;">Reasons Behind the Houthi Designation</h3><br />Concern about such ramifications were the main reason why the Biden administration, just weeks after taking office, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/1/18/what-the-designation-of-terrorist-means-for-yemens-houthis#:~:text=In%20February%202021%2C%20less%20than,more%20humanitarian%20aid%20for%20Yemen.">reversed</a> the Trump administration’s January 2021 designation of the Houthis as a “Foreign Terrorist Organization” (FTO) and as a SDGT. <a href="https://eg.usembassy.gov/y/">The Trump administration had stated that its move aimed</a> “to hold Ansar Allah accountable for its terrorist acts, including cross-border attacks threatening civilian populations, infrastructure, and commercial shipping.” The designation came during a period of close US ties with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), who had pushed Washington to designate the Houthis. After the Houthis escalated their attacks on <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/20190623-yemens-houthi-rebels-launch-deadly-strike-saudi-airport">Saudi Arabia</a> and <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-saudi-aramco-houthis-emirates/yemens-houthis-threaten-to-attack-united-arab-emirates-targets-idUSKBN1W3282/">the UAE</a>, Trump sought to please his Gulf allies. The Trump administration announced the designation following its “<a href="https://www.axios.com/trump-administration-iran-sanctions-january-3951f776-09c9-4e55-b0f5-4a9c80e9e974.html">maximum pressure” campaign</a> against Houthi-backer Iran that resulted in almost <a href="https://www.i24news.tv/en/news/international/americas/1606379799-us-special-iran-envoy-says-more-sanctions-coming">weekly</a> sanctions against the Islamic Republic.<br /><br />Significant developments followed Biden’s February 2021 delisting, including resumed diplomatic relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia in March 2023 and a notable reduction of hostilities between the Houthis and Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Most recently, the Houthis became involved in the war on Gaza as part of the Axis of Resistance, which also includes Lebanon’s Hezbollah and Iraq’s pro-Iran militias. While the Houthi group sees direct confrontation with the United States—and Israel—as a religious duty, the United States wants to punish it for attacking US military forces and international commercial vessels in the Red Sea. Since November, the Houthis have attacked at least <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/navy-counters-houthi-red-sea-attacks-in-its-first-major-battle-at-sea-of-21st-century-60-minutes-transcript/">45 ships</a>, leading to a surge of approximately <a href="https://economymiddleeast.com/news/shipping-costs-red-sea/">250 percent</a> in shipping costs and pushing <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/business/armstrong-houthi-shipping-supply-chains-1.7086745">70 percent of cargo ships</a> to avoid the area. <br /><br />The Biden administration <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2024/01/17/statement-from-national-security-advisor-jake-sullivan-on-the-terrorist-designation-of-the-houthis/">justifies</a> its designation as an effort “to impede terrorist funding to the Houthis, further restrict their access to financial markets, and hold them accountable for their actions.” But the move’s efficacy is questionable. The Houthis derive income not from international sources but from exploiting the Yemeni population by imposing unjust <a href="https://sanaacenter.org/publications/analysis/11628">taxes</a> on companies and individuals in the areas they control without providing public services and by seizing <a href="https://samrl.org/l?l=a/10/A/c/1/0/77/3734/SAM-Condemns-Houthi%E2%80%99s-Seizure-of-Opponents-Assets">private property</a>—including land, real estate, and funds—without compensation. Houthis also rely on <a href="https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/NEWS-ARTICLES/News-Article-View/Article/2087998/us-dhow-interdictions/">smuggled advanced weapons from Iran</a>. <a href="https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/military-balance/2024/01/houthi-anti-ship-missile-systems-getting-better-all-the-time/">Since 2015</a>, the Houthi forces have received Iranian-made anti-ship missiles and other advanced weaponry, significantly enhancing their maritime threat in the Red Sea.<br /><br />The Biden administration’s <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2024/01/17/statement-from-national-security-advisor-jake-sullivan-on-the-terrorist-designation-of-the-houthis/">assertion</a> that it will “immediately reevaluate” the terrorist designation if the Houthis cease their Red Sea shipping attacks suggests an acknowledgment that its approach may not be sustainable because it may not effectively address the complex challenges posed by the Houthis.<br /><br /></div><div><h3 style="text-align: left;">How the Designation Works</h3><br />The designation is typically carried out by the US Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) under various <a href="https://www.state.gov/executive-order-13224/">executive orders and laws</a>. When an individual or group is designated as an SDGT, it translates to a freeze on their assets within US jurisdiction, accompanied by a general prohibition on US citizens engaging in transactions with it. Beyond the financial ramifications, the designation serves as a public condemnation of those implicated in acts of terrorism and as a crucial component of a broader strategy aimed at disrupting networks involved in terrorist financing.<br /><br />The SDGT designation will have an impact on aid organizations, the private sector, and the peacebuilding process in areas under Houthi control. The designation could prevent numerous nonprofit groups, humanitarian aid organizations, private companies, and individuals located in Houthi-controlled regions who have dealings with the Houthi authorities from implementing their programs. In a February 5 <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/ngo-statement-humanitarian-impacts-potential-us-fto-designation-yemen">statement</a>, a coalition of international humanitarian organizations providing much-needed aid to Yemeni civilians expressed concern that major import suppliers and financial institutions will not be able to continue their work in Yemen, cautioning that the designation “will likely already contribute to the complex operating environment” in the country.<br /><br />In addition, the designation is expected to exacerbate the already significant challenges posed by the <a href="https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/yemens-war-economy-a-key-factor-in-the-ongoing-conflict/">interference of warring parties</a> in the distribution of humanitarian aid in Yemen. Furthermore, local media reports say that the money transfer company Western Union <a href="https://twitter.com/Alia_Yemen77/status/1760475373026918902">has suspended</a> its operation in Yemen as a result of the designation. Finally, the designation could create significant challenges for external mediators participating in peace negotiations with the Houthis. This is because the designation criminalizes the provision of <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/2339A">any property or service, including expert advice or assistance</a>, to designated organizations, thus hindering the ability of mediators to contribute effectively to the peace process.<br /><br />Despite the designation and the Operation Prosperity Guardian attacks, the Houthis are persisting in their activities undeterred. US officials, in outlining plans to curtail Houthi capabilities and secure the Red Sea, have asserted that US strikes have damaged or destroyed nearly <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2024/01/15/politics/latest-houthi-missile-attack-demonstrates-limited-scope-of-us-led-airstrikes-in-yemen/index.html">one-third</a> of the Houthis’ offensive capacities. Despite this, the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED) <a href="https://acleddata.com/2024/02/08/regional-overview-middle-east-january-2024/">reports</a> that the Houthis launched 21 attacks on international shipping last month.<br /><br />The Houthis are leveraging the western military operations against them to bolster their popularity among pro-Palestinian Arab publics. They seek to present themselves as the legitimate rulers of Yemen, despite their ascension to power in Sanaa through military means, plundering of Yemeni state institutions, and history of repression and human rights violations. In response to the designation, the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/houthis-order-us-british-nationals-leave-yemen-2024-01-24/">Houthis expelled all US and UK nationals</a> working for the United Nations and aid organizations in Yemen. Taking further advantage of the current situation, the Houthi-controlled parliament in Sanaa <a href="https://www.saba.ye/en/news3304981.htm">ratified a law</a> classifying countries, entities, and individuals deemed hostile to Yemen. This law is seen as part of the Houthis’ ongoing effort to seize properties and as a potential tool to suppress local dissent.<br /><br /><div><h3 style="text-align: left;">Shift in Approach Needed</h3><br />The decision to designate the Houthis is troubling due to its potential negative impact on the Yemeni population. The United States must reassess the designation’s efficacy in achieving its intended objectives. If the goal is to influence Houthi behavior or constrain the group’s operations, a more comprehensive and strategic approach is required.<br /><br />There is an urgent need for Washington to acknowledge the link between the Houthi attacks in the Red Sea and the war on Gaza. The US focus should shift toward multilateral engagement with regional and international partners, especially the Palestinians, to foster dialogue and to find diplomatic solutions to end the war on Gaza. There is a clear Arab and international interest in protecting Red Sea shipping lanes and in achieving a comprehensive resolution that starts with a ceasefire in Gaza. Additionally, to counter Houthis’ increasing military capabilities, the United States should support a politically and militarily unified Yemeni government and ensure a unified front against the group. The United States must address political fragmentation in Yemen to strengthen the Yemeni state and to empower it to counter Houthi influence both inside the country and in the Red Sea. </div></div><div><br /></div><div>__________________________________________________</div><div>*<a href="https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/instead-of-houthi-designation-the-united-states-should-embrace-a-comprehensive-approach/" target="_blank">This policy analysis paper </a>was written first for and published on the Arab Center Washington DC. </div>Afrah Nasser's Bloghttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05429782314834231913noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7866330248567333783.post-48818323094964617132024-01-19T08:03:00.008+01:002024-01-21T08:28:36.885+01:00The U.S. Is Repeating Its Own Mistakes in Yemen<div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: left;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjhKlwW5aG6mI13e07xB5VbArEkzyx2RbpBoZIAMJkN0pjeDENa0DdgKNkDEJndkiyV7cxzq6TVXPBhgzADHmC7iwgMD3Z8MEdudu8RrXl_qDW4x9Bt_SSqGkkhcd2i9SIvdDIDGhh1wBSl7tR5Zyjmq6LhAvahp3BZFK4Cu77TSrviRs0YGh1CY7SsOpo/s1424/Screenshot%202024-01-21%20at%2011.05.34.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="671" data-original-width="1424" height="302" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjhKlwW5aG6mI13e07xB5VbArEkzyx2RbpBoZIAMJkN0pjeDENa0DdgKNkDEJndkiyV7cxzq6TVXPBhgzADHmC7iwgMD3Z8MEdudu8RrXl_qDW4x9Bt_SSqGkkhcd2i9SIvdDIDGhh1wBSl7tR5Zyjmq6LhAvahp3BZFK4Cu77TSrviRs0YGh1CY7SsOpo/w640-h302/Screenshot%202024-01-21%20at%2011.05.34.png" width="640" /></a></div> <div><br /></div><div><br /></div><div><br /></div><div><br /></div><div>*The continuing rounds of U.S. airstrikes on Houthi targets in Yemen in response to their attacks on shipping in the Red Sea, and the <a href="https://www.state.gov/terrorist-designation-of-the-houthis/">re-listing</a> of the Houthis as a "specially designated global terrorist" group, are the latest in a long list of mistakes in U.S. strategy in Yemen. These miscalculations were both expected and unexpected. On the one hand, they were unexpected, given hopes that the United States—and the United Kingdom, which has taken part in some of the bombardment of Yemen—had learned crucial lessons from Yemen's protracted conflict, most of all that the Saudi-led coalition that intervened in Yemen in 2015, with backing from the U.S. and the U.K., struggled to overcome the Houthi insurgency. On the other hand, these errors were expected, given the lack of any shift in strategy on the part of the American and British governments.</div><br />The Biden administration's decision to re-designate the Houthis as a terrorist group and to launch airstrikes on Yemen is a sign of the persistent neglect of any strategic considerations of the complexities of Yemen's conflict. Yemeni experts and observers have been nearly unanimous in their <a href="https://dawnmena.org/biden-is-taking-the-houthi-bait-in-yemen/">skepticism</a> about the effectiveness of these airstrikes and the terrorism designation in deterring Houthi missile and drone attacks on ships in the Red Sea, which the militant group has portrayed as a campaign to defend Palestinians and force Israel to end its war in Gaza. Those doubts stem from a shared belief that the U.S., and with it the U.K., are repeating mistakes of the past in Yemen.<br /><br />Since 2015, the U.S. and the U.K. have made a series of strategy errors through their support for the Saudi- and Emirati-led war against the Houthis in Yemen. They inadvertently bolstered the Houthis' military capabilities and strength on the ground, contributing to the overall instability in Yemen today. The airstrikes against the Houthis this month are seemingly a continuation of these mistakes and are unlikely to achieve their stated goal of "deterring" the Houthis in the Red Sea.<br /><br />The Houthis control around half of Yemen today, thanks in part to missteps by the coalition fighting them since 2015, after they seized the capital, Sanaa. It all began when the U.S., the U.K., Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates together failed to prevent then-Yemeni President Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi, in 2016, from moving Yemen's Central Bank headquarters to Aden, where his government had fled—a move that directly facilitated the Houthi takeover of state institutions in Sanaa. The U.S. and the U.K., which were both supplying the joint Saudi-Emirati coalition with weapons and logistical support for their war, also didn't do more to stop the infighting among the Yemeni armed groups combating the Houthis on the ground, which were nominally part of that coalition. The Saudi-backed, armed wing of the Islah party, a Sunni Islamist movement, and the separatist Southern Transitional Council, backed by the Emiratis, were at war with each other more than they were fighting the Houthis.<br /><br />The U.S. and U.K. also never expressed public disapproval of the <a href="https://www.middleeasteye.net/opinion/expo-2020-dubai-yemen-pavilion-look">UAE's role in forming Yemeni militias</a> operating outside Yemen's internationally recognized government—which the coalition was trying to restore to power. Nor did they <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gEKcaZKpB7I&t=2069s">condemn</a> the coalition (but most of all Saudi Arabia) for inadequately funding the Yemeni army, which weakened the Yemeni government in their fight against the Houthis. And between 2016 and 2018, the U.S. and the U.K. stood by when Saudi airstrikes <a href="https://sanaacenter.org/publications/analysis/11729">targeted </a>Yemeni army units loyal to former President Ali Abdullah Saleh, to the benefit of the Houthis, whose units remained unharmed and were able to take control of the army's former bases.<br /><br />As Yemeni analyst <a href="https://sanaacenter.org/member/abdulghani-aliryani">Abdulghani al-Iryani</a> put it, this was the Saudis' "greatest gift" to the Houthis." In those years, "when frontlines were largely static, the coalition provided the Houthis the opportunity to complete their military takeover of northern Yemen and get rid of their erstwhile partner," Saleh. "Thus, Riyadh, which for close to a century had a strategic objective to degrade the Yemeni military threat, ended up facilitating the Houthis' assertion of military dominance in the north, a process that was largely completed by 2017," al-Iryani explained—just before the Houthis turned on Saleh and assassinated him.<br /><br />Similarly, the U.S. and the U.K. did not take any action when the UAE, which was supposedly supporting the Yemeni army against the Houthis, killed at least <a href="https://www.theglobeandmail.com/world/article-air-strikes-hit-yemeni-government-forces-near-aden-at-least-30-troops/">30 Yemeni soldiers</a> in airstrikes during infighting in Aden between the army and the Southern Transitional Council's UAE-backed militia. Washington and London both ignored the <a href="https://www.un.org/press/en/2019/sc13920.doc.htm">Yemeni government's condemnations</a> of the UAE for supporting the southern separatists and helping to further fragment Yemen, to the extent that Hadi reportedly described the Emirates as an <a href="https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/exclusive-yemen-president-says-uae-acting-occupiers">occupier</a> rather than a liberator.<br /><br />Meanwhile, the U.S. and the U.K. failed to address the <a href="https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/yemens-war-economy-a-key-factor-in-the-ongoing-conflict/">Houthis' diversion of international humanitarian aid</a> for their own purposes, despite many warnings. Washington and London seemingly ignored reports from the <a href="https://apnews.com/article/7f96cc808d3f45be920ee706c7bde300">United Nations</a> and <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2020/09/14/deadly-consequences/obstruction-aid-yemen-during-covid-19">human rights groups</a> that the Houthis were <a href="https://sanaacenter.org/files/TYR_February_2020_en.pdf">obstructing and seizing</a> aid supplies and money in the areas under their control for their war effort. Houthi forces used the diverted aid, including food, to recruit soldiers from impoverished communities in Yemen, exploiting their desperation, or sold the aid for profit on the black market. <br /><br />In designating the Houthis as a terrorist group, Biden, who promised to "end the war in Yemen," is following Donald Trump. The widely criticized listing of the Houthis as a "foreign terrorist organization" in Trump's last days in office—a more severe designation than "specially designated global terrorist" group—had prevented much-needed humanitarian aid from getting into Yemen. As a presidential candidate, Biden criticized the terrorism listing, and he revoked it in his first weeks as president. With Biden's reversal, the U.S. has once again failed to understand the Houthi propaganda machine.<br /><br />The Houthis are leveraging perceived U.S. injustice against the Yemeni people to garner sympathy in both domestic and international public opinion. Considering the severe impact that the terrorism designation has on humanitarian efforts in Yemen, the more dire the humanitarian situation becomes, the more evidence the Houthis have to present the U.S. as an enemy of the Yemeni people and the root cause of their suffering. Such a situation makes it easier for the Houthis to attract and recruit fighters, further strengthening their military capabilities and hold on much of Yemen.<br /><br />All these errors have led to the fragmentation of the Yemeni state, politically and militarily, helping the Houthis consolidate their power. And they are being repeated, despite <a href="https://apnews.com/article/biden-houthis-yemen-shipping-attacks-fc5c1ed40f4e370bed81670bfdda0899">Biden himself admitting</a> that airstrikes won't deter the Houthis, even though that was his initial justification for them. "When you say working, are they stopping the Houthis? No," Biden said in an exchange with reporters at the White House about the military strikes. "Are they going to continue? Yes."<br /><br />There has been a profound inability in Washington to understand and learn from policy failures in Yemen. A more informed and nuanced approach that empowers Yemeni partners against the Houthis, especially through diplomatic pressure, is more urgent than ever to address the complexities of Yemen, rather than falling into another cycle of ineffective bombings and airstrikes.</div><div><br /></div><div>_____________________________________________________</div><div>*This article was first written for and published in DAWN's website <a href="https://dawnmena.org/the-u-s-is-repeating-its-own-mistakes-in-yemen/" target="_blank">here</a>. </div>Afrah Nasser's Bloghttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05429782314834231913noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7866330248567333783.post-78212239480555800452023-12-21T09:44:00.005+01:002023-12-24T09:58:32.598+01:00COP28: Achievements Fall Short of the Goal<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEgrQAh5YPkeWF9ckq0ntYNUlskCijMvL7q48gbFISGhF1j0T73EREO3gn5uPbpGW2VScTh4Q8LwGBi6PXSsSksop5JvQIg23zcuBJg93Cix2005CfrMxmBc9kZh0d9Xx1Sj7dgNGw7c5ukHxtK1x1JIOvp0NPXzhjknZcElFafShHh1hcqPue1IxxMVRXQ" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img alt="" data-original-height="462" data-original-width="768" height="386" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEgrQAh5YPkeWF9ckq0ntYNUlskCijMvL7q48gbFISGhF1j0T73EREO3gn5uPbpGW2VScTh4Q8LwGBi6PXSsSksop5JvQIg23zcuBJg93Cix2005CfrMxmBc9kZh0d9Xx1Sj7dgNGw7c5ukHxtK1x1JIOvp0NPXzhjknZcElFafShHh1hcqPue1IxxMVRXQ=w640-h386" width="640" /></a></div><br /><br /><div> <a href="https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/cop28-achievements-fall-short-of-the-goal/" target="_blank">Arab Center Washington DC</a> - The recently concluded United Nations Climate Change Conference in Dubai, otherwise known as COP28, marked a significant moment in global efforts to address climate change. Over the course of negotiations from November 30 to December 13, representatives from 198 countries grappled with crucial decisions that will shape the world’s response to the climate crisis. Key accomplishments included an agreement to transition away from fossil fuels, the creation of a fund to help vulnerable countries pay for climate-related damage, and the publication of a landmark assessment of the world’s progress in mitigating climate change. While these achievements are all steps in the right direction, COP28 still fell short due to shortcomings and loopholes in the agreements.<br /><br />The overall sentiment at COP28 was clear: while the international community postpones taking action to address climate change, the window of opportunity may be closing. “We are living through climate <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/11/1144147">collapse</a> in real-time,” said António Guterres, the UN Secretary-General at the summit’s opening, underscoring the urgency of the situation. Without aggressive actions, global warming is on track to reach <a href="https://www.reuters.com/sustainability/climate-energy/climate-track-warm-by-nearly-3c-without-greater-ambition-un-report-2023-11-20/">nearly 3 degrees Celsius</a> (°C) this century—twice the desired 1.5°C. Scientists anticipate that at this warming rate, the world could pass several catastrophic points of no return, from extreme weather events to rising sea levels to loss of biodiversity.<br /><br /></div><div><h3 style="text-align: left;">COP28’s Major Decisions</h3><br />Most important at COP28 was participant countries’ <a href="https://www.reuters.com/business/environment/countries-push-cop28-deal-fossil-fuels-talks-spill-into-overtime-2023-12-12/">commitment to</a> “transitioning away from fossil fuels in energy systems, in a just, orderly and equitable manner…so as to achieve net zero by 2050 in keeping with the science.” The announcement was a milestone: it is <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2023/dec/13/cop28-landmark-deal-agreed-to-transition-away-from-fossil-fuels">the first time</a> that the world has pledged to move away from fossil fuels, the <a heat.="" href="https://www.un.org/en/climatechange/science/causes-effects-climate-change#:~:text=Fossil%20fuels%20%E2%80%93%20coal%2C%20oil%20and,they%20trap%20the%20sun" s="">largest contributor</a> to climate change. <a href="https://www.un.org/en/climatechange/cop26">COP26</a>, held in 2026 in Glasgow, pledged only to “phase down” fossil fuel and coal and to “phase out” inefficient fossil fuel subsidies. The concept of phaseout refers to the complete discontinuation or removal of fossil fuel usage, while phasedown suggests a reduction in or restriction on usage without eliminating them. COP28’s agreement to shift away from fossil fuels represents a compromise between more than 100 countries that advocated for a phaseout and the members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Companies (OPEC), led by Saudi Arabia, which argued that emissions can be reduced without abandoning specific fuels.<br /><br />The proposed transition away from fossil fuels does not legally obligate parties to comply or specify mechanisms of enforcement, which is unfortunate because countries are <a href="https://healthpolicy-watch.news/governments-plan-massive-expansion-of-fossil-fuel-production-despite-climate-crisis/#:~:text=The%20United%20States%2C%20Canada%2C%20Australia,and%20gas%20extraction%20by%202050.">expanding their fossil fuel production</a>. In an effort to reduce reliance on fossil fuels globally, more than 100 governments pledged at COP28 to <a href="https://www.reuters.com/sustainability/climate-energy/over-110-countries-set-join-cop28-deal-triple-renewable-energy-2023-12-02/">triple the world’s renewable energy</a> capacity by 2030. As <a href="https://www.iea.org/news/iea-assessment-of-the-evolving-pledges-at-cop28">the International Energy Agency</a> warned on December 10, however, such a move is not sufficient on its own to limit global warming to 1.5°C.<br /><br />Delegates at COP28 also achieved a historic breakthrough by formally establishing a <a href="https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2023/12/cop28-loss-and-damage-fund-climate-change/">Loss and Damage Fund</a>, which will provide financing for vulnerable countries hit hard by climate disasters. Climate change-induced loss and damage has severe, and sometimes irreversible, consequences for both nature and human beings. Developing countries, particularly those in the Southern Hemisphere, are the most vulnerable. For <a href="https://www.bic-rhr.com/research/decoding-achievements-and-failures-cop27-way-forward-more-effective-global-climate-policy#:~:text=At%20COP27%2C%20achievements%20on%20the,for%202022%20did%20not%20succeed.">instance</a>, the 2022 floods in Pakistan resulted in more than $30 billion in economic losses, affecting millions of people and causing significant infrastructure damage and highlighting the urgent need for robust funding mechanisms. The new fund will be <a href="https://www.reuters.com/sustainability/sustainable-finance-reporting/world-bank-poised-host-climate-loss-damage-fund-despite-concerns-2023-11-04/">hosted</a> by the World Bank for a four-year period. So far, some $700 million has been pledged, including $100 million each from the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Germany, $75 million from the United Kingdom, $17.5 million from the United States, and $10 million from Japan. But the fund <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2023/dec/06/700m-pledged-to-loss-and-damage-fund-cop28-covers-less-than-02-percent-needed">remains critically underfunded</a>, as the economic cost of loss and damage in developing countries <a href="https://us.boell.org/en/unpacking-finance-loss-and-damage">is estimated</a> to reach $400 billion annually by 2023 and nearly $1.8 trillion by 2050. Although the Loss and Damage Fund is intended for poor nations most severely affected by climate change, more developed countries like China or India may be able to utilize it as well. This raises concerns about the equitable distribution of resources and increases the prospect of clashes between developing and developed nations over climate finance.<br /><br />Finally, COP28 published the first-ever <a href="https://www.zawya.com/en/special-coverage/cop28-talking-climate-in-uae/global-stocktake-draft-text-accepted-at-cop28-uae-l6aapz1x">Global Stocktake</a> in the history of climate negotiations, representing a crucial step forward in assessing and monitoring global efforts to address climate change. The Stocktake reports on global progress in emissions reduction, adaptation to climate impacts, and provision of support and on the overall progress of countries and stakeholders toward the objectives of the 2015 Paris Climate Change Agreement. The December 2023 Global Stocktake revealed that current actions are insufficient for maintaining a 1.5°C pathway. The text urged nations to triple renewable energy capacity and to double the global average annual rate of energy efficiency improvements by 2030, while advocating for the phasedown of unabated coal power and for a just transition away from fossil fuels.<br /><br /></div><div><h3 style="text-align: left;">Rich Versus Poor Sacrifices</h3><div><br /></div>The ongoing discussions surrounding climate change extend beyond mere dialogue—developed and developing countries have long-standing disagreements over financial accountability for climate change and environmental responsibility. Although developed countries are more responsible for causing climate damage, they have not made the necessary sacrifices to protect the climate, particularly in two crucial aspects. <br /><br />First, developed countries are falling behind in fulfilling their commitment to fund climate finance. While there has been <a href="https://www.cleanenergywire.org/factsheets/qa-cop28-and-100-billion-us-dollar-climate-finance-commitment#two">a collective pledge </a>among wealthy nations to contribute $100 billion annually, there exists no official assessment of each country’s share in achieving this goal. Rich nations should provide substantial financial support to aid developing countries in transitioning from fossil fuels to renewable energy and in enhancing energy efficiency.<br /><br />Second, developed nations are lagging in implementing environmental actions such as reducing carbon emissions, transitioning to renewable energy sources, and phasing out fossil fuels. Some of these countries rationalize their inaction by arguing that the burden of addressing climate change is unfairly placed upon them, especially when they perceive insufficient proportional efforts from developing nations. For example, developed countries <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/8e588867-1938-40df-beef-f6a6a13a0d90">are insisting</a> that countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) be among the rich nations required to fund climate finance, although the GCC countries historically have not contributed to climate change as significantly as bigger countries have.<br /><br /><a href="https://apnews.com/article/cop28-united-nations-climate-change-dubai-aljaber-543225dd77913eee8ca69bc53ea3da76">Developing countries</a> are also expected to contribute to global efforts to address climate change, such as by mitigating their greenhouse gas emissions, by implementing adaptation measures, and by providing transparent and accurate information about their emissions. But numerous challenges hinder their progress, with finance standing out as a barrier. Developing countries often rely on loans and other financial assistance from developed nations and international financial institutions to fund their climate initiatives. As a June 2023 International Institute for Environment and Development <a href="https://www.iied.org/poorest-countries-spending-billions-more-servicing-debts-they-receive-tackle-climate-change">report</a> put it, “The world’s most climate-vulnerable countries are being forced to spend billions more paying off their debts than they are receiving in help to beat climate change.” These loans can contribute to a cycle of debt, especially if the terms are not favorable or the borrowed funds are not effectively utilized.<br /><br />This financial imbalance has led to growing frustration among developing nations. Developing countries <a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/11/02/1210065704/climate-change-finance-adaptation-gap-developing-countries">are angry</a> that they have contributed least to greenhouse gas emissions heating the planet, yet they are suffering the most—and are the least equipped to cope with the death and destruction wrought by climate disasters. In recent years, developing countries’ demands of equity and social justice have been sidelined, creating a sense of being taken for granted or regarded as mere supplicants of foreign aid and humanitarian assistance.<br /><br /></div><div><h3 style="text-align: left;">Controversies at COP28</h3><div><br /></div>The controversy surrounding Dubai’s hosting of COP28 stems from the UAE’s status as one of the world’s largest oil-producing countries. Throughout the gathering the summit’s Emirati president Sultan al-Jaber <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2023/12/10/politics/cnntv-al-gore-cop28-uae-climate-trump/index.html">took the heat</a>. The Guardian exposed al-Jaber’s misleading November 21 comment defending the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2023/dec/03/back-into-caves-cop28-president-dismisses-phase-out-of-fossil-fuels">continued use of fossil fuels</a>. During a live online event, al-Jaber stated that “there is no science indicating that a phase-out of fossil fuels is needed to restrict global heating to 1.5°C.” This stance can be attributed to al-Jaber’s role as the president of UAE’s national oil company, ADNOC, which is one of the world’s largest energy companies. Defending fossil fuels is hardly a new phenomenon, however. <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-02-08/biden-s-acknowledges-in-state-of-the-union-speech-that-oil-demand-to-endure#:~:text=President%20Joe%20Biden%20went%20off,and%20gas%20for%20a%20while.%E2%80%9D">US President Joe Biden recently </a>acknowledged that the United States—one of the world’s leading climate polluters—will continue to need oil and natural gas over the next decade.<br /><br />What distinguished COP28 was the unprecedented number of <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2023/dec/05/record-number-of-fossil-fuel-lobbyists-get-access-to-cop28-climate-talks">fossil fuel lobbyists</a> in attendance. This surge conveyed a powerful message: that the economic interests of major countries are still predominantly controlled by the need for fossil fuels. While it is crucial to involve oil-producing nations and companies in climate summits to address the root cause of global warming, such gatherings also offer them the opportunity to mobilize and to collectively resist a fossil fuel phaseout. Indeed, media reports indicate that Saudi Arabia and OPEC <a href="https://www.reuters.com/business/environment/opec-members-push-against-including-fossil-fuels-phase-out-cop28-deal-2023-12-09/">exerted pressure</a> on the UAE to shift its focus away from advocating for a fossil fuel phaseout.<br /></div><div><br /></div><div><h3 style="text-align: left;">Climate Inaction: A Global Challenge</h3><div><br /></div>Despite knowing the necessary steps to save the planet, governments lack the political will to take decisive action. The <a href="https://www.un.org/en/climatechange/net-zero-coalition#:~:text=to%202010%20levels.-,To%20keep%20global%20warming%20to%20no%20more%20than%201.5%C2%B0,reach%20net%20zero%20by%202050.">United Nations</a> emphasizes the urgent need to reduce emissions by 45 percent by 2030 and to achieve net-zero by 2050 to limit global warming to 1.5°C, as outlined in the 2015 Paris Agreement. But most global policies and alternative energy initiatives are falling <a href="https://www.npr.org/2022/10/27/1131687504/heres-how-far-behind-the-world-is-on-reining-in-climate-change">behind these targets</a>.<br /><br />A critical concern is whether or not major economies will end their <a href="https://www.thepolicypractice.com/why-governments-drag-their-feet-climate-action-and-what-do-about-it-new-blog-tpp-director-neil">climate foot-dragging</a> and meet their climate commitments. The United States, India, China, Germany, the United Kingdom, South Korea, Saudi Arabia, Russia, Canada, Brazil, and Australia, among others, are <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2023/dec/07/visualised-how-all-of-g20-is-missing-climate-goals-but-some-nations-are-closer-than-others#:~:text=China%2C%20Brazil%2C%20Australia%2C%20the,factoring%20in%20their%20historical%20emissions.">out of reach</a> of their climate targets. <br /><br />Challenges also exist in fully replacing traditional energy sources with solar and wind power. Initial investments in renewable energy infrastructure have proven costly, and long-term success requires finding solutions to technical complications. During the slow transition to clean energy there is still a huge reliance on fossil fuels. <a href="https://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/press_room/3467.htm">OPEC, OPEC+</a> governments, China, India, the United States, and the European Union continue to urgently need fossil fuels to finance their economies during the transition.<br /><br />It is doubtful that countries will be able to reach climate goals with quick solutions. Instead of merely setting pledges, the international community should implement a reward and punishment mechanism in which countries that exceed pollution quotas are penalized and fines are used to fund climate finance. In other words, such a mechanism would punish countries that pollute the planet more and reward those that demonstrate more effort to protect the planet. But the challenge lies in finding an entity with the power to enforce such measures. For example, it is impossible to imagine that the United Nations Security Council could do the job, given its ineffectiveness in addressing conflicts in Ukraine, Syria, Sudan and Gaza, among other crises.<br /><br />The global public must persist in exerting pressure on world leaders and vocalizing the jeopardy in which climate change places humanity’s future. The effectiveness of public pressure is evident in the progress made during climate summits in addressing fossil fuels and discussing their problems. Until a couple of years ago, fossil fuels were virtually taboo at these significant global gatherings. Notably, it was at COP26 that leaders officially acknowledged fossil fuel and coal as a problem for the first time. That a COP summit, after 26 annual UN climate meetings, finally recognized the problem of fossil fuel in its final agreement shows how important words are to the countries negotiating at these summits.<br /><br />Scientists play a crucial role in maintaining momentum by continuously expressing their concerns. Their persistence is essential to prompt governments to devise practical procedures for meeting their commitments. Our planet, unable to articulate its distress, is already emitting warning signals, akin to pulling a rubber band. The question that looms is for how long we can stretch it before it inevitably snaps.<br /><br />__________________________________________________________________<br />*<a href="https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/cop28-achievements-fall-short-of-the-goal/" target="_blank">This policy analysis paper</a> was written for and published first on the Arab Center Washington DC website.</div>Afrah Nasser's Bloghttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05429782314834231913noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7866330248567333783.post-83930754598909619652023-09-20T10:42:00.007+02:002023-09-26T11:32:00.521+02:00Yemen’s War Economy: A Key Factor in the Ongoing Conflict<div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiMY1FHER6Y_n8v9Z7W3LUuCOWaj2Dp-lfTvy__jnHgIOD99bDpoBxGD9h5ysWRY685CGKZCamzPIAFx2tgZ5fB_Uy95ydbI9N3oFzWtnqveX355HuW841Fg5CAEzkUb95w01h44PxZWHjddKOgVYjTWoFjoUIFRxG_IrxqXUyBbXtEySZo5uWGG4XiT2w/s768/Yemen-Afrah%20Nasser's%20Blog.jpeg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="432" data-original-width="768" height="360" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiMY1FHER6Y_n8v9Z7W3LUuCOWaj2Dp-lfTvy__jnHgIOD99bDpoBxGD9h5ysWRY685CGKZCamzPIAFx2tgZ5fB_Uy95ydbI9N3oFzWtnqveX355HuW841Fg5CAEzkUb95w01h44PxZWHjddKOgVYjTWoFjoUIFRxG_IrxqXUyBbXtEySZo5uWGG4XiT2w/w640-h360/Yemen-Afrah%20Nasser's%20Blog.jpeg" width="640" /></a></div><br /><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><br /></div></div></div><a href="https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/yemens-war-economy-a-key-factor-in-the-ongoing-conflict/" target="_blank">Arab Center Washington DC</a> - As Houthi negotiators <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/houthi-negotiators-leave-riyadh-after-talks-with-saudi-officials-sources-2023-09-19/">leave Saudi Arabia</a> after five days of talks with Saudi officials regarding the contours of a compromise solution to Yemen’s ongoing conflict, the country remains in the grip of certain war outcomes, specifically that of a war economy. Although the current conflict famously began with the 2015 Saudi and UAE military intervention against the Houthi armed group, it is in large part the pivotal juncture of many others: the 1994 <a href="https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20220504-remembering-the-1994-yemeni-civil-war/">Yemeni Civil War</a>, the <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/who-are-yemens-houthis">2004 Houthi insurgency</a>, the turbulent events of <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2023/2/15/12-years-after-yemens-uprising-peoples-dreams-are-shattered">Yemen’s 2011 uprising</a>, and the Houthi group’s <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/yemen/yemen-s-houthi-takeover">takeover</a> of Yemen’s capital, Sanaa, in 2014. Deep economic grievances primarily caused these conflicts, just as economic crises stemming from the current war are producing ever-growing poverty, suffering, and despair.<br /><br />For example, discriminatory resource allocation, unemployment, and land rights violations were among the <a href="https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/the-thorny-relationship-between-yemens-government-and-the-southern-transitional-council/">grievances</a> that fueled the South’s role in the 1994 Civil War. Regarding the Houthi insurgency, historical grievances also played a significant role. The group’s members <a href="https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/1968-siege-sana-houthi-historical-parallel">claim</a> to belong to the sayyed class, which enjoyed ruling authority in North Yemen during the Mutawakkilite Kingdom of Yemen (1918–1962, with some vestiges of control until 1970). Following the initial defeat of the kingdom in 1962 by the revolutionary republicans at the start of the North Yemen Civil War, the group was discontented over its loss of power, and aimed to restore what was taken from it. Decades later, additional discontent due to the <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/files/war_in_saada.pdf">marginalization and impoverishment</a> of the group’s home governorate of Saada in the North directly led to the Houthi insurgency in 2004. Yemen’s 2011 uprising was also driven primarily by economic grievances, such as <a href="https://news.gallup.com/poll/147980/yemenis-widespread-corruption-government.aspx">corruption</a> and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/jan/27/yemen-protests-president-saleh">rising poverty</a>. Then, in 2014, the Houthi group <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-protests/tens-of-thousands-of-yemeni-houthis-protest-against-fuel-reform-government-idUSKBN0GI1O420140818">protested the government’s fuel reforms</a>, after which it <a href="https://mepc.org/commentary/houthi-coup-leaves-yemen-brink">carried out a coup</a> against the Yemeni government, which prompted the Saudi-led coalition’s engagement in the conflict in 2015.<br /><br />Decades of unaddressed economic grievances and conflicts have provided fertile ground for the emergence of a dynamic war economy in Yemen, characterized by complex networks of actors all competing for economic power and control. Yemen’s <a href="https://jied.lse.ac.uk/articles/10.31389/jied.71">war economy</a> is mainly about resource allocation, organization, and mobilization with the key purpose of sustaining the fighting. Hence, war profiteering and exploitation of the various dimensions of the war in Yemen have prolonged the conflict and impeded the achievement of a durable peace and lasting stability. Additionally, the far-reaching impact of the war economy has been changing the country’s landscape and socioeconomic structure in complex ways. <br /><br /><div><h3 style="text-align: left;">The War Economy’s Manifestations</h3><br />The current conflict has been altering numerous aspects of the country’s economic system and activities, and has resulted in the creation of two essentially parallel economies, one in the North and one in the South. Some of the most significant manifestations of Yemen’s war economy include double tariffs and double customs duties, two different currency exchange rates, disputed oil revenues, aid divergence, and an extraction economy, all of which place immense pressure on the Yemeni people.<br /><br />Disagreement between the belligerent parties, the Houthi armed group in the North and the internationally-recognized government of Yemen (IRGY) in the South, over taxation and customs duties has led to a divided tax system in the country, with each side enforcing its own system of tariffs and customs duties. The IRGY charges customs when any goods arrive in ports under its control. Then, when traders navigate inland crossings to deliver those goods to areas under Houthi control, they are charged additional customs as the Houthis claim to be the legitimate governmental authority in the North. In fact, in August the Houthis <a href="https://www.arabnews.pk/node/2356266/middle-east">increased charges</a> on traders when they import items to Houthi-controlled areas from IRGY-controlled ports, areas, or land crossings by a 100 percent levy. These double tariffs deplete traders’ economic power and exponentially increase the price of goods. The Houthis’ move is intended to boost the group’s economic power, and it is already raking in the profits, having collected <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/final-report-panel-experts-yemen-s202179-enar">at least $1.8 billion in taxes and state revenues</a> in 2019 alone. <br /><br />The two economies have also produced two considerably different <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/8/22/yemen-currency-clash-deepens-crisis-in-war-torn-country">currency values</a> in the North and South, in large part because the Houthis and the IRGY have both been printing bank notes, albeit in different volumes. As of February 2023, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/2/22/saudi-arabia-puts-1-billion-in-yemens-aden-based-central-bank">the going rate</a> was 600 rials to the US dollar in Houthi-controlled areas and 1,225 rials to the dollar in IRGY-controlled areas—more than double the value. The conflict and the North-South division have also impacted oil exports, leading to a standoff over oil revenue allocation between the Houthis and the IRGY. The Yemeni economy relies heavily on <a href="https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/1011pp_yemeneconomy.pdf">the production and export of crude oil</a>, which generate the lion’s share of state revenues. Revenues from crude oil exports <a href="https://www.agenzianova.com/en/news/yemen-entrate-petrolifere-raggiungono-14-miliardi-di-dollari-nel-2021/">increased in 2021</a>, reaching $1.418 billion, compared to $710.5 million the previous year, primarily due to a rise in oil prices in global markets.<br /><br />Under the pretext of <a href="https://www.thenationalnews.com/gulf-news/2023/01/02/hopes-for-yemen-peace-talks-amid-civil-servant-wages-spat/">paying civil sector and military salaries</a>, the Houthis are <a href="https://www.spglobal.com/commodityinsights/en/market-insights/latest-news/oil/062823-feature-yemens-oil-and-gas-sector-faces-precarious-future-as-peace-talks-intensify">demanding a large share</a> of oil revenues. The IRGY has refused to share those revenues, and in order to halt them the Houthis in 2022 attacked three <a href="https://www.arabnews.com/node/2196786/middle-east">oil loading terminals</a> located in IRGY areas, at the al-Mukalla port on October 25, at a Shabwa Governorate port on November 9, and at the port of <a href="https://apnews.com/article/middle-east-business-yemen-sanaa-houthis-c115994692a5c2db28f14d74895e00c3">al-Dabah</a> on November 21. These attacks were intended to <a href="https://sanaacenter.org/the-yemen-review/october-2022/19013">weaken the IRGY’s finances</a>. Additionally, the Houthis in June 2023 <a href="https://sanaacenter.org/the-yemen-review/may-2023/20390">banned domestically produced gas cylinders</a> coming from the IRGY-controlled city of Marib in order to undermine its revenue streams. The clear message in all the Houthis’ moves is that in the absence of the group enjoying its share of Yemen’s state revenues, no one will enjoy them. Obtaining oil revenues is one of the Houthis’ central economic objectives, and the group has repeatedly tried without success to capture Yemen’s oil-rich Marib Governorate.<br /><br />International humanitarian aid has become a means for economic benefit for the warring parties. Reports by various international organizations, including the United Nations, humanitarian agencies, and human rights organizations have revealed a pattern of interference in humanitarian aid distribution in Yemen. Humanitarian aid divergence, restrictions, and obstruction are some of the economic strategies that the warring parties have used to strengthen their influence. The IRGY and the secessionist <a href="https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/the-thorny-relationship-between-yemens-government-and-the-southern-transitional-council/">Southern Transitional Council</a> have interfered with and <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/final-report-panel-experts-yemen-s202179-enar">obstructed humanitarian assistance</a> in Yemen’s Aden Governorate. In 2020, the IRGY reportedly engaged in money laundering and corruption practices, which had negative consequences on people’s ability to access adequate food supplies. Additionally, the government devised a scheme to divert funds from Saudi deposits, resulting in an illegal transfer of $423 million in public funds to traders. The Houthis have also been implicated in the exploitation of humanitarian aid, and the World Food Program has acknowledged the group’s <a href="https://apnews.com/article/7f96cc808d3f45be920ee706c7bde300">aid divergence</a> in the areas under its control. This diverted aid then <a href="https://sanaacenter.org/files/TYR_February_2020_en.pdf">makes its way into the Houthis’ own war effort</a>.<br /><br />Simultaneously, ordinary citizens’ financial resources have also gone toward filling the warring parties’ pockets. The high tariffs and the <a href="https://www.oxfam.org/en/press-releases/unprecedented-spike-food-prices-puts-yemenis-risk-extreme-hunger">skyrocketing prices of essential commodities</a> are part of an “extraction economy” perpetrated by the warring factions on the population at large. As <a href="https://www.mei.edu/publications/dilemma-public-sector-salary-payments-yemen">thousands of civil workers</a> have had difficulties receiving their salaries for years, they have been living off of their hard-earned savings, which in many cases have likely been thoroughly depleted. It is almost certain that the majority of people in Yemen have spent all their savings, considering that Yemen is <a href="https://bonyan.ngo/yemen/poverty-in-yemen/">one of the world’s poorest countries</a>. Their money was taken by greedy warlords who wield both arms and power. The systematic extraction and depletion of people’s wealth, or rather the transfer of wealth from the citizenry to the political and military elite is one of the key manifestations of the war economy, and has led to a widening gap between the rich and the poor.<br /><br /></div><div><h3 style="text-align: left;">The Impact on Yemen’s Future</h3><br />The war economy in Yemen holds two potential effects on the country’s future: structural transformations and the perpetuation of conflict. Players and networks that emerged and gained influence under the conflict have created new economic dynamics, leading to structural changes in the fundamental mechanisms of the country’s economic functions. An evident demonstration is the diverging economic systems between Yemen’s northern and southern regions. The structural changes have also profoundly changed capitalist elite formation in the country. For instance, prior to the conflict, former Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh and his entourage sat at the top of the capitalist hierarchy in Yemen. Today, people from diverse factions—including the Houthi armed group, the IRGY, and the Southern Transitional Council—who dominate and control key economic domains such as the oil and fuel trade have become major players in the economy, and are rapidly becoming Yemen’s new capitalist elite.<br /><br />The other significant effect of the war economy on Yemen’s future is the protraction of the conflict. The economic gains the warring parties continue to make during the war provide little impetus for ending the conflict, as demonstrated by the fact that a truce that expired in October 2022 has yet to be renewed. In this disheartening scenario, the outlook for Yemen’s future is darkened by persistent conflict.<br /><br /></div><div><h3 style="text-align: left;">Tomorrow’s Destiny</h3><br />Decades of unresolved economic grievances and discontent compounded by a series of conflicts have formed the perfect environment for the emergence of a robust war economy. Double tariffs and customs duties, differing currency values, shrinking oil revenues, the exploitation and diversion of international humanitarian aid, and the extraction of the population’s wealth are some of the most significant economic activities emerging under the ongoing conflict. The warring parties have made economic gains through opportunism during wartime, making them unwilling and less likely to seek a peaceful resolution to the conflict. Meanwhile, the war economy has been transforming the country’s socioeconomic structure. Consequently, Yemen’s future looks bleak, and is likely to be characterized by protracted conflict, deepening poverty, and economic devastation. <br /><br />Yemen’s war economy represents a critical factor sustaining the conflict, and addressing the war economy is thus essential to ending it. Given that the continuation of the war economy is in the interest of the warring parties, an external party must intervene. Here, the international community’s role is profoundly vital. It must take a multifaceted approach to Yemen’s economy, putting pressure on the warring parties to reach an agreement that addresses Yemen’s economic woes on two levels: historical economic grievances and contemporary economic challenges. Although the latter is an extension of the former, there must be a nationwide discourse to address these issues in order to pave a path toward national economic reconciliation. The outcomes of such deliberations could lay the groundwork for a more stable and prosperous Yemen in the long run. Although it must be said that any nationwide discourse should avoid the <a href="https://www.yemenpolicy.org/yemens-incomplete-national-dialogue/">shortcomings and pitfalls</a> of the previous National Dialogue Conference (2013–2014).<br /><br />Regarding the country’s pressing contemporary economic challenges, the international community should press the warring parties to implement tangible measures to address the war economy’s many manifestations by unifying the tax system and exchange rate, resolving the oil revenues dispute, ensuring better and more transparent oversight of humanitarian aid, and redressing economic disparities. The international community also needs to support a preemptive post-conflict economic recovery plan so that once the conflict ends, a plan will be ready for swift implementation. Certainly, reaching a comprehensive peace agreement is the fundamental first step before launching a post-conflict economic recovery plan. At every step, international diplomatic efforts must push the warring parties to prioritize the well-being of the Yemeni people over their own economic interests. Tackling the root causes of economic grievances and dismantling the war economy’s underpinnings are essential for ending the protracted conflict. Doing so may provide hope for a brighter future for Yemen and its people. </div><div><br /></div><div>____________________________________________________</div><div>*<a href="https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/yemens-war-economy-a-key-factor-in-the-ongoing-conflict/" target="_blank">This policy analysis paper</a> was written for and published first on the Arab Center Washington DC website. </div>Afrah Nasser's Bloghttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05429782314834231913noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7866330248567333783.post-42413043987187009042023-06-22T12:46:00.032+02:002023-07-03T13:29:54.003+02:00Crackdown on Press Freedom in Yemen Threatens Peace-Building Efforts<div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEi2QeSMzE7FeCXhPmg1oFxfA_naNCAHKWjTKQmgXvGoO4rny7riszrsLKeOGi5S4aAwccDyeV-iqIDRl4qTX5UytxP0wqsvNXgKarwwlpziMjmuYMhggBP99VhDzLnRTAc5GR_U3cfiULHjEBgrmDlrjTY75Wc6JMkSfhnUNH9PAi4nSojTyv1ggUeHkbI" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img alt="" data-original-height="507" data-original-width="760" height="426" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEi2QeSMzE7FeCXhPmg1oFxfA_naNCAHKWjTKQmgXvGoO4rny7riszrsLKeOGi5S4aAwccDyeV-iqIDRl4qTX5UytxP0wqsvNXgKarwwlpziMjmuYMhggBP99VhDzLnRTAc5GR_U3cfiULHjEBgrmDlrjTY75Wc6JMkSfhnUNH9PAi4nSojTyv1ggUeHkbI=w640-h426" width="640" /></a></div><br /></div><br /><a href="https://sanaacenter.org/the-yemen-review/may-2023/20398" target="_blank">Sana'a Center, June 22</a> - As a Yemeni with over 15 years of experience in journalism, I was delighted to have recently been invited by the Samir Kassir Foundation to be <a href="https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/lebanon/european-union-rewards-journalists-egypt-lebanon-and-syria-during-2023-edition_en?s=203" target="_blank">one of the seven jury members for its 2023 Award for Freedom of the Press</a>. I am the second Yemeni to be on the foundation’s jury, after photojournalist Amira al-Sharif took part in 2021. Out of 240 entries, 75 made it to the pre-final stage, where they were judged based on three criteria: relevance to human rights topics, journalistic style, and innovation. <div><br /></div><div>The <a href="https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/lebanon/european-union-rewards-journalists-egypt-lebanon-and-syria-during-2023-edition_en?s=203" target="_blank">winners were announced</a> on June 5: Syrian filmmaker and writer Inas Hakky in the opinion piece category, Egyptian journalist Mahmoud Al-Sobky in the investigative article category, and Lebanese reporter Mohamad Chreyteh in the audiovisual news report category.<div><br /><br /><table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEj4yeKiddOfjtrI-lb0DdeEqCQTcTqvxz0BbW7-7s_mDx_q68x1U2PxyAHPbieeVpzmY3Rm3X3EzxzwwSUsQkHkbJhgj0Y7DdccysIKaPYxU_a7jsDnXC7uvd47NGegKYwQExcKj8jLkb1EblVna9gi18rQ0iyZygTTk6Qq9xjyw0qY94_IjN1RV_z4t58" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img alt="" data-original-height="1536" data-original-width="2048" height="480" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEj4yeKiddOfjtrI-lb0DdeEqCQTcTqvxz0BbW7-7s_mDx_q68x1U2PxyAHPbieeVpzmY3Rm3X3EzxzwwSUsQkHkbJhgj0Y7DdccysIKaPYxU_a7jsDnXC7uvd47NGegKYwQExcKj8jLkb1EblVna9gi18rQ0iyZygTTk6Qq9xjyw0qY94_IjN1RV_z4t58=w640-h480" width="640" /></a></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">Ceremony of Samir Kassir Award for Press Freedom in Beirut, June 2023</td></tr></tbody></table><br /><br /><table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEiBpyfhUWP_1wKlPiQIJxpzsRdYRHCl8YPR8SdASPTJ0kl0wQ_pXofJtrOSbZoYP9sYOrtjfCOd2TUmi-wTrNEE-6KHSBeLlhd6VKPRgO71KW0NjINeLtwTk7pmtSHt4rRTXwYrXFeTFAKQ8JOJmCzjyJ-W3vsAxvMQlqg08jYMN89Yl0Deogyy54-ZykI" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img alt="" data-original-height="745" data-original-width="1117" height="426" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEiBpyfhUWP_1wKlPiQIJxpzsRdYRHCl8YPR8SdASPTJ0kl0wQ_pXofJtrOSbZoYP9sYOrtjfCOd2TUmi-wTrNEE-6KHSBeLlhd6VKPRgO71KW0NjINeLtwTk7pmtSHt4rRTXwYrXFeTFAKQ8JOJmCzjyJ-W3vsAxvMQlqg08jYMN89Yl0Deogyy54-ZykI=w640-h426" width="640" /></a></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">Inas Hakky and Afrah Nasser at the ceremony of Samir Kassir Award for Press Freedom</td></tr></tbody></table><br /><br />As I reviewed the entries from multiple Arab countries, I could not help feeling disappointed with the small number of entries by Yemeni journalists and the generally poor quality of the work. It was a sad reminder of the severe deterioration of press freedom in Yemen, the dangerous environment Yemeni journalists now work in, and the impact of that deterioration on our struggle for peace and justice in our country.<br /><br /><h3 style="text-align: left;">War on Media</h3><div><br /></div>Prior to 2014, Yemen enjoyed a <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/the-yemen-war-media-and-propaganda/" target="_blank">relatively vibrant media landscape</a>, but this has been rapidly eroded during the war. All parties to the Yemen conflict have committed abuses against journalists, and even ordinary citizens who express themselves on social media have not been spared from the recent crackdown on freedom of expression.<br /><br /><a href="https://www.facebook.com/100064879022605/posts/pfbid0wLx7YAvmvhX54tbjRKz2sy2na1qQBRtDyAJEvjp9u3Q2SKiZf6UvLkKN93JAxMm7l/?mibextid=cr9u03" target="_blank">Almost half of Yemen’s media outlets</a> that existed prior to 2014 have reportedly been shut down, and at least <a href="https://www.yemenjs.net/%d9%86%d9%82%d8%a7%d8%a8%d8%a9-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%b5%d8%ad%d9%81%d9%8a%d9%8a%d9%86-%d8%aa%d8%b3%d8%ac%d9%84-20-%d8%ad%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%a9-%d8%a7%d9%86%d8%aa%d9%87%d8%a7%d9%83-%d9%84%d8%ad%d8%b1%d9%8a%d8%a9/" target="_blank">49 Yemeni journalists have been murdered</a> since 2011, including <a href="https://cpj.org/2016/02/cpj-urges-full-independent-investigation-into-kill/" target="_blank">five</a> killed by the Saudi-led coalition. The Houthi movement will go down in history for having used journalists as human shields, after <a href="https://cpj.org/2015/05/two-abducted-yemeni-journalists-found-dead-after-a/" target="_blank">abducting two</a> and keeping them captive in a building being targeted by Saudi-led coalition airstrikes in 2015, leading to their deaths. In the latest wave of repressive measures against dissent, between December 2022 and January 2023, the Houthis detained four <a href="https://www.arabnews.com/node/2273241/middle-east" target="_blank">YouTubers</a> for nearly six months before granting them pardons. </div><div><br /></div><div>In Aden, largely controlled by the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC), car bombs <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/11/11/yemeni-journalist-and-child-killed-in-car-bombing-in-aden" target="_blank">killed pregnant journalist Rasha al-Harazi</a>, and journalist <a href="https://cpj.org/2022/06/journalist-saber-al-haidari-killed-in-yemen-car-bombing/#:~:text=Human%20Rights%20Council%20formed%20an,body's%20mandate%20in%20October%202021." target="_blank">Saber al-Haidari</a> in June 2022. The STC has detained journalist <a href="https://cpj.org/2022/08/security-forces-in-aden-detain-yemeni-journalist-ahmed-maher/" target="_blank">Ahmed Maher</a> since August 2022, with no clear reason for his arrest. The STC’s detention of journalist Adel al-Hasani in 2021 remains particularly poignant for me, as I investigated the case while working at Human Rights Watch, and found evidence that a <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/02/22/yemen-uae-backed-forces-torture-journalist" target="_blank">UAE intelligence officer had ordered his detention</a>.<br /><br />The Yemeni government, which championed the recent <a href="https://rsf.org/en/four-yemeni-journalists-finally-freed-after-being-held-hostage-eight-years#:~:text=The%20four%20journalists%20%E2%80%93%20Abdul%20Khaleq,by%20the%20internationally%20recognised%20government." target="_blank">release of four journalists</a> from Houthi prisons, has assaulted nine journalists, detained nine more, and threatened three in <a href="https://www.yemenjs.net/%d9%86%d9%82%d8%a7%d8%a8%d8%a9-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%b5%d8%ad%d9%81%d9%8a%d9%8a%d9%86-%d8%a7%d9%84%d9%8a%d9%85%d9%86%d9%8a%d9%8a%d9%86-14/" target="_blank">2022</a> alone.<br /><br />And the list goes on.<br /><br /><h3 style="text-align: left;">Media Freedom Matters</h3><br />These violations give a glimpse into a widespread pattern of repression in the country and the dangers facing Yemeni journalists at the hands of all warring parties. They also reflect the threat media freedom poses to them. It is telling that one of the first military attacks the Houthi movement carried out when they took over Sana’a in 2014 was the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security-idUSKBN0HD16H20140919" target="_blank">shelling of the state television building</a>. Attacks on the press in Yemen are motivated by the warring parties’ understanding of the significance of a strong, independent press.<br /><br />In the words of UN Secretary-General António Guterres on the occasion of <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/05/1136272" target="_blank">World Press Freedom Day in May</a> of this year, “Freedom of the press is the foundation of democracy and justice.” If Yemen enjoyed media freedom, journalists could play critical roles in raising people’s awareness of their rights and promoting peace and justice. A free press could contribute to the prosperity of the nation.<br /><br /><h3 style="text-align: left;">How We Can Support a Free Press in Yemen</h3><br />In June of 2022, the UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2022/06/ensuring-media-freedom-and-safety-journalists-requires-urgent-concrete" target="_blank">Irene Khan, said</a>, “Independent, free, and pluralistic news media is crucial for democracy, accountability, and transparency, and should be nurtured by states and the international community as a public good.” Ensuring media freedom in Yemen likewise requires international action.<br /><br />Calls on the warring parties to end their violations and abuses against journalists have been in vain. Holding them accountable, however, could pay off. The UN Human Rights Council is morally obliged to <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/mde31/6012/2022/en/" target="_blank">establish an independent and impartial monitoring body</a> to investigate and document human rights abuses and possible war crimes in Yemen, which could contribute to accountability efforts. <br /><br />Yemeni journalists lack international support for press-related work. The UN, European Union, UK, US, and relevant international organizations should generously fund and support media groups in Yemen. Journalists need support in three main areas: projects that aim at building a strong and independent press, journalism oriented toward a peaceful settlement, and projects that improve journalists’ skills. This support would go a long way in helping Yemeni journalists document attacks and threats directed at the media, gather evidence to hold perpetrators to account and bring impunity for war crimes to an end.</div><div><br /></div><div>___________________________________</div><div>*This article was first written for <a href="https://sanaacenter.org/the-yemen-review/may-2023/20398" target="_blank">Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies</a>. <br /><br /></div></div>Afrah Nasser's Bloghttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05429782314834231913noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7866330248567333783.post-18453896793412236822023-06-05T10:05:00.023+02:002023-07-18T10:17:03.112+02:00Samir Kassir Awards for Press Freedom I was a member of the jury committee that decided the winners of the Samir Kassir Awards for 2023, given by the <a href="https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/lebanon/european-union-rewards-journalists-egypt-lebanon-and-syria-during-2023-edition_en?s=203" target="_blank">delegation of the European Union to Lebanon</a> and the Samir Kassir Foundation. This year, 242 journalists participated in the competition from many Arab countries. 81 candidates competed in the Opinion Piece category, 110 in the Investigative Article category, and 54 in the Audiovisual News Report category. The winners were Inas Hakky from Syria, Mahmoud Al-Sobky from Egypt, and Mohamad Chreyteh from Lebanon. The awards ceremony was in Beirut. I was delighted to hand one of the awards to Inas.<div><br /> <div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEgfu22FFfhMzNOV32ikCUp5tGm6eJeQTFuz3OOWGs3aQ_YpDO7wEhLW8BqFkptO2HsSzBlKvpBUUuzAmb1gvYAPMB8zAR1FsQD9LfvzpN1lTkIlMNUIOTmPgV8At0_1Fnf69UFYAUpYM930hP2QR4oiR-ocdb6__SZFvLeWISWEksZtwqJLMqWGg3DWU0o" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img alt="" data-original-height="745" data-original-width="1117" height="426" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEgfu22FFfhMzNOV32ikCUp5tGm6eJeQTFuz3OOWGs3aQ_YpDO7wEhLW8BqFkptO2HsSzBlKvpBUUuzAmb1gvYAPMB8zAR1FsQD9LfvzpN1lTkIlMNUIOTmPgV8At0_1Fnf69UFYAUpYM930hP2QR4oiR-ocdb6__SZFvLeWISWEksZtwqJLMqWGg3DWU0o=w640-h426" width="640" /></a></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEiq3XAgU_RxmNRkPKOyQj0lLtIuadkoMyotzXpfnys0Jv4REoSNbmxSOn0Szgdz1ZzhvrnK6gSdspzXwnlbAPQksMKifYWQNd-to7Wk-ij3zT4vuUBV1pwdGnAOAbq1w8e4rDxN9tY9Xd2N0Bjln5g3AB-YIpplSzudA3FnmyPBo32ZuN1oF8DIX4lm_WE" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img alt="" data-original-height="745" data-original-width="1117" height="426" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEiq3XAgU_RxmNRkPKOyQj0lLtIuadkoMyotzXpfnys0Jv4REoSNbmxSOn0Szgdz1ZzhvrnK6gSdspzXwnlbAPQksMKifYWQNd-to7Wk-ij3zT4vuUBV1pwdGnAOAbq1w8e4rDxN9tY9Xd2N0Bjln5g3AB-YIpplSzudA3FnmyPBo32ZuN1oF8DIX4lm_WE=w640-h426" width="640" /></a></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEg9Insg_Lqtwb8QrxWIm5XoWW7CnpYMtO7yW4U8ldVqTRLvmTls5OX5LHbkrWgXbldXEbb-kGlg4m7z3zYIT7qbb3NaaUgcCUbRc6MzZM5x6CIb82hQ0bW8Y16DLv24-12zoW-oc6b-NDuKp0m9pBumU0dKyh1pmrE6o1nW8vu7moFR4Zqj1mbtCg2LGa8" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img alt="" data-original-height="745" data-original-width="1117" height="426" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEg9Insg_Lqtwb8QrxWIm5XoWW7CnpYMtO7yW4U8ldVqTRLvmTls5OX5LHbkrWgXbldXEbb-kGlg4m7z3zYIT7qbb3NaaUgcCUbRc6MzZM5x6CIb82hQ0bW8Y16DLv24-12zoW-oc6b-NDuKp0m9pBumU0dKyh1pmrE6o1nW8vu7moFR4Zqj1mbtCg2LGa8=w640-h426" width="640" /></a></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEiIKAhtvE15Sy9rHH6ryx9jwBP_RSayZltZPhsWlev9MqeV2qCZr1WwFpm61ugkCzsYxvwHfwnTJ5AdzpgBXSnLGY7kPZpV8l9TuiNv4XvivPVJAUCYYhU4Z5GrIRYNgrVslSiM3MgeWRYLENrv2_UmCoiu9hxcUfnxKFHllHjKhvSd8cl6IFF3_k9vfpc" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img alt="" data-original-height="745" data-original-width="1117" height="426" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEiIKAhtvE15Sy9rHH6ryx9jwBP_RSayZltZPhsWlev9MqeV2qCZr1WwFpm61ugkCzsYxvwHfwnTJ5AdzpgBXSnLGY7kPZpV8l9TuiNv4XvivPVJAUCYYhU4Z5GrIRYNgrVslSiM3MgeWRYLENrv2_UmCoiu9hxcUfnxKFHllHjKhvSd8cl6IFF3_k9vfpc=w640-h426" width="640" /></a></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEjldAMvsJa9B9iaWMMyXgLD6JX70ifo9CDeLVw75ftUOTGCzuTeSud0EbVp_q0MSD036GQoovBJCNbXt1r-onIhTgFTBN4n28CYdkVXgj8kFVzyhAE84ybuvic25_nIACaE4z2ttkdUi4Mq_MnY6o7EBlmBcCwlyciVWxVcQF9vyNx7TE-bkKn__reqgeg" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img alt="" data-original-height="745" data-original-width="1117" height="426" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEjldAMvsJa9B9iaWMMyXgLD6JX70ifo9CDeLVw75ftUOTGCzuTeSud0EbVp_q0MSD036GQoovBJCNbXt1r-onIhTgFTBN4n28CYdkVXgj8kFVzyhAE84ybuvic25_nIACaE4z2ttkdUi4Mq_MnY6o7EBlmBcCwlyciVWxVcQF9vyNx7TE-bkKn__reqgeg=w640-h426" width="640" /></a></div><br /><div><br /></div></div></div>Afrah Nasser's Bloghttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05429782314834231913noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7866330248567333783.post-63179249337720445102023-05-03T11:54:00.001+02:002023-05-06T12:07:53.610+02:00The Thorny Relationship between Yemen’s Government and the Southern Transitional Council <div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEgS4fASaFN1GH-LDvZYsa20qN5ViHf5Os7f-coTxUfjYcoksyHfFEIYA_3zmVLRy6KaxoQGJ8zu8bae_7byo4bAGXW5EZxJiTurFk00GEzmI6t3WyMLSeuiLUbw0aHbzJtlMzvwVyAmTbUx2KC8UbdND0OxvUBn4Ce3-XGna6u_K1-YsymBljq2s9_r" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img alt="" data-original-height="432" data-original-width="768" height="360" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEgS4fASaFN1GH-LDvZYsa20qN5ViHf5Os7f-coTxUfjYcoksyHfFEIYA_3zmVLRy6KaxoQGJ8zu8bae_7byo4bAGXW5EZxJiTurFk00GEzmI6t3WyMLSeuiLUbw0aHbzJtlMzvwVyAmTbUx2KC8UbdND0OxvUBn4Ce3-XGna6u_K1-YsymBljq2s9_r=w640-h360" width="640" /></a></div><br /><br /><div><a href="https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/the-thorny-relationship-between-yemens-government-and-the-southern-transitional-council/" target="_blank">Arab Center Washington DC</a> - In Yemen, the Southern Movement calling for separation between the North and South of Yemen is controversial. For those who oppose it, it is a simple secessionist movement; but for those who take a more neutral position, it is a movement for self-determination. Its supporters think of it as not merely a secessionist movement but a struggle for both independence from a northern “occupation” and the reestablishment of the now defunct state of South Yemen (the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen), which in 1990 was unified with North Yemen (the Yemen Arab Republic) following more than a decade of conflict.<br /><br />After the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-14704951">1994 Civil War</a> between the southern socialist separatists and the northern pro-union forces, which the latter won, the Southern Movement (known in Yemen as al-Hirak) gradually emerged as a peaceful movement. It grew to prominence due to its regular and continuous <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2009/12/15/name-unity/yemeni-governments-brutal-response-southern-movement-protests">protests, demonstrations, and marches</a> starting in 2007 in the city of Aden and in many other places in the southern region. The protests were met with a <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2009/12/15/name-unity/yemeni-governments-brutal-response-southern-movement-protests">brutal crackdown</a> by the Yemeni government’s forces. Although the movement was composed of a mix of several southern factions with different ideologies and politics, they all shared a common goal: independence for the South. In addition to the disregard of injustices carried out during the crackdown, southern grievances include protests against <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2009/12/15/name-unity/yemeni-governments-brutal-response-southern-movement-protests">political and economic marginalization</a>.<br /><br />The <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/4/26/yemen-what-is-the-southern-transitional-council">Southern Transition Council (STC)</a> is the major player within the Southern Movement today. Since its establishment in 2017, the STC has effectively been calling for the establishment of “<a href="https://en.stcaden.com/news/7931">a sovereign independent federal state</a>” in southern Yemen—a proposal the internationally recognized government of Yemen (IRGY) <a href="https://www.yemenembassy.org/news/42620/">has continuously rejected</a>. The IRGY and the STC are adversaries and politically and militarily challenge each other. But despite this, both have been members of <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/6/3/yemens-new-leadershiperadicating-divisions-in-anti-houthi-force">the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC)</a> since its establishment in April 2022, opening the door for a pragmatic relationship between the two, especially in light of recent <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/04/1135477">Saudi-Houthi talks</a> in Sanaa.<br /><br /></div><div><span style="font-size: x-large;">Increased Southern Grievances</span><br /><br />The STC and the Yemeni government’s problematic relationship today is directly impacted by a long historical context of deep-seated, decades-long tensions between the government of former President Ali Abdullah Saleh and the Southern Movement. Many argue that the tensions began in 2007, at the beginning of the Southern Movement. However, these tensions have their roots in the unification period, when a combination of nation-building and the attempted integration of the North and the South ultimately turned out to be a failure. The unified government under Saleh’s rule failed to manage the challenges of integrating the northern and southern economic systems and resolving the implications of the post-civil war period. Over the next three decades, the Southern Movement faced a <a href="http://afrahnasser.blogspot.com/2013/12/graphic-10-dead-in-army-shelling-of.html">fierce</a> <a href="http://afrahnasser.blogspot.com/2014/01/graphic-another-killing-of-yemeni.html">crackdown</a> <a href="https://afrahnasser.blogspot.com/2014/01/report-what-really-happened-in-al-dhale.html">by Saleh’s regime</a>, which antagonized Yemeni citizens in the south and essentially made them second-class citizens.<br /><br />Prior to 2015, southern grievances included exclusion from political power, discrimination, abuses against southern security and military officers, and land rights violations. Similar grievances existed in the North, but they were differently motivated in each region. The southern region suffered the most from <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2009/12/15/name-unity/yemeni-governments-brutal-response-southern-movement-protests">alienation and exploitation</a> by Saleh’s regime. <br /><br />In the wake of Yemen’s <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2021/4/27/yemens-uprising-was-magical-spiritual-powerful">2011 uprising</a> and the overthrow of Saleh’s regime, national plans for federalism were intended to resolve southern grievances. However, with the beginning of <a href="https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/war-yemen">the current civil war</a> between the Houthi armed group and then President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi’s government in 2014, the conflict weakened the government, deepened southern grievances, and radicalized the Southern Movement. Today, southern grievances include insecurity, negligence, and poverty. The government has failed to protect people in the South <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/07/29/yemen-houthi-artillery-kills-dozens-aden">on many occasions</a>; but the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-33542261">Southern Resistance Committees</a> and later the STC did. Despite <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/7/17/yemens-exiled-government-declares-liberation-of-aden">the liberation of Aden</a> from the Houthi armed group in 2015, the government has failed to provide citizens in the South with basic services such as electricity, water, and infrastructure development, and has also failed to stabilize the Yemeni currency, which has <a href="https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2022/02/divergent-currency-values-make-life-even-harder-yemen">depreciated</a> more in the South than in the North.<br /><br /></div><div><span style="font-size: x-large;">The STC-IRGY Relationship<br /></span><br />There exists an undeniable incompatibility between the IRGY and the STC. This incompatibility includes the 2017 dispute between former President Hadi, and the then governor of Aden (who is also the leader of the STC), Aidarous al-Zubaidi. Although Hadi is a southerner, he was unpopular in the South because he <a href="https://www.oasiscenter.eu/en/war-in-yemen-who-is-involved">supported</a> the pro-unification northern war against the South in 1994 and favored the <a href="https://www.refworld.org/docid/5b0c14824.html">Islah political party</a> that dominated his government, and that was <a href="https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/brothers-no-more-yemens-islah-party-faces-collapse-aden-alliances">a foe of southerners</a>. The dispute between Hadi and al-Zubaidi included the fact that Hadi’s government had <a href="https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/yemenis-march-against-hadi-after-sacking-aden-governor">northern generals</a> who were loyal to him but adversaries of al-Zubaidi, and also stemmed from al-Zubaidi’s <a href="https://www.newarab.com/analysis/yemens-third-government-emerges-southern-yemen">close ties</a> with the United Arab Emirates, which had strained relations with the Hadi government. Consequently, <a href="https://apnews.com/article/132d0a1a44874370aa96d54b067c626d">Hadi sacked al-Zubaidi</a>, who the following month announced <a href="https://en.stcaden.com/news/7931">the establishment of the Southern Transitional Council</a>, with which <a href="https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/understanding-military-units-in-southern-yemen">numerous armed groups</a> are affiliated. In 2018, STC-affiliated armed forces <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/yemen-separatists-reportedly-capture-govt-hq-in-aden/1044899">seized control</a> of the Yemeni government’s headquarters in Aden. This “takeover” of Aden marked the increasingly strained relations between Hadi and the UAE.<br /><br />In the ensuing months, several serious military confrontations occurred between the STC and IRGY forces. In August 2019, unprecedented violence and deadly clashes took place in the wake of <a href="https://almarsdpost.com/post7219.html">the killing of a senior STC military commander</a>. The Houthi armed group <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/8/1/yemen-dozens-killed-in-houthi-attack-on-aden-military-parade">claimed responsibility for the killing</a>; the STC, however, <a href="https://www.newarab.com/analysis/yemen-focus-war-takes-new-turn">accused</a> the Yemeni government of assisting the Houthi offensive. The STC then <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-yemen-security-sanaa-idUKKCN1V91VQ">removed</a> IRGY political officials from Aden and Abyan. After Saudi mediation, the two sides signed <a href="https://www.saudiembassy.net/sites/default/files/Riyadh%20Agreement%20Fact%20sheet.pdf">the Riyadh Agreement</a> at the end of 2019, ensuring the establishment of a power-sharing government and temporarily reducing tensions. But the following year, tensions and military confrontations <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/yemeni-separatists-suspend-talks-with-govt-clashes-resume/2020/08/26/f84b4c3e-e780-11ea-bf44-0d31c85838a5_story.html">resumed</a>, leading to additional Saudi mediation attempts in <a href="https://www.mei.edu/publications/saudi-houthi-talks-could-pave-way-intra-yemeni-ones-will-they-ensure-sustainable-peace">2020 and 2021</a>.<br /><br />After <a href="https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/a-ceasefire-and-a-presidential-council-but-uncertainties-abound-in-yemen/">the formation of the PLC</a> in Saudi Arabia in 2022, the relationship between the two sides took a new turn motivated by pragmatism. Because of their divergent political agendas, the STC and the IRGY were made members of the same council and put under Saudi pressure to cooperate, a desperate attempt to mitigate the volatile situation. At first glance, it seems illogical that al-Zubaidi would be a member of the PLC while still heading the STC. Although the STC has a uniquely different political agenda than the rest of the PLC’s members, it has remained in the PLC out of pragmatic interest.<br /><br />At this point, the PLC and the STC need each other for different reasons. The IRGY may be internationally recognized, but it is not recognized by many Yemenis. In the view of the majority of the Yemeni public, the Yemeni government has lost legitimacy over the course of the conflict due to its countless failures in securing a stable economy and providing basic services, and for its having <a href="https://www.bayancenter.org/en/2022/05/3416/">violated Yemen’s constitution</a>. All this time, the government has survived because of Saudi Arabia’s support. Meanwhile, the STC has gained a sufficient popular base in the majority of Yemen’s southern region, including <a href="https://en.ypagency.net/276456">in Hadramawt Governorate</a>, which has the same political aspiration of separation. And yet, the STC has been repeatedly <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security-stc/southern-yemenis-warn-exclusion-from-u-n-peace-talks-could-trigger-new-conflict-idUSKCN1QI5HJ">sidelined</a> from political peace talks. Thus, on one hand, the PLC needs the STC because the latter has a popular base in the South, something the Presidential Council lacks in both the South and the North. No matter what comes, the PLC would reject the breakaway of southern Yemen, including of Hadramawt; should that happen, it would not have much to govern in the country. On the other hand, the STC also needs the PLC—although obviously temporarily—because the latter provides the political opportunity and venue for the former to finally ensure its political participation in any upcoming political process and to push for a political roadmap for restoring the state of South Yemen.<br /><br /></div><div><span style="font-size: x-large;">The UAE Has Its Thumb on the Scale</span><br /><br />One sign of <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/saudi-arabia-and-u-a-e-clash-over-oil-yemen-as-rift-grows-ff286ff9">the Saudi-UAE spat</a> is their divergent approaches in Yemen, with the UAE’s approach being essentially a thumb on the scale. Although Saudi Arabia and the UAE together intervened militarily in Yemen to fight the Houthi armed group, they have been supporting opposing sides in southern Yemen. Saudi Arabia supports the IRGY while the UAE <a href="https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/S_2022_50.pdf">supports the STC</a> politically, financially, and militarily. The UAE also <a href="https://www.middleeasteye.net/opinion/expo-2020-dubai-yemen-pavilion-look">supports other Yemeni forces</a> operating outside of government control, mostly situated along Yemen’s Red Sea coast and the Gulf of Aden.<br /><br />The IRGY has publicly condemned the UAE’s role on several occasions. In 2017, former President Hadi <a href="https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/exclusive-yemen-president-says-uae-acting-occupiers">described</a> the UAE’s role in Yemen as an occupation. In 2019, at a UNSC briefing, Yemen’s representative to the UN, Abdullah al-Saadi <a href="https://press.un.org/en/2019/sc13920.doc.htm">condemned</a> the UAE’s support for the STC. But condemnations did not deter the UAE from expanding its role. During the August 2019 military confrontations between the STC and the IRGY, the UAE was directly involved, <a href="https://www.theglobeandmail.com/world/article-air-strikes-hit-yemeni-government-forces-near-aden-at-least-30-troops/">launching airstrikes</a> on government forces, apparently in support of STC-affiliated forces. The UAE <a href="https://wam.ae/en/details/1395302782852">denied such accusations</a>, saying that the strikes were carried out on terrorist targets. Subsequently, the IRGY <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/yemen-demands-u-a-e-s-expulsion-from-saudi-led-coalition-11566496717">demanded an end</a> to the UAE’s participation in the Saudi-led coalition. <br /><br />The UAE sees Yemen as holding strategic significance for its commercial and military interests, for example in its developing <a href="https://apnews.com/article/mysterious-air-base-volcanic-island-yemen-c8cb2018c07bb5b63e1a43ff706b007b">an airbase</a> on the island of Mayun in the Bab al-Mandab Strait. And Yemen’s <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20210607-yemen-s-socotra-isolated-island-at-strategic-crossroads">Socotra Island</a>, a UNESCO World Heritage Site, is controlled by UAE-backed armed forces.<br /><br />Saudi Arabia has not publicly expressed opposition to the Southern Transitional Council. However, the kingdom’s <a href="https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2020/08/yemen-southern-riyadh-agreement-mechanism-peace.html">tireless attempts to merge STC-affiliated armed forces with those of the IRGY</a> demonstrate its desire to dissolve the STC’s military power. The Riyadh Agreement, which calls for a unity government, along with a subsequent push to implement the agreement and the creation of the PLC in Saudi Arabia are all Saudi attempts to challenge the UAE’s plans in southern Yemen by tinkering with fundamental domestic rifts.<br /><br /></div><div><span style="font-size: x-large;">Possible Scenarios</span><br /><br />On April 9, the Saudi ambassador to Yemen, Mohammed bin Saeed Al-Jaber <a href="https://apnews.com/article/yemen-saudi-arabia-houthis-peace-war-faf722203eca078d91e040c1c296a8f7">arrived in Sanaa</a> for talks with Houthi officials regarding a solution to the conflict. The UAE has not officially commented on the Saudi-Houthi talks, but two days after the Saudi visit to Sanaa, the STC <a href="https://en.stcaden.com/news/10945">said</a> that the South seeks to restore “its usurped state with full sovereignty as a strategic goal for the people of the South,” and that it would accept no alternatives to this goal. Moreover, Amr al-Bidh, an STC official, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/yemeni-southern-separatists-voice-frustration-over-saudi-houthi-talks-2023-03-09/">reportedly indicated</a> on March 9 that due to the isolation of the STC, the potential Saudi-Houthi deal cannot be binding on the STC.<br /><br />The Saudi-Houthi talks provide hints that the kingdom is starting to recognize the Houthi group as a legitimate political component in the country. A new round of Saudi-Houthi talks is expected soon, many believe that there will be a push to reach a joint political agreement between the country’s domestic warring parties. This is indeed the focus of the <a href="https://www.state.gov/u-s-special-envoy-for-yemen-lenderkings-travel-to-the-gulf-3/">current visit</a> by US Special Envoy for Yemen, Tim Lenderking, to the Gulf where he is to push toward securing “a durable ceasefire and inclusive, UN-mediated political process while ensuring continued efforts to ease the economic crisis and suffering of Yemenis.” <br /><br />One of two scenarios might follow. In one scenario, if a deal to establish a national transitional government were to be discussed, one in which there would be a power-sharing government between the Houthis and the PLC, the STC would completely refuse to sign on. From the STC’s viewpoint, the Houthis would not allow for the possibility of southern independence, let alone the opportunity to hold a peaceful democratic process of self-determination for the South. The STC would disregard Saudi pressure because it enjoys the UAE’s support. In a Houthi-PLC political dialogue, the STC would use every opportunity to try to ensure southern independence, which would be met with the Houthis’ rejection. In this scenario, fighting would rage again, likely seeing Houthi attacks on Aden similar to those in <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/02/yemen-houthi-fighters-aden-southern-port-crater-saudi">2015</a>; but this time clashes would occur between Houthi forces and STC-affiliated forces and their supporter, the UAE. Yemeni analysts anticipate that in this scenario Yemen would become yet another of the world’s incredibly protracted conflicts. This would obviously derail whatever efforts the United Nations envoy to Yemen, Hans Grundberg,<br /><br />In another scenario, the STC might sign onto a Houthi-PLC deal, but only if Saudi Arabia succeeds in convincing the UAE of its value. The STC might then acquiesce to UAE pressure and sign such a deal. Public outrage in the South would surely follow, leading to greater unrest, instability, and quite possibly the outbreak of armed public resistance since the Southern Movement is ultimately larger than the STC. It would then be up to the Southern Movement to reposition itself and decide the South’s future. In this scenario, the chance for a power-sharing government would be quite limited as well. Both scenarios thus promise to lead Yemen even further down the road of conflict and instability.</div><div><br /></div><div>__________________________________________</div><div>*This <a href="https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/the-thorny-relationship-between-yemens-government-and-the-southern-transitional-council/" target="_blank">policy analysis report</a> was written for & published in the Arab Center Washington DC. </div>Afrah Nasser's Bloghttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05429782314834231913noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7866330248567333783.post-14561651586446413732023-04-26T09:21:00.000+02:002023-04-26T09:21:45.612+02:00Discussion with Catholic University of Milan Students During the International Journalism Festival in Perugia, Italy, I was invited to speak to students from Catholic University of Milan, doing MA in Journalism. I shared my experience in doing investigative journalism, & the challenges & opportunities for critical independent journalism. You may know more about my talk at the International Journalism Festival <a href="http://afrahnasser.blogspot.com/2023/04/yemen-at-international-journalism.html" target="_blank">here</a>. <br /><div class="separator" style="clear: both;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEgN-lfkT91qDJ9DOiWoU2KKOQHUmEgzvt8720jSW48bApjU0tNNwAp-qfoF_4fI5CFtzKHO8p16nTPBk2QY2-GosoZDO7I3Jw9ePYUdUnkbsgo4EoAFoYfZyjP12w0_qLFSMon-e-J5pSHu5KWzyJBOZ815AVn0vbEnwpELZ-3R71N8wHIXkBcxdTaI" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img alt="" data-original-height="1536" data-original-width="2048" height="480" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEgN-lfkT91qDJ9DOiWoU2KKOQHUmEgzvt8720jSW48bApjU0tNNwAp-qfoF_4fI5CFtzKHO8p16nTPBk2QY2-GosoZDO7I3Jw9ePYUdUnkbsgo4EoAFoYfZyjP12w0_qLFSMon-e-J5pSHu5KWzyJBOZ815AVn0vbEnwpELZ-3R71N8wHIXkBcxdTaI=w640-h480" width="640" /></a></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEgXz7kLrTfZHaV3ZQAjQozkydw2v7KZ2Dcua1DRtL7EhO7KpRpqzTIb8-s8yI7DIup2E96F73x20UnCJbt_fN84KDN8FYgo3t8QBR-R3B8yV5kd1MPTowaaBxzTZlQtCwhRk3Q3z-Nnmla7ql8nKWf0D4MijeZyOl4vXEopVgeVPy5S9ptdhTammOS5" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img alt="" data-original-height="1536" data-original-width="2048" height="480" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEgXz7kLrTfZHaV3ZQAjQozkydw2v7KZ2Dcua1DRtL7EhO7KpRpqzTIb8-s8yI7DIup2E96F73x20UnCJbt_fN84KDN8FYgo3t8QBR-R3B8yV5kd1MPTowaaBxzTZlQtCwhRk3Q3z-Nnmla7ql8nKWf0D4MijeZyOl4vXEopVgeVPy5S9ptdhTammOS5=w640-h480" width="640" /></a></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEiASwtiuDEIV0uCGUkuNvFmZ6eR9FOBCtvYPu7S9MGTNVw6amHXz2xIst9Rg1A_1uYwRgcPHFe4N0aBXcnrzZ8KAeYki3sy99kvRJBdu_SMYDz0_eByEHrk1-sPqnodez205HMvqmFXb9r9DzjgVPLE0-oVn2aRSFwOCSsRk5DEMTmgb7xlKwrq-bLs" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img alt="" data-original-height="1536" data-original-width="2048" height="480" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEiASwtiuDEIV0uCGUkuNvFmZ6eR9FOBCtvYPu7S9MGTNVw6amHXz2xIst9Rg1A_1uYwRgcPHFe4N0aBXcnrzZ8KAeYki3sy99kvRJBdu_SMYDz0_eByEHrk1-sPqnodez205HMvqmFXb9r9DzjgVPLE0-oVn2aRSFwOCSsRk5DEMTmgb7xlKwrq-bLs=w640-h480" width="640" /></a></div><br /></div><p></p>Afrah Nasser's Bloghttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05429782314834231913noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7866330248567333783.post-23981647436766153352023-04-20T08:51:00.003+02:002023-04-26T09:22:55.195+02:00Yemen at the International Journalism Festival<p>The International Journalism Festival in Perugia, Italy invited me to speak about the state of journalism & the conflict in Yemen. I was <a href="https://www.journalismfestival.com/programme/2023/yemen-from-the-forgotten-to-the-untold-war" target="_blank">in conversation</a> with Italian journalist, Laura Silvia Battaglia al-Jalal at the festival on Thursday, April 20, 2023. In my talk, I mentioned the essay (essay's <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2022/12/18/republic-of-fear-a-return-to-yemen-after-11-years?fbclid=IwAR2ncrCRQ3MwtfBM73-EQLKM6f2-3rVjfs5FN1b1_p0L931A3hOAyo96wUg" target="_blank">link here</a>) I wrote recently for Al Jazeera English about my trip to Yemen after 11 years in exile in Sweden. You may watch the talk in the following YouTube clip or <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=i2DMkKfdjRA" target="_blank">here</a>: </p>
<iframe allow="accelerometer; autoplay; clipboard-write; encrypted-media; gyroscope; picture-in-picture; web-share" allowfullscreen="" frameborder="0" height="350" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/i2DMkKfdjRA" title="YouTube video player" width="650"></iframe> <div><br /></div><div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEjDeiKKzorZ6lUjZanhOHyx5eOTCqN_eM18QRdyJCFw5kzFv6ziFt7S65iMKrb5ID64TGGWPP2taBAHr1vupfxcw2HJfr-nQnoIxYiok-TNo7fFRK5O_e8PA1p7h_Tw8VjO07puflYVPiyClcxGWXshvAd5nvNk7acFJf_zloHomIDTmUEYz9VsexB-" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img alt="" data-original-height="998" data-original-width="1500" height="426" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEjDeiKKzorZ6lUjZanhOHyx5eOTCqN_eM18QRdyJCFw5kzFv6ziFt7S65iMKrb5ID64TGGWPP2taBAHr1vupfxcw2HJfr-nQnoIxYiok-TNo7fFRK5O_e8PA1p7h_Tw8VjO07puflYVPiyClcxGWXshvAd5nvNk7acFJf_zloHomIDTmUEYz9VsexB-=w640-h426" width="640" /></a></div><br /><br /></div><div><br /></div><div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEiDyB_Fn4LfK0sGCAigSMkeGSsml509nPEen487cwRAAajixI9UjEI_sUP2scLwGYNtOIycGPOyt8JtB81WQJfAT8e-haD2Jqu9gNfWw1cjhBgOEphtqzYj4FpcF_lNWFF19NMiXQTsCfLL2DjUiyIKT-cO4JJOPTZleD7It5KlyjQocqR4SC3sXaJL" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img alt="" data-original-height="998" data-original-width="1500" height="426" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEiDyB_Fn4LfK0sGCAigSMkeGSsml509nPEen487cwRAAajixI9UjEI_sUP2scLwGYNtOIycGPOyt8JtB81WQJfAT8e-haD2Jqu9gNfWw1cjhBgOEphtqzYj4FpcF_lNWFF19NMiXQTsCfLL2DjUiyIKT-cO4JJOPTZleD7It5KlyjQocqR4SC3sXaJL=w640-h426" width="640" /></a></div><br /><br /></div><div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEivUahY8FMTLWqqLHqbM1OP8FPS554w2K9IVX44d9_GNx_e5zZ4OUgtYO7XGssbT6XUN8zSY0MkSVxo3x0KAuqey-PQLqLU-D-Sjb0heq0BlWWB-P1-8ddsUPOj62vnCUGwXG99Uyv1jqivVyU8vLnRNOO6h_hZz53i1f2dorbhQrsKi9zlcdR2E8t9" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img alt="" data-original-height="998" data-original-width="1500" height="426" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEivUahY8FMTLWqqLHqbM1OP8FPS554w2K9IVX44d9_GNx_e5zZ4OUgtYO7XGssbT6XUN8zSY0MkSVxo3x0KAuqey-PQLqLU-D-Sjb0heq0BlWWB-P1-8ddsUPOj62vnCUGwXG99Uyv1jqivVyU8vLnRNOO6h_hZz53i1f2dorbhQrsKi9zlcdR2E8t9=w640-h426" width="640" /></a></div><br /><br /></div><div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEjeFY0eqb-x_MrjTQPzH8eHxytl9bcTYqcVNssLKdp5gDyU-am0HyiQmHnT9knx8lvoM3Z-zr64hHSL8WwzOFDQldxMhNq-RVtdjpZHtP8HeGekZhj38eedTdA2I9xPUF2zSevesIAmPaH5FlP35xzJO0M_8pTLdbhWe0ajp-Z13hf8N52n7qtKNx8N" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img alt="" data-original-height="1500" data-original-width="998" height="640" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEjeFY0eqb-x_MrjTQPzH8eHxytl9bcTYqcVNssLKdp5gDyU-am0HyiQmHnT9knx8lvoM3Z-zr64hHSL8WwzOFDQldxMhNq-RVtdjpZHtP8HeGekZhj38eedTdA2I9xPUF2zSevesIAmPaH5FlP35xzJO0M_8pTLdbhWe0ajp-Z13hf8N52n7qtKNx8N=w427-h640" width="427" /></a></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEgbHT9UP1SAyFDw4hLgULF5i_Z0wL7I57UnaBxB0L1p899OGKeuFUPtXHegqK5MNWOoEXmwXE9wBK01j_zitH8M2jfNZ-MV4JBF4yNCW5Zh_9SXifE93rUlqh_kGoBux22MP29hdHoRNH9KNPVRNga1cP97BubNlrj0yYfEnFVMiQlGSHMsHhLxRnSL" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img alt="" data-original-height="1500" data-original-width="998" height="640" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEgbHT9UP1SAyFDw4hLgULF5i_Z0wL7I57UnaBxB0L1p899OGKeuFUPtXHegqK5MNWOoEXmwXE9wBK01j_zitH8M2jfNZ-MV4JBF4yNCW5Zh_9SXifE93rUlqh_kGoBux22MP29hdHoRNH9KNPVRNga1cP97BubNlrj0yYfEnFVMiQlGSHMsHhLxRnSL=w427-h640" width="427" /></a></div><br /><div><br /></div><br /><br /></div>Afrah Nasser's Bloghttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05429782314834231913noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7866330248567333783.post-36094024787802652682023-04-10T09:38:00.003+02:002023-04-12T10:16:10.857+02:00Could talks in Yemen bring a breakthrough to end years of war? | Inside Story<div>I was on Al Jazeera English TV channel discussing if talks between Houthis and Saudi Arabia could bring a breakthrough to end years of war in Yemen: </div><div><br /></div> <iframe allow="accelerometer; autoplay; clipboard-write; encrypted-media; gyroscope; picture-in-picture; web-share" allowfullscreen="" frameborder="0" height="350" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/xFwmFiKGN4Q" title="YouTube video player" width="650"></iframe> <div><br /></div><div>Many of my family members kept texting me asking me in disbelief if the photo of the <a href="https://www.saba.ye/ar/news3233686.htm" target="_blank">Saudi ambassador and the Houthi leader shaking hands</a> was true or photographed. Clearly, so many Yemenis didn't imagine this day would come and are in disbelief. Death, pain, suffering, and destruction have been embedded in people's minds in Yemen for the past 8 years which really have left millions traumatized. I wasn't surprised when I felt this disbelief reaction.</div><div><br /><div><br /></div><div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: left;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEgP8BDN56DAC7U79WYnogC_TBVPUWdP3UlnhxDjrP4iyyJb91xPYwGsHcRWrAusN2XTqE5s-LgFplsn97mjknNOZ8EmXrYjD__8_pAhbP21twwE6XEp9EUapJzk3z8dtD54hqH246RhrXLqBxksKVOFUKMzU-75AOwLQ03-_nwbpEUawpDWuXay_5xw" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img alt="" data-original-height="1080" data-original-width="1920" height="360" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEgP8BDN56DAC7U79WYnogC_TBVPUWdP3UlnhxDjrP4iyyJb91xPYwGsHcRWrAusN2XTqE5s-LgFplsn97mjknNOZ8EmXrYjD__8_pAhbP21twwE6XEp9EUapJzk3z8dtD54hqH246RhrXLqBxksKVOFUKMzU-75AOwLQ03-_nwbpEUawpDWuXay_5xw=w640-h360" width="640" /></a></div><br /><br /></div><div>The key question now: are these talks going to lead to lasting peace in Yemen? It's still unclear at this stage all the details of the Saudi-Houthi initial political agreement. However, I think without solving Yemen’s internal political problems, it will be impossible to bring about lasting peace. For example, without addressing Yemen's internal conflicts and political tensions; which include the southern movement aiming for secession, Houthi attacks on Marib, and Hadrmout calling for secession as well, it will be so difficult to achieve lasting peace across all of Yemen.<br /><br />So, What is needed for lasting peace? I think we should learn from Yemen's recent past and the transitional period after Yemen’s 2011 uprising. The GCC at the time intervened with a power-transfer deal that ignored transitional justice - which played a role in triggering the civil conflict. To ensure a lasting peace today, besides addressing Yemen's internal conflicts and political tensions, we need to learn from the recent past & understand that Transitional justice is key. Some think it's too early to discuss the need for reparations & redress to war victims by all parties to the conflict, but I think this is fundamental as one peril of lasting peace.<br /></div><div><br /></div></div>Afrah Nasser's Bloghttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05429782314834231913noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7866330248567333783.post-75283965644623190532023-03-28T21:30:00.002+02:002023-03-29T10:53:16.466+02:00Is there any hope of an end to Yemen’s war? | Al Jazeera English <div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjg6klHQ9aDg8AaSI3OaciB2ou17QALwl3wURs89ebQC7bYYNkJznR5W9d6iD_CRvwzPTNtRgLQRs4yNGWoZp4v0qLoJJwA9rFcEVBoVEJBrsPNfDtHWE3QKP9-WsyLHwy4qnU-FwT0lrd7tRalku0YV2n5epAdldcWdFbj5GoLh11e6JMzZY1N0cxO/s1429/Screenshot%202023-03-29%20at%2010.37.55.png" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="825" data-original-width="1429" height="335" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjg6klHQ9aDg8AaSI3OaciB2ou17QALwl3wURs89ebQC7bYYNkJznR5W9d6iD_CRvwzPTNtRgLQRs4yNGWoZp4v0qLoJJwA9rFcEVBoVEJBrsPNfDtHWE3QKP9-WsyLHwy4qnU-FwT0lrd7tRalku0YV2n5epAdldcWdFbj5GoLh11e6JMzZY1N0cxO/w579-h335/Screenshot%202023-03-29%20at%2010.37.55.png" width="579" /></a></div><div style="text-align: center;"><br /></div><h3 style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-weight: normal;">Recent events have made Yemen in the news headlines. From the announcement of a coming prisoners exchange deal to the impact of the Saudi-Iran resuming ties deal, one wonders if those events bring Yemen closer to a peace deal. I reflect on all that in a quick comment on <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=b8lfrgIiYjc" target="_blank">Al Jazeera English's The Stream Program</a>. </span></h3><div><span style="font-weight: normal;"><br /></span></div>
<iframe allow="accelerometer; autoplay; clipboard-write; encrypted-media; gyroscope; picture-in-picture; web-share" allowfullscreen="" frameborder="0" height="350" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/b8lfrgIiYjc" title="YouTube video player" width="650"></iframe> Afrah Nasser's Bloghttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05429782314834231913noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7866330248567333783.post-39162748303104673762023-03-14T10:54:00.008+01:002023-03-29T11:17:26.400+02:00Oman’s Interests and Role in the Conflict in Yemen<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><div style="text-align: left;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEi0nAZT_Y0n60YNlX0L3aOCO1s0RKWaxI1e_0banaC8uMurVM4DJBFDzDXpa8Hvznbm1fgOpOfwGHhISjt77BTAdDojVxsfvbWjUTm7hrlgbqKKBsyr4Pm3qyk_oTPpYpu9dmi2dqjBMy3AWvrYpEF8YzZ7MKIeRqIFqBUGpCxt4iQt66voItA24_qh" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img alt="" data-original-height="800" data-original-width="1200" height="186" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEi0nAZT_Y0n60YNlX0L3aOCO1s0RKWaxI1e_0banaC8uMurVM4DJBFDzDXpa8Hvznbm1fgOpOfwGHhISjt77BTAdDojVxsfvbWjUTm7hrlgbqKKBsyr4Pm3qyk_oTPpYpu9dmi2dqjBMy3AWvrYpEF8YzZ7MKIeRqIFqBUGpCxt4iQt66voItA24_qh=w280-h186" width="280" /></a> <a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEjuhOyDdzxnYRnRE22z6LroNyYnc2oZOCAExRFRGr9P_5quWnhH2GI_Idodn6p8k5BaaoJ_CbRVUA2seP9wZ64a2AkUnAaZGvLCBs57zBbGLaKvQKM0nJqLGbjgdsikpdHJGpb7tN1RmucfinLU4gdRp0pDwEOe2dI2ekMuw_yevSzKM1rTJNzrAww5" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em; text-align: right;"><img alt="" data-original-height="563" data-original-width="750" height="184" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEjuhOyDdzxnYRnRE22z6LroNyYnc2oZOCAExRFRGr9P_5quWnhH2GI_Idodn6p8k5BaaoJ_CbRVUA2seP9wZ64a2AkUnAaZGvLCBs57zBbGLaKvQKM0nJqLGbjgdsikpdHJGpb7tN1RmucfinLU4gdRp0pDwEOe2dI2ekMuw_yevSzKM1rTJNzrAww5=w245-h184" width="245" /></a></div><br /></div><br /><a href="https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/omans-interests-and-role-in-the-conflict-in-yemen/" target="_blank">Arab Center Washington DC</a> - In the course of the conflict in Yemen, Oman’s role has evolved substantially and in various ways. Currently, expectations are high that the sultanate will be able to do more, especially after its having <a href="https://www.muscatdaily.com/2023/03/11/iran-saudi-thank-oman-for-facilitating-talks/">hosted talks between Saudi Arabia and Iran</a> that partially paved the road to a recent deal between the two rivals. Yemen’s humanitarian crisis and the presence of security risks on its border with Oman are among the factors that have made the sultanate’s interaction with both Yemeni and foreign parties to the ongoing conflict more or less inevitable. By using covert mediation efforts early on, and by later deploying more overt means of facilitating dialogue, Oman has been using its longstanding policy of deploying diplomacy for conflict resolution, and thereby playing an important role in working to end the conflict and to address Yemen’s dire humanitarian crisis. Although it remains to be seen whether Omani mediation will successfully achieve a peace deal in Yemen, Oman’s role will undoubtedly represent a vital factor in Yemen’s prospects for peace and stability.<br /><br /><br /><h3 style="text-align: left;">What Does Yemen Represent for Oman?</h3><div><br /></div><div>Wracked as it is by the conflict, Yemen represents for Oman both a humanitarian burden and a security challenge. Humanitarian problems have spilled over into Oman as Yemen’s conflict, which has led to hundreds of thousands of people being <a href="https://acleddata.com/conflict-watchlist-2023/yemen/">killed and wounded</a>, and which has caused <a href="https://www.unfpa.org/yemen">one of the world’s largest humanitarian crises</a>, with <a href="https://www.wfp.org/emergencies/yemen-emergency">17 million people</a> currently suffering from food insecurity and a lack of basic services that are compounded by the country’s damaged infrastructure. Oman has also felt Yemen’s deepening humanitarian crisis, given that the two countries share a nearly 300-kilometer border, and that Oman has been one of the few countries that has kept its doors open for Yemenis.<br /><br />Over the course of the conflict, <a href="https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/un-general-assembly-syria-calls-us-leave-oman-praises-yemen-peace-efforts">thousands of Yemeni refugees</a> have fled to Oman, and Yemenis <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/12/16/yemens-war-wounded-find-comfort-in-brotherly-oman/">injured in the conflict</a> have been able to take advantage of the <a href="https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2020/01/oman-humanitarian-aid-yemen-pragmatic.html">medical care</a> that Oman has been providing them free of charge. With the number of internally displaced people in Yemen now standing at 4.5 million, Yemen is a potential source for an influx of refugees into Oman, which would certainly weigh heavily on the sultanate’s economy and drain its ability to provide various services.<br /><br />In terms of national security, militarization and possible terrorist activities in Yemen’s al-Mahra Governorate, which abuts Oman from the west, have represented a major security concern for the sultanate, since it fears that violence could easily cross over into its territory. With the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-36128614">temporary rise of al-Qaeda</a> in Yemen’s Hadramawt Governorate in 2016, Oman was reminded of these very fears, which it had been <a href="https://www.pressreader.com/oman/times-of-oman/20150204/281479274831371">expressing since the beginning of the Yemen conflict</a> in 2015. Saudi and Emirati military forces deployed to eliminate the threat posed by al-Qaeda, but their <a href="https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2018/01/saudi-uae-involvement-eastern-yemen-oman-border.html">expanded presence in Yemen</a>, which started to reach into al-Mahra in 2017 raised security concerns in Oman, especially given that the sultanate has spent many years establishing its influence in eastern Yemen.<br /><br /></div><div><h3 style="text-align: left;">Oman’s Involvement in the Yemen Conflict</h3><br />Oman’s involvement in the Yemen conflict has gone through several phases. In the first phase, it chose to present a prospective peace deal instead of participating in the conflict militarily; and it was indeed the only Gulf state that refused to participate in the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-32061632">Saudi-led military coalition</a>. Oman thus demonstrated its strong belief that a military option was not the solution to the conflict, but rather that diplomacy and peaceful political dialogue were the way forward. This led to the second phase of Oman’s involvement, wherein it was quietly <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/oman-s-diplomatic-bridge-in-yemen/">leading covert mediation efforts</a> between the parties to the conflict. In the third and current phase, Oman has been publicly <a href="https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2023/02/yemen-closed-consultations-and-vote-on-sanctions-regime-renewal.php">hosting direct talks</a> between the Houthi armed group and Saudi Arabia ever since a United Nations-sponsored <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/04/1115392">truce</a> ended in October 2022 without an extension.<br /><br />Nonetheless, doubts about Oman’s involvement in Yemen grew with increasing reports about weapons smuggling off its coast and on its border with Yemen. Numerous reports have detailed the confiscation of smuggled weapons in the Gulf of Oman. On March 2, for example, the US Navy <a href="https://www.cusnc.navy.mil/Media/News/Display/Article/3315919/us-forces-assist-uk-seizure-of-missiles-shipped-from-iran/">reported</a> that it had assisted the British Navy in confiscating a weapons shipment that originated from Iran and that was likely bound for Yemen. In January, the US Navy said that its forces had <a href="https://www.navy.mil/Press-Office/News-Stories/Article/3263315/us-navy-intercepts-more-than-2000-assault-rifles-shipped-from-iran/">intercepted a fishing vessel</a> in the Gulf of Oman that was carrying 2,116 AK-47 assault rifles on a route used to transfer illicit cargo to the Houthis. In February, the Wall Street Journal reported that French special forces had <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/french-forces-seize-iranian-supplied-weapons-bound-for-yemen-11675242819">seized rifles and anti-tank missiles</a> that also were bound for the Houthis. Again in February, UN investigators reported on the possible role of individuals or entities in Oman in <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/final-report-panel-experts-yemen-established-pursuant-security-council-resolution-2140-2014s2023130-enar">smuggling anti-tank guided missiles</a> overland from Oman to Yemen, weapons that were probably destined for the Houthis.<br /><br />Allegations that Oman was <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/yemen-security-iran-idINL8N1CO6S1">quietly supporting the Houthis with smuggled weapons</a> began several years ago. At the time, the Omani Ministry of Foreign Affairs strongly <a href="https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/oman-denies-arms-smuggled-through-border-houthis">denied said allegations</a>, saying that claims about Iranian weapons being smuggled across Oman’s border with Yemen were baseless and that arms traffickers were instead taking advantage of unmonitored areas of Yemen’s shoreline. Regional experts and scholars agree that even before the ongoing conflict in Yemen, areas at the Yemen-Oman-Saudi confluence of borders were known for smuggling activities. The idea that Oman was allowing arms to be funneled to the Houthis is based on the misconception that Oman is supporting the Houthi armed group, whose officials it openly hosts in Muscat. However, the truth is that Oman is maintaining good ties with all parties, and is hosting numerous officials from a wide range of Yemen’s political parties, including the General People’s Congress, the Islah Party, and the Southern Transitional Council (STC); but it asks these officials to keep a low profile in their dealings with Oman for the sake of a successful mediation process, since Oman sees that undue publicity in the process as potentially counterproductive.<br /><br />Because Oman does not update the media with information about its approach to the conflict in Yemen, two of the steps it has taken could be interpreted as indicative of its security approach and its recent mechanisms to address increased smuggling. First, since 2013, Oman has sought to strengthen its border security by building a costly <a href="https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/salalah-forever-omans-security-wall-cant-dent-deep-yemeni-ties">security wall</a> along its border with Yemen. Second, in 2021, Oman <a href="https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2022-04/fs_2204_milex_2021_0.pdf">spent 7.3 percent of its GDP on military expenditures</a>, demonstrating its increased concern with a potential enlargement of the conflict. So far, Oman has successfully avoided a spillover of violence into its territory and has also succeeded in refusing to be dragged into the violence in Yemen. Nonetheless, the sultanate remains vigilant about the prospect of threats emanating from its neighbor.<br /><br /></div><div><h3 style="text-align: left;">Oman’s Involvement with Foreign Actors in Yemen</h3><br />Armed with its stance in favor of peace in Yemen, Oman has maintained good relations with the various outside actors involved (directly and indirectly) in the conflict: Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Iran, and the United States. And it has done this despite security concerns about the growing influence and military mobilization of Saudi Arabia and the UAE in southern Yemen. The UAE’s support of <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/4/26/yemen-what-is-the-southern-transitional-council">the STC</a>, which is calling for “<a href="https://en.stcaden.com/news/7931">a sovereign independent federal state</a>” in southern Yemen, and the presence of the UAE’s proxy armed forces <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-yemen-security-separatists-idUKKBN23S0DH">controlling Yemen’s Socotra island</a> have been unsettling for Oman. Even more concerning is the UAE and Saudi Arabia’s <a href="https://www.middleeasteye.net/opinion/expo-2020-dubai-yemen-pavilion-look">support of Yemeni armed groups</a> that operate outside the control of the internationally-recognized Yemeni government, and that actually often militarily challenge government forces. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia seems to have aspirations of <a href="https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20180903-saudi-arabia-prepares-to-extend-oil-pipeline-through-yemen-to-arabian-sea/">building an oil pipeline</a> from the kingdom through eastern Yemen to the Arabian Sea.<br /><br />These changing security dynamics just next door could translate into instability in the sultanate’s western region for some time to come. Expectedly, responding to these developments is a priority in Oman’s national security agenda. However, Oman has not initiated any confrontation—neither a diplomatic nor a military one—most probably because of Oman’s long-standing policy of tolerance of differences and of peaceful dialogue during conflicts.<br /><br />Oman is eager to continue its cordial relationships with the UAE and Saudi Arabia, and seems to be primarily focusing on continuing and enhancing its constructive diplomatic efforts and on building a bridge between Saudi Arabia and the UAE on the one hand, and the Houthis and Iran on the other. Now that Saudi Arabia and Iran have resumed diplomatic relations, Oman’s involvement between the two will evolve into a new chapter, one that moves beyond merely using backchannels for communication between the two countries.<br /><br />The United States, meanwhile, <a href="https://www.state.gov/telephonic-press-briefing-with-special-envoy-for-yemen-tim-lenderking/">continues to express gratitude</a> for Oman’s engagement and mediation efforts in the conflict in Yemen; but Oman continues to be cautious. Notably, US Special Envoy to Yemen Tim Lenderking has not officially met with Mohammed Abdul-Salam, head of the Houthi delegation in Muscat. Oman seems to be pushing the United States’ mediation efforts to the side because it views US involvement in the peace process in Yemen as problematic. One interpretation of this is that Oman views cleaning up the US’s currently bad reputation in Yemen—built in large part on US complicity in war crimes—as extremely time consuming. Also possible is that Oman is concerned that the US might take all the credit when a peace deal is brokered, even though the sultanate is the country that has done all the hard work.<br /><br /></div><div><h3 style="text-align: left;">What Is to Be Expected?</h3><br />Oman’s role in Yemen has been vital, as is vividly demonstrated by its mediation efforts. The public in Yemen perceives Oman positively, despite media reports of smuggled weapons traversing its territory. Yemenis recognize Oman primarily as a peacemaker, given that it stepped in with a peace initiative early on in the conflict, at a time when not many other countries were willing to do so. Yemeni expectations for Oman are positive, and most appreciate Oman for its wise decision not to participate in the Saudi-led coalition and for prioritizing peaceful dialogue instead.<br /><br />The warring parties, meanwhile, perceive Oman as a third party that enjoys good connections with all stakeholders, and that could help all of them save face as they try to reach a settlement to resolve the conflict. This is Oman’s biggest challenge in the mediation efforts, because putting the warring parties in embarrassing or uncomfortable positions could possibly cause a return to the status quo ante. Thus, Oman’s tactic of starting covert mediation efforts in the beginning of the conflict and continuing them now saves all the parties from the dreaded embarrassment and discomfort.<br /><br />The question remains: Will Oman bring peace to Yemen? Does it have the ability to influence the warring parties? For Oman, the answers depend on those parties’ plans. Being friends with everyone gives it an opportunity to communicate with all actors, but not necessarily to influence them. Oman’s approach is not to impose solutions on anyone or to patronize; but rather to provide a venue for warring parties to sit, negotiate, and reach a solution themselves, and at their own pace.<br /><br />However, in one of the few rare official statements by Omani officials about Oman’s mediation efforts, Omani Foreign Minister Badr Albusaidi in 2022 gave a description of <a href="https://thearabweekly.com/oman-calls-formation-inclusive-government-yemen">the political settlement that Oman envisions for Yemen</a>. He said that Oman is pushing for the formation of an inclusive national government, in which all stakeholders in Yemen are represented. The Omani role in achieving this goal is expected to proceed within the framework of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). In 2021, prominent Omani academic Abdullah Baabood <a href="https://berghof-foundation.org/library/omani-perspectives-on-the-peace-process-in-yemen">predicted</a> that Oman’s peace perspective on Yemen might include its possible support of a GCC-led initiative for the country that would include the withdrawal of foreign forces on the one hand, and its possible support of Yemen’s admission to the GCC, on the other. Only time will tell regarding the fate of Oman’s mediation efforts and its future role in Yemen. </div><div><br /></div><div>*I wrote this policy analysis paper for the Arab Center Washington DC. It was first published on the center's website <a href="https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/omans-interests-and-role-in-the-conflict-in-yemen/" target="_blank">here</a> on the 14th of March 2023. </div>Afrah Nasser's Bloghttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05429782314834231913noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7866330248567333783.post-22099756814107755422023-02-02T11:33:00.013+01:002023-02-06T12:16:16.495+01:00Child Soldiers in Yemen: Cannon Fodder for an Unnecessary War<div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEgUHDCZHltSXPrDvJL1DurO93z7STh7PAqcYS9d4_SB8qp2ycBPg5uKOHu_e6ywnS_BPfMY3sQRSjZ1SFqwJzeSvtuta78SYHs7BVohIJKdT72W9cTBbQ_QxlmqLPO-mJtkCffzedSeWmdDMGtmabd1OF09HWvI8apoxt7rZ-jmVKlJNrJ253Ax5C4U" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img alt="" data-original-height="432" data-original-width="768" height="360" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEgUHDCZHltSXPrDvJL1DurO93z7STh7PAqcYS9d4_SB8qp2ycBPg5uKOHu_e6ywnS_BPfMY3sQRSjZ1SFqwJzeSvtuta78SYHs7BVohIJKdT72W9cTBbQ_QxlmqLPO-mJtkCffzedSeWmdDMGtmabd1OF09HWvI8apoxt7rZ-jmVKlJNrJ253Ax5C4U=w640-h360" width="640" /></a></div><br /><br /></div>*Feb 2, 2023, <a href="https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/child-soldiers-in-yemen-cannon-fodder-for-an-unnecessary-war/" target="_blank">The Arab Center Washington DC</a> - Recruitment of children as actual or auxiliary soldiers in Yemen’s ongoing war is one of the most dire developments in the conflict since its initial eruption in 2014. Driven to the frontlines by the machinations of invested leaders, financial need, tribal solidarity, and other reasons, children have paid a heavy price, one that will continue to accrue for years to come and will affect all of Yemeni society. Aside from it being a war crime under international law, using Yemen’s children as fuel for a seemingly endless war will deprive them and their country of the chance to build both a modern economy that can guarantee a decent standard of living and a sovereign state that can safeguard the rights of its people.<br /><br /><div><h2 style="text-align: left;">All Parties Recruit Children</h2><br />Walking down any street of Yemen’s capital city, Sanaa, which is controlled by the Houthi insurgent group (officially known as Ansar Allah), one quickly notices posters and photos pasted on walls and advertising stands that show the group’s child soldiers who were killed in the conflict, all dressed in military uniform. The Houthi armed group has recruited and utilized <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/04/19/houthis-commit-end-violations-against-children-yemen">thousands of children</a> in the fighting, and indeed, <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/press-release/2017/02/yemen-huthi-forces-recruiting-child-soldiers-for-front-line-combat/">all parties to the conflict in Yemen</a> have recruited children. According to the <a href="https://childrenandarmedconflict.un.org/2022/07/statistics-should-never-overshadow-the-individual-suffering-of-children-in-armed-conflict-we-must-redouble-efforts-to-end-grave-violations/">Annual Report of the UN Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict</a> released in July 2022, children in Yemen have been recruited by the internationally recognized government of Yemen (IRGY), pro-government militias, the Houthis, unidentified perpetrators, the Security Belt Forces, and the so-called Islamic State. UNICEF <a href="https://www.unicef.org/mena/press-releases/more-11000-children-killed-or-injured-yemen">reported</a> at the end of last year that the UN has verified that 3,995 children (both boys and, to a lesser extent, girls) have been recruited since 2015. And the report admits that actual numbers are likely much higher.<br /><br />The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/2017/02/press-briefing-notes-thailand-and-yemen?LangID=E&NewsID=21244">reported in</a><a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/2017/02/press-briefing-notes-thailand-and-yemen?LangID=E&NewsID=21244"> 2017</a> that the majority of the reports it has received of child recruitment were committed by the Popular Committees affiliated with the Houthis. Local Yemeni human rights group, SAM for Rights and Liberties, together with Euro-Med Human Rights Monitor, <a href="https://samrl.org/pdf/455childrenyemenrepen.pdf">reported in 2021</a> that data it has gathered shows that the Houthi group alone has recruited 10,333 children since 2014. Despite the decline in active fighting following a series of truces last year, and despite the Houthis’ <a href="https://www.unicef.org/press-releases/sanaa-authorities-yemen-sign-action-plan-un-prevent-grave-violations-against">pledge</a> to the UN in April to end child recruitment, the group <a href="https://apnews.com/article/politics-middle-east-sanaa-houthis-religion-5e62561f8070441412ed52d222c950e3">continues to recruit children</a>.<br /><br /><br />Recruitment of children under the age of 18 is a direct violation of existing Yemeni legislation, including the <a href="https://www.unicef-irc.org/portfolios/documents/457_yemen.htm">Juvenile Welfare Act</a> established in 1992 and the <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2009/10/committee-rights-child-examines-report-yemen">Rights of the Child Act</a> established in 2002. And recruitment of children under 15 is <a href="https://childrenandarmedconflict.un.org/six-grave-violations/child-soldiers/">defined as a war crime</a> by the International Criminal Court. Regardless, children who act as combatants in armed groups, militias, and even government forces typically engage in warfare in a variety of ways, including fighting, spying, laying mines, and working at security checkpoints.</div><div><br /><h2 style="text-align: left;">Using Children as Fodder for War</h2><br />Since the beginning of the Yemen conflict in 2014, child recruitment has become extremely prevalent among parties to the conflict. On December 2018, the New York Times <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/28/world/africa/saudi-sudan-yemen-child-fighters.html">reported</a> that Saudi Arabia has recruited Sudanese children as child soldiers and sent them to the battlefield. Moreover, the UN Group of Eminent International and Regional Experts on Yemen <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/situation-human-rights-yemen-including-violations-and-abuses-september-2014-report-1">reported</a> <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/situation-human-rights-yemen-including-violations-and-abuses-september-2014-report-1">in 2021</a> that it has investigated cases of children being recruited in Yemen, trained in Saudi Arabia, and used in hostilities in Yemen by the Saudi-led coalition and the government of Yemen.<br /><br />Child recruitment has also been taking place among Yemen’s UAE-backed, non-state armed groups. The UN Group of Eminent International and Regional Experts on Yemen <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/GEE-Yemen/2020-09-09-report.pdf">reported</a> in 2020 that the UAE was providing support to nearly 90,000 fighters in Yemen, and some of these fighters are <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/4/1/exclusive-yemeni-child-soldiers-recruited-by-saudi-uae-coalition">known to be children</a>.<br /><br />The Security Belt Forces and the Shabwani Elite Forces are some of the major <a href="https://www.middleeasteye.net/opinion/expo-2020-dubai-yemen-pavilion-look">UAE-backed armed groups</a> in Yemen. The Security Belt Forces, established <a href="https://www.aljazeera.net/encyclopedia/military/2017/10/21/%D9%82%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B2%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%86%D9%8A-%D8%A5%D8%AD%D8%AF%D9%89-%D8%A3%D8%B0%D8%B1%D8%B9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA">in 2016</a>, are the military unit affiliated with the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council—a political council seeking to establish <a href="https://en.stcaden.com/news/7931">a sovereign and independent federal state</a> in southern Yemen. The Security Belt Forces <a href="https://reliefweb.int/attachments/a999a934-cae1-482e-9c2a-6f25d686a1ff/Secretary-General-Annual-Report-on-children-and-armed-conflict.pdf">have recruited children</a>, according to a UN report published last year. And Yemen’s National Commission to Investigate Alleged Violations of Human Rights <a href="https://www.nciye.org/reports/NineReport/NINE-en.pdf">reported</a> in 2021 that the Shabwani Elite Forces had recruited one child.<br /><br /></div><div><h2 style="text-align: left;">Factors Behind the Recruitment of Children</h2><br />Before the outbreak of the current conflict, during former President Ali Abdullah Saleh’s rule, the recruitment of children happened mainly within government forces. In those days, the defense sector was one of the state’s most stable institutions, providing steady salaries. This situation encouraged families to alter their children’s birth certificates to raise their ages to 18, allowing them to enlist in the army and receive a salary. However, children didn’t necessarily participate in belligerent military activities at the time. <br /><br /><br />Another factor affecting such enlistment was the fact that Yemeni social customs and traditions associate carrying a gun with prestigious status and power, including when it comes to children. There is also a tendency in Yemeni culture to perceive someone who is 15 or 16 as an adult, and no longer a child. At this age, individuals are expected to work, especially if they are already married, having been victims of the practice of child marriage. Laws established prior to the conflict to prohibit child recruitment, such as the aforementioned Juvenile Welfare Act and the Rights of the Child Act, turned out to be extremely weak because they failed to deter perpetrators by mandating and enforcing concrete punishment.<br /><br />The <a href="https://borgenproject.org/child-marriage-in-yemen/">lack of legislation to ban child marriage</a> has also had an indirect but significant effect on child recruitment. Unable to afford to feed and take care of their children, families escape poverty by marrying off their young children. Married children tend to have children directly after marriage and remain illiterate and without the skills to raise and take care of their children. Child marriages lead to an abundance of children in a family that is already struggling with poverty. It is not unusual in Yemen to find a man or a woman, especially in rural areas, who is still in their twenties yet is already a grandparent. And people who were married as children often push their children to do any kind of work to make money, even if it means taking part in war.<br /><br />In a country where nearly half the population of <a href="https://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/yemen-population">34 million</a> is under 18, children are always plentiful. Given the <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/yemen/publication/yemen-economic-monitor-clearing-skies-over-yemen-spring-2022">profound economic crisis</a> that Yemen is currently facing, children have been the victims of economic exploitation amid growing poverty. Reasons for child recruitment vary from one area to another; however, the most common reason behind its success is dire economic circumstances. The <a href="https://www.undp.org/publications/assessing-impact-war-yemen-pathways-recovery">destruction of vital infrastructure</a> during the conflict has destroyed livelihoods, including those reliant on farming and fishing systems, <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/yemen/publication/economic-update-april-2022">making an already dire situation even worse</a>. And the <a href="https://yemenconflict.crisisgroup.org/">war economy</a> has made participation in armed conflict and related industries one of the key sources of income in the country.<br /><br />The majority of Yemen’s child soldiers come from destitute families and regions and are lured with money. Through a combination of coercion, solicitation with salaries, and propaganda, children are recruited, and they are easily lured by the promise of a salary of 20,000 Yemeni rials (approximately $25), accommodation, a daily supply of khat (a plant that acts as a stimulant when chewed), tobacco, and other benefits. The salary makes a child feel that they will soon be in a better economic situation and will be able to transfer some of the money to their family and to thereby improve their economic situation as well.<br /><br /></div><div><h2 style="text-align: left;">The Recruitment Process</h2><br />In the child soldier recruitment process, international humanitarian aid plays a significant role. According to numerous reports by local media, the Houthi group steals humanitarian aid and then exploits people’s need for said aid in order to recruit children. Several <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2020/09/14/deadly-consequences/obstruction-aid-yemen-during-covid-19">reports</a> have documented that the group has <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2019/jan/02/aid-officials-aware-for-months-of-widespread-food-aid-theft-in-yemen">diverted aid</a> to its military effort.<br /><br />The Houthi group has created the Supreme Council for Management and Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and International Cooperation (SCMCHA), which supervises and regulates all humanitarian aid programs carried out in Houthi-controlled areas. However, it often uses this body and other means to “try to compel the selection of certain contractors, restrict the travel of aid workers or otherwise seek to influence aid operations,” according to a <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/under-secretary-general-humanitarian-affairs-and-emergency-relief-coordinator-martin-griffiths-statement-security-council-briefing-yemen-16-january-2023">statement</a> made in January by UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator Martin Griffiths.<br /><br /><br />The Houthi armed group has an advanced system of recruiting given its long history of recruiting children since the 1990s, one that includes brokers, Houthi supervisors, teachers, and neighborhood elders. Children recruited by the group go into a camp for children where they receive military training. Those camps date to the 1990s when they were called “summer camps” and intended to be run only during the summer, during children’s break from school. Today, those camps are open all year long. And traditional schools are actually being transformed to more closely resemble the organization of the old summer camps. This is being done by the second most important man in the armed group, Yahia Badreddin al-Houthi—the brother of the group’s leader, Abdul-Malik al-Houthi—who has been the Minister of Education in the Houthi’s de facto northern government since 2016. Al-Houthi has made <a href="https://sanaacenter.org/ypf/curriculum-changes-to-mold-the-jihadis-of-tomorrow/">changes to the curriculum</a> in Houthi-controlled areas, with a focus on the group’s <a href="https://south24.net/news/newse.php?nid=3018">sectarian ideology</a>.<br /><br /></div><div><h2 style="text-align: left;">Implications of Child Recruitment</h2><br />The ramifications of child recruitment, if not carefully and thoroughly addressed, will negatively impact peace-building efforts, especially because numerous child soldiers repeatedly return to fighting, with local media groups claiming that some have returned as many as three times. The increasing militarization of Yemen’s youth in the course of the conflict might become one factor affecting the potential for the conflict to erupt again in the future, even if peace is achieved in the short term. Pre-conflict factors, the devastating impact of the conflict, and the lack of a comprehensive development strategy will all likely lead to continued recruitment—and most likely the re-recruitment—of children. However, comprehensively addressing child recruitment today will help minimize the chances of a return to conflict.<br /><br />The recruitment of children for warfare in Yemen is not only a fundamental human rights issue; it is also a profound peace issue. No society can achieve peace by turning its children into soldiers. Any potential political agreement or negotiation to end the conflict in Yemen must therefore include a clause banning the recruitment and use of children in any form of hostilities. The UN and other stakeholders should then establish monitoring procedures to identify individuals and groups that violate such an agreement. The international community needs to play a more proactive role by instituting sanctions against officials and individuals responsible for child recruitment.<br /><br />The international community should also donate generously to rehabilitation and reintegration programs organized and run by Yemen’s civil society groups who are documenting the recruitment of children for military activities, such as the <a href="https://www.yocht.org/?lang=en">Yemen Organization for Combating Human Trafficking</a> and <a href="https://www.mayyun.org/news108.html">Mayyun for Human Rights and Development</a>. The international community must rethink its humanitarian aid funding and limit the ways that local armed groups can manipulate aid to fuel the process of child soldier recruitment, ensuring that aid distribution happens independently and without interference. The Yemeni government must also be pressured to amend its inconsistent laws defining the age of a child, which also feed confusion and lead to victimization. Yemen’s children will soon be the ones building their country’s future, but in order to do so they must first be allowed to enjoy a real childhood, one that is free from exploitation and violence.</div><div><br /></div><div><br /></div><div>*This policy analysis report by Afrah Nasser was originally written for/published by the Arab Center Washington DC on February 2, 2023. <a href="https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/child-soldiers-in-yemen-cannon-fodder-for-an-unnecessary-war/" target="_blank">Source link here</a>. </div>Afrah Nasser's Bloghttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05429782314834231913noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7866330248567333783.post-91302672351593263712022-12-18T09:11:00.009+01:002023-02-05T10:25:46.410+01:00‘Republic of fear’: A return to Yemen after 11 years <table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEhK80beHcRm78TVzr0LXphzefTibO_H_Zz78gdXBbuETRh7rhGqkmbTnkv3cYhDHgThWDp2CwreiE_kC0ZrbOrLSE3Kw1pyEoBu_RIQcuIvuKrayUuTYTGK8N9IKoXxFhYW-8HzF-B8A0KSzBuKERcR2PEDhPiR_aDzVjD45xXZpGZp4XPQfUNcOa2M" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img alt="" data-original-height="787" data-original-width="1049" height="480" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEhK80beHcRm78TVzr0LXphzefTibO_H_Zz78gdXBbuETRh7rhGqkmbTnkv3cYhDHgThWDp2CwreiE_kC0ZrbOrLSE3Kw1pyEoBu_RIQcuIvuKrayUuTYTGK8N9IKoXxFhYW-8HzF-B8A0KSzBuKERcR2PEDhPiR_aDzVjD45xXZpGZp4XPQfUNcOa2M=w640-h480" width="640" /></a></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption"><div style="text-align: center;"><i><span style="color: #444444;">After almost 12 years of living in exile in Sweden, I went back to Yemen </span></i><i><span style="color: #444444;">to visit my </span></i></div><div style="text-align: center;"><i><span style="color: #444444;">hometown Sana'a in May 2022. (Old Sana'a, Yemen (C) Afrah Nasser)</span></i></div></td></tr></tbody></table><br /><br />*As the plane descended, a once familiar sight appeared outside the window, one that I had not seen for 12 years: the waters of the Arabian Sea, the buildings in the distance and then, just when you think you’re about to land on the water, the runway of Aden’s airport.<br /><br />When I left Yemen’s capital Sanaa in 2011, with just carry-on luggage, I didn’t think I would be away for so long.<br /><br />But a dictatorship, threats, and then <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/10/3/is-fighting-about-to-return-to-yemen-explainer">a war</a> kept me away.<br /><br />The war was why, when I arrived for my visit in April, I had to fly to Aden, Yemen’s second city in the south of the country, and not Sanaa, where I’m from, in the north. Sanaa is controlled by the Houthis, the Iranian-allied rebel group the Saudi-backed government has been fighting since 2014.<br /><br />As I was to find out, despite all those years of fighting, and Saudi-led coalition air raids, the Houthis are still deeply entrenched in the north.<br /><br />“You still look the same,” said my 31-year-old cousin, Ahmed*, as he greeted me at the airport. “It’s like you’ve only been away for a short trip.”<br /><br />Ahmed and the rest of my family have been following my reporting on Yemen from Sweden, where I have been based since I left, and the country I am now a citizen of. But writing about Yemen is not the same as being in it. As Ahmed hugged me, my tears betrayed how I felt about being away from my country and my family.<br /><br />“Don’t cry,” said Ahmed gently, as we began the 14-hour road trip to Sanaa. “Save your tears for the destruction and despair that you are about to see.”<div><br /></div><div><table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEiIUAJFylJhkmAZgdY-C__dtZKbfH5sOsDRu6PfmWrkZ9cXRbo1qIdD8EqV3xhZkilK8oxJ5SlBr_HQDZnn7DUxydNGe9B2gqdjo-TtcLOGcxPp-hULaPdnJBFMpKsVkxvSyBbESV8_SJjZdBFTiLsC2xVgvR8ayCyodCzKDWK04BlKpNfdMAos63XE" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img alt="" data-original-height="513" data-original-width="770" height="426" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEiIUAJFylJhkmAZgdY-C__dtZKbfH5sOsDRu6PfmWrkZ9cXRbo1qIdD8EqV3xhZkilK8oxJ5SlBr_HQDZnn7DUxydNGe9B2gqdjo-TtcLOGcxPp-hULaPdnJBFMpKsVkxvSyBbESV8_SJjZdBFTiLsC2xVgvR8ayCyodCzKDWK04BlKpNfdMAos63XE=w640-h426" width="640" /></a></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><i><span style="color: #444444;">The flag of the former South Yemen, which united with North Yemen to form the Republic of Yemen in 1990, is visible across southern Yemen,a sign of the strength of separatist sentiment<br /> [Afrah Nasser/Al Jazeera]</span></i></td></tr></tbody></table><br /><h2 style="text-align: left;">Journey into exile</h2><br />Before leaving Yemen I worked as a journalist. I had just started my blog, devoted to covering human rights in the country, when the 2011 uprising began. I covered the protests against then-President Ali Abdullah Saleh, who had ruled the former North Yemen since 1978, and then when it united with South Yemen in 1990, the Republic of Yemen. <br /><br />In those early days of the protests, there was so much optimism about the future of the country, but at the same time, massacres of protesters warned of what was to come.<br /><br />I was frustrated that only a few native Yemeni voices were writing about what was happening in Yemen in English, so I started to blog about it.<br /><br />My writing brought warnings, hateful comments, and then death threats. But I continued until, in May 2011, three years into my work as a full-time reporter at the Yemen Observer newspaper in Sanaa, I left for Sweden to participate in a training course I’d applied for before the protests had begun.<br /><br />While I was away, armed fighting started on the streets of Sanaa. “The violence is escalating. Don’t come back now,” my family would tell me on the phone. “If you do come back, you won’t be able to write, you can’t write any more. It’s too dangerous.”<br /><br />I couldn’t imagine life without writing, so, at 25 years old, I made the decision to stay on my own in Sweden.<br /><br />In my phone calls with my family, the main way I have been able to keep in touch during the long years of my exile, the warnings continued.<br /><br />“If you come back and continue your journalism, you’ll end up in prison,” my mother would say. “I have no connections to get you out, and I will not come to visit you in your cell. You’ll be tortured and raped. Do not come back.”<br /><br />My mother was terrified that my work would endanger me. Her solution was to try and scare me away from the profession.<br /><br />I heard their warnings, but the pain of being away was growing unbearable. I’m sure everyone says the same thing about their country, or the place they grew up in, but Yemen had a hold of me.<br /><br />Covering Yemen from afar was the only thing that filled the void inside me and helped ease the pain of missing home. <br /><br /><table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEiXgfKWPfy91hm_BhsVWswuT9n5-ZMQP66nbBJTyF_snwPQPzRy4NeC_Y_gi8s-T337SCpxMLVJk_0cWHQ2mHQVSBN3DtQIH6ywcfzl4zmKGdLJM5p5DLKQB2cuZS0D49wqkjmCY6LfansP5cSdFpGlBe1HldTZ0h2Qj6O3Tt8NEXh1_1z8UND3bvxM" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img alt="" data-original-height="513" data-original-width="770" height="426" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEiXgfKWPfy91hm_BhsVWswuT9n5-ZMQP66nbBJTyF_snwPQPzRy4NeC_Y_gi8s-T337SCpxMLVJk_0cWHQ2mHQVSBN3DtQIH6ywcfzl4zmKGdLJM5p5DLKQB2cuZS0D49wqkjmCY6LfansP5cSdFpGlBe1HldTZ0h2Qj6O3Tt8NEXh1_1z8UND3bvxM=w640-h426" width="640" /></a></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><i><span style="color: #444444;">Posters of Houthi fighters who have died in the fighting have become ubiquitous <br />around Sanaa [Afrah Nasser/Al Jazeera]</span></i></td></tr></tbody></table><br /><br /><h2 style="text-align: left;">An opportunity to return</h2><br />This April, a <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/4/1/yemens-warring-parties-agree-to-two-month-truce-un-says">truce</a> – which ended on October 2 after the Houthis failed to agree on its renewal – brought the opening I was waiting for.<br /><br />An opportunity to spend the final days of Ramadan, and celebrate Eid, with the people I loved the most.<br /><br />But my entire family, apart from Ahmed, remained oblivious to my plans. After all their warnings, I didn’t want to have them worrying while I made the arduous journey.<br /><br />The trip from Aden to Sanaa was never an easy one – it passes from Yemen’s southern coast through the mountains, along winding roads with huge drops, and some of the most beautiful scenery you’ll see, the landscape changing from Ibb’s green mountains, to Dhamar’s fields, and then to the dustier, and yet still majestic, mountains of Sanaa.<br /><br />That beauty was still there, but the trip was now far harder to make.<br /><br />To avoid front lines, the route takes several detours, sometimes along roads that can barely be described as such, which occasionally flood in the summer rainy season.<br /><br />Many have lost their lives along these treacherous passages – secondary casualties of this brutal war. Another cause of significant delays: the approximately 40 checkpoints we had to pass through along the road that belonged to the various parties to the conflict.<br /><br />These checkpoints leave you drained, not only because of the gruelling interrogations that take place there, but also because of the realisation that you’re in a divided country, and Yemen is no longer a united land.<br /><br />“Where are you from? Show me identification,” the guard yelled as Ahmed and I arrived at a checkpoint controlled by the separatist Southern Transitional Council (STC).<br /><br />The United Arab Emirates-backed STC, the major force in southern Yemen, controls all the checkpoints along the road we took, up to the central governorate of al-Bayda.<br /><br />The STC guards had more questions: What city we were travelling to, where the car’s papers were, and whether they could take some of our qat (for all of Yemen’s divisions, qat, a mild narcotic, remains a great unifier).<br /><br />As we drove away from the checkpoint, Ahmed explained why we had not had much trouble.“They wanted to know if we were from Sanaa,” Ahmed, who was born and raised in Sanaa, said.<br /><br />“But my ID says that I’m from Hadramout instead.” Hadramout, a large governorate in eastern Yemen, has stayed out of much of the tension between the north and south. While it is a southern governorate, and separatist sentiment exists there, it has been spared much of the direct fighting that has occurred between government forces and separatists in other parts of the south.<br /><br />Back in 2016, Ahmed had managed to change his identification card to show his residence as Hadramout, knowing that it would save him from a lot of suspicion on trips around the country.</div><div><br /></div><div><table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEi4cWPV4IZ6iHxTCn_b0BhjOln4GG3u-tUwKTPic-qPhh_Ws4D-j9J0RnNA18lEhoIZVyDVgPdJTePF6LAXBmrucZwF8G_X6PUcMI-GKC-NGi639tW_oTo5OYvF_3ivRMBWYbKhnhkwidqkwI3kcSbHB1l9FbtC8vclGKEtCnY1vUHalL1R-K7sJJRv" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img alt="" data-original-height="513" data-original-width="770" height="426" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEi4cWPV4IZ6iHxTCn_b0BhjOln4GG3u-tUwKTPic-qPhh_Ws4D-j9J0RnNA18lEhoIZVyDVgPdJTePF6LAXBmrucZwF8G_X6PUcMI-GKC-NGi639tW_oTo5OYvF_3ivRMBWYbKhnhkwidqkwI3kcSbHB1l9FbtC8vclGKEtCnY1vUHalL1R-K7sJJRv=w640-h426" width="640" /></a></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><i><span style="color: #444444;">The Houthi slogan, including the line ‘Death to America’ is plastered on a monument at one of Sanaa’s busiest intersections [Afrah Nasser/Al Jazeera]</span></i></td></tr></tbody></table><br /> <br /><h2 style="text-align: left;">Reunited with family and friends</h2><br />As we travelled, the physical effects of this war became visible. Refugees and migrants, seemingly east African, walked along the roads, having picked a country at war to be their transit point to the Gulf. Tents housing internally displaced people dotted the landscape.<br /><br />Infrastructure – such as roads, bridges and houses – was destroyed. Air raids and shelling had left roads impassable, forcing cars onto alternate routes.<br /><br />“The car accidents that happen because of these unpaved roads are horrific,” Ahmed told me, almost nonchalantly.<br /><br />“You know, I follow a great Facebook page that shares updates about car accidents and I never drive without checking it.”<br /><br />When we arrived in Sanaa, I went straight to my family’s home. They were shocked and overjoyed to see me. Seeing my mother again, and being able to hold her, was amazing.<br /><br />After all the hugs and tears of happiness, she was able to give me comprehensive updates on everything that had happened to our neighbours, relatives and friends.<br /><br />Some had passed away, some had fallen ill, and many others had lost their jobs and depended on donations.<br /><br />Things were a lot worse than when I left. My conversations with family members and friends were often about the catastrophic economic hardships that they had to go through on a daily basis.<br /><br />Even if you receive your salary, and many millions do not, it is often worthless as a result of high inflation. Food prices are now extraordinarily higher than before I left Yemen, with some items at approximately the same price as I would see in my local supermarket in Stockholm, and sometimes even higher.<br /><br />“Thank God I still have a job, but the salary isn’t enough to pay for all my monthly expenses,” my cousin Najat*, who is like an older sister to me, explained. Hearing her recount the hardship of the last few years made me sad and outraged.<br /><br />Her side hustle, making and selling bakhour, wood chips soaked in perfumed oil and burned as traditional incense, was helping her get by.<br /><br />“If I didn’t have that, I don’t know how I would have survived,” she said. “At home, we try to minimise our expenses: We almost never use electronics such as the television or the fridge because we need to lower our electricity bills. We buy and eat meat only on special occasions, maybe twice a year, during Eid, because it’s so expensive.<br /><br />“I walk most of the time because transport has become so expensive amid the fuel shortages.”</div><div><br /></div><div><table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEgvhKStaSiaY3muu4JzFV9AGiH8aS2_W2V_EeiBey6xLm8Zs3f2i6hAYA3-JkYWcgOKyoNStSekGM7j-HkevuqdYHmRwSwiclYx8Gq7PGc99BU1Aos3w6PDzdxKHVTJfqU5EnO1DNiI7GT50k-kg6gi8kCS3W4AyZ3SDI24dx2FEBgU38cG2ybIOovE" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img alt="" data-original-height="513" data-original-width="770" height="426" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEgvhKStaSiaY3muu4JzFV9AGiH8aS2_W2V_EeiBey6xLm8Zs3f2i6hAYA3-JkYWcgOKyoNStSekGM7j-HkevuqdYHmRwSwiclYx8Gq7PGc99BU1Aos3w6PDzdxKHVTJfqU5EnO1DNiI7GT50k-kg6gi8kCS3W4AyZ3SDI24dx2FEBgU38cG2ybIOovE=w640-h426" width="640" /></a></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption"><div style="text-align: center;"><span style="color: #444444; font-style: italic;"><br /></span></div><i><div style="text-align: center;"><i><span style="color: #444444;">The Houthis have refused to allow the newer government-printed currency to be used in areas under their control, forcing people to use older money [Afrah Nasser/Al Jazeera]</span></i></div></i></td></tr></tbody></table> <br /><h2 style="text-align: left;">Surviving on generosity</h2><br />For my aunt, who used to be a teacher at a state school, it was the same. “I used to receive a salary of 40,000 Yemeni riyals [$160 at the official rate] before the war. But I stopped going to work in 2017 because they stopped paying me.<br /><br />“I tried to find another job in another school, but they only offered me 20,000 riyals [$80]. What can I do with that today? Our house rent on its own is 35,000 [$140].” My aunt has stopped trying to find work, and stays at home, her family solely reliant on her husband’s salary.<br /><br />The solution, as presented to me by everyone I spoke to was simple: They didn’t want aid or donations as that wouldn’t help them in the long term. What they wanted was their jobs, decent salaries, and an end to the depreciation of the national currency and inflation.<br /><br />Clearly, that will not come for a long time. And so I asked myself, how are people surviving?<br /><br />Quite simply: on each other’s generosity.<br /><br />In both Sanaa and Aden, where I spent a week, I was struck by how people looked out for each other, something that I have often missed in Sweden. As Ramadan wound down, I was reminded of the traditions that I had left behind in Yemen. Our neighbours would knock on our door and bring us food, unasked.<br /><br />My mother would do the same for them, cooking big portions of food and sharing it with whomever she could. I would go shopping with Najat, but instead of buying clothes for herself, she was buying special clothes for Eid for the children in her neighbourhood.<br /><br />“Let me buy clothes for those poor kids as a charity,” she said as we were heading to the shops.<br /><br />“I heard one store had good sales, so we’ll go there. At least my bakhour business gave me some spare money last month.”</div><div><br /></div><div><table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEjdcN-It3GF_pyqIjVzf4MiYCp3CctfGvik3OM1oz5jcKYloLJrVkHVUZpVFxMJZoUBedt6EYqibulvaPFSay7W41YwdpAx3NCitvSlmP-C-MbJBWZz0_3nwUJzQj1Iy1NesnTenOVBpucOllKWSjJJeqgp9nMtITFK0Ad1P-djsHki1BQiRCxf06oH" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img alt="" data-original-height="513" data-original-width="770" height="426" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEjdcN-It3GF_pyqIjVzf4MiYCp3CctfGvik3OM1oz5jcKYloLJrVkHVUZpVFxMJZoUBedt6EYqibulvaPFSay7W41YwdpAx3NCitvSlmP-C-MbJBWZz0_3nwUJzQj1Iy1NesnTenOVBpucOllKWSjJJeqgp9nMtITFK0Ad1P-djsHki1BQiRCxf06oH=w640-h426" width="640" /></a></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption"><div style="text-align: center;"><i><span style="color: #444444;">What remains of Change Square in Sanaa, once the centre of Yemen’s protest</span></i></div><div style="text-align: center;"><i><span style="color: #444444;">movement in 2011 [Afrah Nasser/Al Jazeera]</span></i></div></td></tr></tbody></table><br /> <br /><h2 style="text-align: left;">The Houthi state</h2><br />As I travelled around Sanaa, I was reminded that I was in a city ruled by the Houthis.<br /><br />The signs had been there even as we travelled to the city. At the checkpoints, the guards were less interested in where we were from, than they were in whether we observed the rules of their state, such as the use of old and tattered bank notes instead of the new ones used in government and STC-controlled territory.<br /><br />The Houthis had banned the new currency, printed since 2019, seeing it as a way of undermining their control.<br /><br />While the vibe of Aden – laid-back, cosmopolitan and welcoming – had been much the same as when I left Yemen in 2011, Sanaa had changed.<br /><br />Without exaggeration, it feels like a city that has been invaded. When the Houthis marched in from the mountains of the far north of Yemen, they brought with them the visible signs of their rule – the green posters depicting their slogan: “God is Great, Death to the USA, Death to Israel, Curse the Jews” – as well as the things that were harder to see, such as the way they have enforced their religious and political ideology on the people.<br /><br />It felt like everywhere I went I could hear the voice of the group’s leader, Abdul-Malik al-Houthi.<br /><br />His location is unknown, hidden away out of fear of a Saudi air attack, but his voice could be heard from cars with large speakers on top, replaying his latest speech.<br /><br />The brainwashing has had its effect. On the walls of Sanaa, alongside the Houthi slogan, are posters of their “martyrs”.</div><div><br /></div><div><table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEj9QxSvzJPUJH9qObV5ORthEZ4At5hY61uK4KCjXDWg7_Q5mp14TTrQgbwlIwJs50owcvJ-VSCIFHixReUN4KPFXhiRRgkkzjXrnkP0KRC_eqzluXXGm3DycIoZP3hO8O57dva-_IfSAWum-fJBRstg30WSnVythMagFUqpbqgzDfrbgQO27EPpEq5A" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img alt="" data-original-height="513" data-original-width="770" height="426" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEj9QxSvzJPUJH9qObV5ORthEZ4At5hY61uK4KCjXDWg7_Q5mp14TTrQgbwlIwJs50owcvJ-VSCIFHixReUN4KPFXhiRRgkkzjXrnkP0KRC_eqzluXXGm3DycIoZP3hO8O57dva-_IfSAWum-fJBRstg30WSnVythMagFUqpbqgzDfrbgQO27EPpEq5A=w640-h426" width="640" /></a></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><span style="color: #444444;"><i>The faces of dead fighters, young and old, stare back from posters stuck onto the walls of the <br />Old City of Sanaa, a UNESCO World Heritage site [Afrah Nasser/Al Jazeera]</i></span></td></tr></tbody></table><br /> <br /><h2 style="text-align: left;">‘Death to this and death to that’</h2><br />The Houthis have sent thousands to the front lines to fight the government and the STC. Many of the faces staring back at me from the posters were children. Seeing that was devastating.<br /><br />“Death to this and death to that,” said Najat, as we passed by one of the Houthi posters. “It’s terrifying. I don’t know how I can protect my seven-year-old daughter from hearing that, it’s everywhere I go. Imagine your children growing up in a culture that glorifies death. What kind of future will we have? What kind of generation are we creating?”<br /><br />My relatives and friends told me to be careful of the Zaynabiyat as I walked the streets. Female forces recruited by the Houthis to carry out a wide range of security and military services, including intelligence gathering. They are hard to notice as they walk in civilian clothing and can’t be picked out of a crowd.<br /><br />The Zaynabiyat, some of them brought in as young girls, are recruited through a mix of ideology and economic incentives.<br /><br />“Never speak to a woman you don’t know at a wedding,” Najat said to me one day, as my mother listened. “You never know, she might be one of the Zaynabiyat. At one wedding a woman was talking to me and started asking me if I wanted to contribute to the Houthi war effort by donating my jewellery. She told me she was one of them.”<br /><br />My mother interjected. “Last year one of our neighbour’s sisters was summoned to the police station – she had said something against the Houthis at a wedding. One of the Zaynabiyat definitely heard her.”<br /><br />The United Nations Panel of Experts on Yemen has reported that the work of the Zaynabiyat is to repress and control women in prisons, professional workspaces and in public places.<br /><br />“If you’re discovered, they [the Houthis] will detain you and torture you,” I was warned. It reminded me of an article I read a few years ago, detailing the abuses, such as beatings and psychological torture, committed against dissident women by the Houthis.<br /><br />I also remembered the ordeal of the detained and prosecuted Yemeni model, Intissar al-Hammadi, who I had researched for my previous work at Human Rights Watch.<br /><br />Intissar is still in a Houthi prison. Sanaa has become the heart of a republic of fear. The Houthis claimed they were bringing a revolution against the corrupt when they took the capital in 2014. But they have now become the corrupt, imposing their ruthless political and security repression on everyone in the areas they control.<br /><br />Meanwhile, members of the internationally-recognised government of Yemen have also been accused of being involved in abuses. According to human rights groups, Saudi Arabia, along with the UAE, has conducted indiscriminate attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure in many parts of Yemen.<br /><br />All parties to the conflict have been accused of committing violations of international human rights laws that rights organisations say could amount to war crimes. </div><div><br /></div><div><table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEgKTk51J65kBJ4ATN5en5W0U_4A4X5r2YPa76Ufwsyuw_ZsyFlFF3bbIIHMUeYArhCGpFiu0ao-ooU7BiGEKT004huZ9KpS6OVCKIoJFbLacnDttZK-F1GTC8ugdIl_wovHWL-W5mSb9tVBhA7UetnBCf7kth9ntC9MtcGhprksctCoHqgUxR1Hi-v9" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img alt="" data-original-height="513" data-original-width="770" height="426" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEgKTk51J65kBJ4ATN5en5W0U_4A4X5r2YPa76Ufwsyuw_ZsyFlFF3bbIIHMUeYArhCGpFiu0ao-ooU7BiGEKT004huZ9KpS6OVCKIoJFbLacnDttZK-F1GTC8ugdIl_wovHWL-W5mSb9tVBhA7UetnBCf7kth9ntC9MtcGhprksctCoHqgUxR1Hi-v9" width="640" /></a></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><span style="color: #444444;"><i>Yemen’s only branch of KFC remains in Sanaa, but billboards featuring the dead founder of the Houthi movement are more prominent [Afrah Nasser/Al Jazeera] </i></span></td></tr></tbody></table><br /><br /><h2 style="text-align: left;">New Yemens</h2><br />It’s impossible to predict what the future holds for Yemen. The current de-facto division is likely to become permanent. The Yemeni state I grew up in has disintegrated.<br /><br />All the stories my family and friends told me during my visit demonstrated to me that the eight-year conflict has split the country into many parts.<br /><br />In the midst of the destruction, new Yemens are emerging, waiting for sufficient political will from either local or international actors to acknowledge it.<br /><br />Ahmed and his Yemeni ID card, with his false home of Hadramout, started to make sense. “See, there is more than one Yemen today,” he said. “The reason I changed my ID and pretended that I was from Hadramout is because it’s seen as peaceful. The other Yemens, the one in the north, and the one in the south, are in a raging war. The division and rivalry between the north and the south is impossible to resolve. Northerners can have their Yemen. Southerners can have their Yemen. And I prefer the Yemen in Hadramout.”<br /><br />Yemenis disagree on what the solution is. To me, the potential division of Yemen would be the lesser of two evils. In its current form, with the current circumstances and tension, unity has become catastrophic for citizens across the country.<br /><br />If Yemen’s relatively young unification project ends, it might be shaky and risky, but at least people might have a second chance to envision a new stable country of their own.<br /><br />Is this something I want? Not necessarily, but it’s rather a matter that I try to be realistic about.<br /><br />In the last few days of my near-month-long trip, as I prepared to go back into my exile, Ahmed drove me in his car and we passed Sanaa University, where the 2011 uprising began.<br /><br />There was the monument, the place we had called Change Square. “What do you feel when you see this place now?” Ahmed asked me. “One part of me feels like I am visiting a graveyard, where my generation’s dreams and aspirations for a democratic Yemen were born and died,” I responded.<br /><br />“But another part of me thinks that there are no shortcuts for going from dictatorship to democracy. Counter-revolutions are inevitable. Just like Saleh was overthrown, the Houthis will be overthrown.”<br /><br />Ahmed nodded. With at least some hope in his voice, he started speaking about the time when it all began for me, the 2011 revolution when I had so much hope for the country’s future.<br /><br />“The past has shown that, no matter what, Yemen will continue to live, to survive and to resist.”<br /><br /><br /></div><div><br /></div><div>*This essay by Afrah Nasser was originally written for/published on Al Jazeera English on December 18, 2022. The source<a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2022/12/18/republic-of-fear-a-return-to-yemen-after-11-years?fbclid=IwAR2ncrCRQ3MwtfBM73-EQLKM6f2-3rVjfs5FN1b1_p0L931A3hOAyo96wUg" target="_blank"> link is here.</a> </div>Afrah Nasser's Bloghttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05429782314834231913noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7866330248567333783.post-9875798201668597412022-12-15T14:35:00.010+01:002023-02-04T14:58:26.193+01:00Yemen in Limbo: No War, Yet Still No Peace<div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEgdz3-G4ijXZ6HoIA_-TKlPxdg72QrQwKlSEQZwpVypsNj9wUrQItkk-vhRTdA85wf1g4Z_uSXxWLRqlzM75ZwOE6QDuiYggdFYEMXpP-SJ1sDV9RaC5qqzzoAr-yGPv-VvcaR2KOAh-qx_5ykUEexUUqeVvYnHCokFPYTXHcn4TGyPPF63cEDnyZ36" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img alt="" data-original-height="512" data-original-width="768" height="426" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEgdz3-G4ijXZ6HoIA_-TKlPxdg72QrQwKlSEQZwpVypsNj9wUrQItkk-vhRTdA85wf1g4Z_uSXxWLRqlzM75ZwOE6QDuiYggdFYEMXpP-SJ1sDV9RaC5qqzzoAr-yGPv-VvcaR2KOAh-qx_5ykUEexUUqeVvYnHCokFPYTXHcn4TGyPPF63cEDnyZ36=w640-h426" width="640" /></a></div><br /><br /></div><div><br /></div>*Dec. 2022 - <a href="https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/yemen-in-limbo-no-war-yet-still-no-peace/" target="_blank">Arab Center Washington DC.</a> - Despite the substantial reduction, even the near cessation of military offensives between the Houthi armed group and the Saudi-UAE-led coalition, and especially following the October 2 <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/10/7/end-yemen-truce-leaves-civilians-afraid-dark-days-back">expiration of a UN-brokered truce</a>, Yemen today is far from peaceful. In fact, a state of “no war, no peace” currently prevails, while the country suffers from an economic collapse and an escalating humanitarian crisis consisting of scant food supplies, health problems, unaddressed trauma, and widespread displacement.<div><br /><h2 style="text-align: left;">Yemen’s Ongoing Stalemate</h2><br />The most recent UN-brokered truce expired on October 2 after the Houthis and the IRGY failed to reach an agreement on its renewal. Subsequent <a href="https://apnews.com/article/middle-east-business-diplomacy-united-nations-yemen-bb501c2bbc39ca6a2e57d8bb53012334">peace talks</a> have also stalled. The Houthis continue to <a href="https://apnews.com/article/middle-east-business-yemen-sanaa-houthis-c115994692a5c2db28f14d74895e00c3">launch both conventional and drone attacks</a> against civilian and vital economic targets in Yemen. Occasional fighting also continues between the IRGY’s forces and the UAE-backed STC. Meanwhile, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/yemen-rivals-ramp-up-economic-war-un-backed-truce-efforts-limp-2022-12-08/">escalating economic warfare</a> between the Houthis and the IRGY is further exacerbating the country’s dire humanitarian situation, and Yemen continues to be ranked as one of the most food-insecure countries in the world.<br /><br />More than half of Yemen’s population of nearly 30 million <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-ipc-acute-food-insecurity-snapshot-october-december-2022-enar#:~:text=The%20IPC%20AFI%20updated%20analysis,between%20October%20and%20December%202022.">are expected</a> to experience a high level of food insecurity by the end of the 2022 due to multiple impacts of the conflict, including still-rising levels of internal displacement (with over four million people already internally displaced) and a collapsing economy, and due also to disastrous flooding and other effects of climate change. One key factor, though, has been the impact of Russia’s war in Ukraine on global wheat supplies, including supplies to Yemen, since until recently Russia and Ukraine supplied <a href="https://oec.world/en/profile/bilateral-product/wheat/reporter/yem">nearly 45 percent</a> of Yemen’s imported wheat.<br /><br />Even though there is a perception that the country is enjoying a period of relative calm—the longest such period that the country has experienced since the beginning of the conflict—internal dynamics and armed violence continue to shatter lives. In June, the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-briefing-notes/2022/06/press-briefing-notes-yemen">reported</a> on dozens of civilian casualties that occurred during the truce because of landmines, and sniper and drone attacks. And in November, the OHCHR reported on <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-briefing-notes/2022/11/yemen-attacks-civilians">additional civilian casualties</a> and called on IRGY forces and on the Houthis and their allies to “choose peace for good.”<br /><br />As important as it is to silence all gunfire in Yemen’s conflict, landmines planted in many parts of the country remain among the most destructive and lethal weapons used in the conflict, and their presence requires immediate and comprehensive action. In the <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/87802">last six years</a>, nearly 2,000 civilians have been killed and about 3,000 structures have been damaged due to landmines. A striking reminder of the danger posed by these weapons was a December 6 landmine explosion that <a href="https://press.un.org/en/2022/db221207.doc.htm">struck an armored vehicle</a> carrying UN officials during a field visit in Yemen’s al-Hodeidah Governorate, an explosion in which, luckily, nobody was hurt. Thus, the civil war continues, despite the perception that the country is experiencing the longest calm it has so far witnessed. <br /><br /><br />Rather than simply aiming to freeze the conflict, the international community must instead show more courage in addressing actions by the various parties to the civil war that delay conflict settlement and deepen the unspeakable suffering of Yemen’s civilians.<br /><br /></div><div><h2 style="text-align: left;">The IRGY’s Diminishing Influence</h2><div><br /></div>As new attempts to revive collapsing peace settlements are coming to the fore, the IRGY’s role in them continues to weaken. An <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/saudi-led-coalition-says-it-exchanged-pow-visits-with-yemens-houthis-2022-10-12/">exchange of visits</a> in October between delegations from Saudi Arabia and the Houthis, which occurred without the presence of any IRGY officials, represented an unprecedented step in the course of the conflict, and raised questions about the possibility of Saudi Arabia’s diplomatic acknowledgement of the Houthis as the de facto authority in northern Yemen.<br /><br />The IRGY’s response to a series of major <a href="https://www.thedefensepost.com/2022/12/01/rebel-port-attacks-threat-yemen/">Houthi attacks</a> during October and November on an oil tanker near the al-Dhabba oil terminal in Yemen’s Hadramawt Governorate and on numerous ports in areas under its control was ineffective. Instead of ensuring the availability of an adequate and powerful mechanism to defend against such attacks, the IRGY’s response was only to issue a decree on October 23 <a href="https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20221024-yemen-defence-body-designates-houthis-as-terrorist-group/">designating</a> the Houthi armed group a terrorist organization, an act that ultimately held no serious repercussions.<br /><br />In the current situation, in which there is no war yet no peace, fuel and energy facilities are likely to form a new battlefield between the Houthi armed group and the IRGY. Houthi attacks on fuel targets in IRGY-controlled areas have disrupted fuel flow, and for several days now, Aden Governorate, where the IRGY is based, has been <a href="https://alkhabaralyemeni.net/2022/12/08/200444/">suffering a major blackout</a> due to severe fuel shortages. The public’s discontent with the IRGY has recently reached a high level. Earlier this month, <a href="https://alkhabaralyemeni.net/2022/12/08/200390/">leaked official documents</a> provided details about scholarships that the IRGY gave to the relatives of its own officials, including a relative of Rashad al-Alimi, the president of the government’s executive body, the Presidential Leadership Council, without any legitimate reason or merit. Given the endless obstacles that Yemeni students face to receive such scholarship opportunities, widespread condemnation from all across Yemen understandably followed the release of this information.<br /><br />The question remains: Does the IRGY still have the capability to play a vital role in any potential peacemaking process? Although both its role in the next chapter of resolving the conflict and its public popularity have been dramatically diminishing, one of the key factors that has enabled this government to survive so far is the fact that it is still recognized by the international community as being the legitimate representative of the Yemeni people.<br /><br /></div><div><h2 style="text-align: left;">The Houthis: Spoilers of Peace</h2><br />The Houthis continue to be one of the truce’s biggest beneficiaries, as most of their conditions have been met, including ending the Saudi-led coalition’s airstrikes and the closure of Sanaa International Airport. However, the group refuses to compromise in return. It remains reluctant to end its <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/rights-groups-urge-yemen-s-houthis-to-end-taiz-blockade-/6721240.html">siege on Taiz Governorate</a>, which was one of the truce’s terms, and in fact is <a href="https://debriefer.net/en/news-31276.html">trying to maximize its gains</a> by setting conditions for peace, such as having the IRGY pay salaries to public sector workers, including Houthi security and military forces. Houthis have long been described by both <a href="https://www.mei.edu/publications/houthis-and-limits-diplomacy-yemen">Yemen experts</a> and <a href="https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/country-files/yemen/events/article/yemen-france-laments-the-failure-to-renew-the-truce-10-3-22">international diplomats</a> as spoilers of peace. US Special Envoy for Yemen Tim Lenderking, for example, notably <a href="https://www.state.gov/u-s-special-envoy-for-yemen-house-foreign-affairs-committee-subcommittee-on-the-middle-east-north-africa-and-global-counterterrorism/">stated</a> on December 6 that the Houthis were the ones who are “walking away from peace.”<br /><br />The cessation of large-scale fighting between the Houthis and the Saudi-led coalition that opposes it has enabled the group to recharge, reorganize, strengthen its military capacity, and train its fighters. And news reports came out in June revealing that the group is increasingly <a href="https://apnews.com/article/politics-middle-east-sanaa-houthis-religion-5e62561f8070441412ed52d222c950e3">recruiting children</a> to build up its forces during the truce, despite its pledge to the UN that it would stop the practice. Meanwhile, several separate incidents occurred during the truce wherein marine shipments carrying <a href="https://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/news-and-latest-activity/news/2022/july/07/20220707-montrose-arms-cache">Iranian weapons bound for the Houthis</a> were confiscated by authorities. In November, the US Navy <a href="https://www.navy.mil/Press-Office/News-Stories/Article/3218299/us-naval-forces-intercept-explosive-material-bound-for-yemen/">said</a> that it had seized more than 70 tons of rocket and missile fuel on a ship bound for Yemen, signaling that the Houthis are still continuing to prepare for conflict. <br /><br /><br />The Houthis’ fortified military capacity is evidently fueling their gains, and they clearly have no plans to stop. In addition to carrying out drone attacks on the IRGY’s ports, in December the group <a href="https://english.almasirah.net.ye/post/30031/Armed-Forces-Able-to-Protect-Yemeni-Sovereignty%2C-Oil">threatened</a> any foreign oil and gas companies operating in Yemen if they looted “the wealth of the Yemeni people.”<br /><br />More tragically, the cessation of large-scale fighting creates a favorable environment for the Houthis to continue waging their parallel war on personal liberties and basic human rights. And indeed, the lull has enabled them to shift their focus toward escalating their political oppression. In November, the group <a href="https://www.saba.ye/en/news3212199.htm">announced</a> a new code of conduct binding all civil servants working in the public sector in Houthi-controlled areas, one that has been met with widespread rejection because of the limits it places on the right to freedom of speech and opinion, and to freedom of mobility. The new code also imposes the group’s sectarian ideas on society. Additional repressive Houthi regulations include <a href="https://english.alarabiya.net/News/gulf/2018/06/22/Yemen-s-Houthi-militia-detains-Sanaa-University-professors">restrictions</a> on university professors to prevent them from working in private universities and enforcing the <a href="https://daraj.media/en/100672/">male guardianship rule</a> for women travelling inside the country and abroad.</div><div><br /><h2 style="text-align: left;">The Southern Transitional Council: Influential but Disregarded</h2><br />The STC has been one of the most crucial and yet disregarded actors influencing the current situation of no war, no peace. The STC was not mentioned in the truce’s agreements, thus treating the organization as if it has no role to play in the cessation of violence. This is a mistake, since the STC authorities are predominately in control of the south of Yemen. And in fact, the STC enjoys more military power than the IRGY.<br /><br />At many points during the conflict, UAE-backed, STC-affiliated forces successfully led <a href="https://www.irishtimes.com/news/world/middle-east/pro-government-yemeni-militia-go-on-offensive-to-gain-territory-from-houthi-forces-1.4776822">military offensives</a> against the Houthis’ armed forces, as happened, for example, earlier this year in Yemen’s Shabwa Governorate. In early August, forces affiliated with the STC also <a href="https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2022/09/yemen-consultations-5.php">fought</a> security forces affiliated with the IRGY. And later that same month, the UAE reportedly <a href="https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20220816-uae-accused-of-bombing-government-forces-in-eastern-yemen/">attacked IRGY forces</a> in a show of support for STC forces. As long as there remains a disregard for the STC’s potential role in ending the conflict, it will be impossible to pave the way for a durable truce, let alone a durable peace agreement.<br />New Approaches to Peace<br /><br />Stakeholders in ending Yemen’s conflict must truly think outside the box. This could entail giving women a chance to join the peacemaking process by creating mechanisms that facilitate their political participation in all peace efforts. Making <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/12/12/yemen-council-approves-conclusions/">statements</a> in support of women’s political participation may sound quite wonderful, but what is more crucial is to actually create effective mechanisms to make that change happen. Despite the high prevalence of sexism and male chauvinism in all aspects of life in Yemen, Yemeni women have proven themselves to be diligent and hardworking, and possessing both a humanitarian consciousness and a peace-loving spirit. To be sure, no peace process would be complete without the inclusion of women, youth, local civil society organizations, and marginalized minority groups. And their inclusion must not be merely for decoration or for a good photo op, but instead needs to mark a meaningful step toward their real participation in determining the country’s future.<br /><br /><br />Another important step would be to end the practice of granting diplomatic impunity to those who work to spoil peace efforts. US Envoy Lenderking, UN Special Envoy for Yemen Hans Grundberg, and UK ambassador to Yemen Richard Oppenheim, along with other European diplomats, officials from Oman, and any other relevant stakeholders who engage in regular meetings with parties to the conflict in Yemen must hold accountable those who work to prevent peace. As Lenderking <a href="https://www.state.gov/u-s-special-envoy-for-yemen-house-foreign-affairs-committee-subcommittee-on-the-middle-east-north-africa-and-global-counterterrorism/">stated</a> in December in reference to the Houthis, “It is the international community’s responsibility to hold them accountable.” One starting point could be sanctioning the officials of groups that work to stymie peace efforts.<br /><br />After nearly a decade of civil war, a resolution to the conflict in Yemen will require political courage from the IRGY, the STC, and the Houthis. Only meaningful negotiations with the participation of all of Yemen’s relevant actors can address the root causes of the civil war and eventually pave the way for a lasting peace. And importantly, peacemaking efforts must adopt a critical approach that goes beyond merely pausing the conflict. The last thing the Yemeni people need is an incomplete peace. What they need is a definite and permanent end to the conflict.</div><div><br /></div><div>*This policy analysis report by Afrah Nasser was originally written for/published by the Arab Center Washington DC on December 15, 2022. <a href="https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/yemen-in-limbo-no-war-yet-still-no-peace/" target="_blank">Main source here</a>. </div>Afrah Nasser's Bloghttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05429782314834231913noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7866330248567333783.post-2385099278896676012022-11-25T18:25:00.003+01:002023-02-06T18:46:11.270+01:00Afrah Nasser: "Believe that you are worth listening to."<div><br /><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEh7ymAR59JP-q1Wed9xA8TpwuTCae7nzv2ps1KoXlFEwEmyn103fxTRDypmvnIfCebeAKR02F9lSIWL2xndMEmgAG0pMscmRNE8d8RxK9IhIZAeN2hEy7fy5wh8XTVNNutIaFOYhp0m3tb66w1hL3MDLYoz7V7x3zWG_rB6VXxhsoTC5V1Oe7V5167m/s959/Screenshot%202023-02-06%20at%2021.35.19.png" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="760" data-original-width="959" height="508" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEh7ymAR59JP-q1Wed9xA8TpwuTCae7nzv2ps1KoXlFEwEmyn103fxTRDypmvnIfCebeAKR02F9lSIWL2xndMEmgAG0pMscmRNE8d8RxK9IhIZAeN2hEy7fy5wh8XTVNNutIaFOYhp0m3tb66w1hL3MDLYoz7V7x3zWG_rB6VXxhsoTC5V1Oe7V5167m/w640-h508/Screenshot%202023-02-06%20at%2021.35.19.png" width="640" /></a></div><br /><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><br /></div><br /></div><div><i><span style="color: #444444;">A <a href="https://www.nobelwomensinitiative.org/afrah_nassar_believe_that_you_are_worth_listening_to" target="_blank">feature about Afrah Nasser</a> written by the Nobel Women's Initiative (NWI), part of the NWI's contribution to the global <a href="https://www.unwomen.org/en/what-we-do/ending-violence-against-women/unite/16-days-of-activism">16 Days of Activism Against Gender-based Violence Campaign</a> featuring interviews with women activists about their experiences advocating for peace and women’s rights in conflict zones.</span></i></div><div><br /><br /></div><div>Nov. 2022 - <a href="https://www.nobelwomensinitiative.org/afrah_nassar_believe_that_you_are_worth_listening_to" target="_blank">Nobel Women's Initiative</a> - A Yemeni human rights activist and writer who claimed political asylum in Sweden in 2011, Afrah is accustomed to freedom of movement. Here, in her native country in 2022, she faced mahram rules that forbid women’s movement without the presence or written permission of a male guardian.<br /><br />“My concern about going to Yemen was that I didn’t know if my name was on a blacklist, but I realized on the ground there that my biggest problem was that I was a woman and a woman without a man, a woman without a guardian,” she said in an interview.<br /><br />It was her first trip to witness the situation in Yemen firsthand since making the difficult decision to claim political asylum in Sweden in mid-2011 during the civilian uprising against the 30-year authoritarian rule of Ali Abdullah Saleh.<br /><br />“I didn’t choose Sweden, it was just an accident,” she said. “I was there at a workshop during the period when the peaceful revolution started to take a different turn.” Guerrilla warfare began in the streets of her hometown, Sana’a. The airport got shut down.<br /><br />As a journalist and blogger in Yemen who exposed human rights abuse and criticized the regime, Afrah had stood up to hate messages and death threats. Could she remain defiant? “My family told me you can come back but you will not write again because it’s dangerous. So, I had to make the hard decision. I couldn’t imagine life without writing.”<br /><br />Since then, staying connected from abroad with an extensive network of contacts, Afrah has chronicled arbitrary detention, torture, and other human rights abuses; the steady marginalization of women; and Yemen’s descent into poverty amid civil war.<br /><br />“The majority of the country is just barely surviving economic hardship,” she said. “A young Yemeni woman today has the responsibility of putting food on the table. Women are the hungriest because they prioritize the men and their children. It’s a dire humanitarian situation.”<br /><br />Conflict began in March 2015 between the internationally recognized government, backed by a Saudi and UAE-led military coalition, and the Houthi movement supported by Iran. A truce in 2022 lasted only six months.<br /><br />An independent writer and commentator who worked as a researcher at Human Rights Watch, Afrah has been honoured frequently with awards for her journalism and activism. “I’m thankful for the blessing of passion,” she said.<br /><br />Amid accolades, she remains acutely aware of her position in a privileged elite. “I feel a huge responsibility because what I’m doing is nothing to what a lot of Yemeni women are doing inside the country.”<br /><br />She said persecution of “the forgotten women of Yemen” is a function of militarism and toxic patriarchy, with the worst treatment in areas controlled by armed Houthi groups.<br /><br />During the war, child marriage increased, as has violence against women. Detainees are held without charge and face torture in Houthi prisons. “Women in Yemen are not cutting their hair on camera,” she said, referring to the Iranian women’s revolution. “They are suffering in silence.”<br /><br />“If I would have one message in this interview, it’s that I think there is a big moral responsibility for European and American diplomats meeting Yemeni officials,” she said. “They must ask ‘Where are the women in this room?’ ‘Why in this delegation is there no woman?’ They have a responsibility if they are truly pro-women’s rights, to confront Yemeni officials with those questions and pressure them to include half of the society.”<br /><br />She recently put the spotlight on <a href="https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/the-flaws-and-failures-of-international-humanitarian-aid-to-yemen/">severe failures in humanitarian aid delivery</a> in Yemen, long the poorest country in the Middle East and North Africa. “People are hungry, but they don’t even know where to register for aid that was given by the UN,” she said. “And God knows how much has gone in corruption cases.”<br /><br />Among her proposals is a call for international condemnation of the Houthi <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2022/09/yemen-huthis-suffocating-women-with-requirement-for-male-guardians/">restrictions on women</a>, including female humanitarian aid workers (both Yemenis and foreigners), whom the Houthis force to have a male guardian when travelling for work inside Yemen.<br /><br />Afrah posts her analyses for think tanks and publications on her <a href="https://afrahnasser.blogspot.com/">blog</a> which has been viewed more than a million times. The blog is illustrated by an Associated Press photo at Change Square in Sana’a where peaceful protesters gathered each morning near her university. “It represents the birth of my political work.”<br /><br />She keeps a photo on her desk of her mentor, the pioneering Yemeni women’s rights advocate and journalist Raufa Hassan. “One time I told her ‘I want to be like you.’ And she said ‘I’m taken. Just be yourself.’ I always keep it in mind.”<br /><br />That conversation is echoed in her advice for other activists. “Believe in yourself. Say and do things as if it’s the most important thing in the world. Believe that you are worth listening to. I wish someone had told me this a long time ago. Don’t wait for recognition. Have confidence in the significance of what you do.’<br /><br />Afrah Nasser is a passionate advocate for the people of Yemen. She is an award-winning journalist, researcher and human rights activist who lives between Sweden and Yemen.<div><br /></div></div>Afrah Nasser's Bloghttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05429782314834231913noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7866330248567333783.post-28382132555932875312022-11-21T20:32:00.001+01:002022-12-17T21:16:40.936+01:00Houthi Male Guardianship Rule for Yemeni Women<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEjWNwwkChMvm3wJizY7NX8proPHL--sOYbB90uHcQ87wGX2lg1QyxcbLqNTpYPA4tipktYfnbhNVLv93_kHlJc6zbdjrw5UUDwxhFCf5p9KuqpCF19lnjJZEcp8jndb00NFwassTHgPJmyN5rp_kxg7LDvFYKiej0qnW03oqQ4E4s1kDzKxs9mUwcRe" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img alt="" data-original-height="560" data-original-width="1000" height="358" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEjWNwwkChMvm3wJizY7NX8proPHL--sOYbB90uHcQ87wGX2lg1QyxcbLqNTpYPA4tipktYfnbhNVLv93_kHlJc6zbdjrw5UUDwxhFCf5p9KuqpCF19lnjJZEcp8jndb00NFwassTHgPJmyN5rp_kxg7LDvFYKiej0qnW03oqQ4E4s1kDzKxs9mUwcRe=w640-h358" width="640" /></a></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">(c) UNFPA-Yemen</td></tr></tbody></table><br /><br /><a href="https://daraj.media/en/100672/" target="_blank">Daraj - Nov. 21, 2022</a> - Male guardianship for women wanting to travel was something that would never happen in Yemen. It was something that Yemeni women would only see from afar in neighbouring Saudi Arabia. Yet today, even as male guardianship has ended in Saudi Arabia, the Houthi armed group in Yemen has imposed exactly that on women living in areas under the control of the group.<div><br />A few months ago, Houthi authorities issued an order addressing transport companies, as well as the Sana’a International Airport to ban any woman from travelling unless she is accompanied by a male guardian (mahram) for the duration of the trip, whether inside Yemen or abroad. <br /><br />This new restriction on women has been in the making for quite a while. Daraj was in fact one of the first publications <a href="https://daraj.media/15834/" target="_blank">reporting on the issue</a> in early 2019. <br /><br />“The mahram requirement, which is not part of Yemeni law, is being enforced by the Houthis through verbal directives,” <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2022/09/yemen-huthis-suffocating-women-with-requirement-for-male-guardians/" target="_blank">stated Amnesty International</a> (AI) in a press release on September 1. “Since April, the Houthi de facto authorities have increasingly insisted on the mahram requirement to restrict the movement of women across areas they control in northern Yemen, including Saada, Dhamar, Hodeidah and Hajjah governorates, and Sanaa.”<br /><br />AI said the restrictive rule was a form of “gender-based discrimination” and called upon the Houthi authorities to end the mahram requirement, and the international community to pressure them to do so. <br /><br />Since then, earlier this month, Yemeni journalist WB posted on her Facebook page that the guardianship rule had been changed. Instead of physically bringing a male guardian with them, women are permitted to travel but need a written approval note – paperwork that still represents a gruelling and discriminative process.<br /><br />Recently, I took part in a closed virtual meeting with women’s rights advocates, both based in Yemen and in the diaspora. The women inside the country spoke about the humiliating treatment women face at security checkpoints, and being deprived of their freedom of movement. <br /><br />One woman, who asked to remain anonymous for her own safety, said that in some towns under Houthi control, women are even banned from walking down the streets without a mahram. In the city of Hajjah, even women going to the hospital were asked to bring a mahram.<br /><br />During the online meeting, one female lawyer told us about a woman who had been detained by the Houthis for three days for attempting to travel without a mahram.<br /><br />Under Houthi rule, there have been unprecedented violations of women’s rights. Having worked in the field of human rights for some 15 years, I have never come across such horrific cases, varying from violent crackdowns on protests to detention, torture and sexual violence while in detention <br /><br />The United Nations Group of Eminent Experts on Yemen <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/letter-dated-27-january-2020-panel-experts-yemen-addressed-president-security-council" target="_blank">in 2020 identified</a> “a Houthi network involved in the repression of women who oppose the Houthis, including through the use of sexual violence.” <br /><br /><a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/final-report-panel-experts-yemen-s202179-enar" target="_blank">In 2021</a>, the UN reported, “the Houthis refused entry to a senior UN official to Sana’a, following the publication of the report of the Group of Eminent Experts, and its findings related to sexual violence.”</div><div><br />The internationally recognized Yemeni government’s forces and armed groups operating outside government control also stand accused of human rights violations and abuse against women, according to the <a href="https://samrl.org/l.html?l=a,10,A,c,1,,71,4389,html/%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%85%20%D8%AA%D8%AF%D8%B9%D9%88%20%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%AD%D9%82%D9%8A%D9%82%20%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%85%20%D9%88%D8%AA%D9%88%D9%81%D9%8A%D8%B1%20%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%8A%D8%A9%20%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D9%88%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A9%20%D9%84%D9%84%D9%86%D8%B3%D8%A7%D8%A1%20%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%85%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AA%20%D9%85%D9%86%20%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%A7%D9%83%D8%A7%D8%AA%20%D8%A3%D8%B7%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%81%20%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B5%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%B9%20%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D9%85%D9%84%20%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89%20%D8%AA%D9%85%D9%83%D9%8A%D9%86%D9%87%D9%85%20%D9%85%D9%86%20%D8%AD%D9%82%D9%88%D9%82%D9%87%D9%85%20%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%B3%D8%A7%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A9" target="_blank">SAM Organization for Rights and Liberties</a>.<br /><br />In the eyes of Houthis, women’s visibility by default represents a threat to the movement. Women are a threat, especially when they are educated and have access to the international community. <br /><br />While there are no reliable statistics regarding female participation in the labour market, women have increasingly joined the workforce in recent years. They have even started to take jobs that used to be reserved for men. It is widely believed that years of armed conflict have led to a relative <a href="https://sanaacenter.org/publications/main-publications/7721" target="_blank">increase in women’s employment</a>.<br /><br />Houthi men, like so many other men in Yemen, fear women’s excellence. Women who work hard and excel remind men of their failures. The Houthis’ marginalization and persecution of women is a clear demonstration of the deep misogyny ruling Yemen. <br /><br />In the absence of any leverage from the internationally recognized government of Yemen over the Houthi Movement, women under its control’s only option is to plea with the international community, which includes western diplomats and human rights organizations, to put pressure on the Houthi armed group to end the mahram rule.<br /><br />Most urgently, the UN Special envoy to Yemen, Hans Grundberg, and the US Special envoy for Yemen, Tim Lenderking, have a moral obligation to pressure the Houthis. Grundberg must brief the UN Security Council as soon as possible. The wider the circle of condemnation, the greater the pressure on the Houthi movement.</div><div><br /></div><div>__________________________________________________</div><div>*This article was written by Afrah Nasser for Daraj media and published first on Daraj's website, <a href="https://daraj.media/en/100672/" target="_blank">link here. </a></div>Afrah Nasser's Bloghttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05429782314834231913noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7866330248567333783.post-47172785517986078822022-10-22T11:19:00.000+02:002022-10-22T11:19:05.423+02:00The Flaws and Failures of International Humanitarian Aid to Yemen<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: left;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEh_CwaJl01iv16HKMZSRMXA44f_u7w-opvAWl_uE4WxbXiwOxRp1b8HV43YBxAbfXKFpZ1TBnvZezgBzMC7DyyoVBweYgv14p2EAw1kAs8qrjmUEVGzPUSriMNk-Bz3cfPd1WCMk5ofy2vrpnAR__YA3xrPXa5Y6fL_rH46pW2Awe3842E70x_cE0eA" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img alt="" data-original-height="432" data-original-width="768" height="360" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEh_CwaJl01iv16HKMZSRMXA44f_u7w-opvAWl_uE4WxbXiwOxRp1b8HV43YBxAbfXKFpZ1TBnvZezgBzMC7DyyoVBweYgv14p2EAw1kAs8qrjmUEVGzPUSriMNk-Bz3cfPd1WCMk5ofy2vrpnAR__YA3xrPXa5Y6fL_rH46pW2Awe3842E70x_cE0eA=w640-h360" width="640" /></a></div><br /><br />*<a href="https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/the-flaws-and-failures-of-international-humanitarian-aid-to-yemen/" target="_blank">Arab Center in Washington DC</a> - In a July 2022 <a href="https://www.unocha.org/sites/unocha/files/Yemen%20IAHE%20Final%20Report_July_13_2022_English.pdf">report</a> on the UN’s humanitarian response to the crisis in Yemen, the UN Inter-Agency Humanitarian Evaluation Steering Group concluded that “the quality of humanitarian aid in many areas was unacceptably low,” and that affected populations repeatedly said that “they did not know how to access aid, or how to get on the ‘lists’ that led to assistance.” Yemenis from all walks of life have indeed been highly critical of how international humanitarian assistance has been undertaken in Yemen. In fact, a <a href="https://apnews.com/article/yemen-ap-top-news-theft-middle-east-international-news-dcf8914d99af49ef902c56c84823e30c">social media campaign</a> using the <a href="https://twitter.com/hashtag/%D9%88%D9%8A%D9%86_%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%81%D9%84%D9%88%D8%B3?src=hashtag_click">hashtag</a> #WhereIsTheMoney has been expressing Yemenis’ frustration over the failures in implementing international humanitarian aid, questioning the quality of said aid, and demanding transparency from the UN and other international agencies regarding the methods and process for spending funds.<br /><br />Moreover, a growing number of Yemen experts have for some time been sounding the alarm about the failures of the international humanitarian response in the country. Yemeni American historian <a href="https://merip.org/2021/05/benefiting-from-the-misery-of-others/">Asher Orkaby</a>, Yemeni investigative journalist <a href="https://magazine.zenith.me/en/society/world-food-programme-yemen">Ali Salem</a>, <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/yemen-s-humanitarian-crisis-persists-despite-humanitarian-funding/">this author</a>, and the <a href="https://sanaacenter.org/reports/humanitarian-aid">Sana’a Center for Strategic Studies</a> have all published striking critiques of the international humanitarian aid system in Yemen, and the Sana’a Center also <a href="https://sanaacenter.org/publications/news/15257">briefed</a> the UN Security Council about the same matter.<br /><br />All of this criticism indicates that there are serious problems that the international humanitarian community needs to address in order to truly relieve human suffering in Yemen. Problems include a weak strategy that focuses on short-term solutions, counterproductive stances of neutrality and impartiality, reluctance to speak out against warring parties’ abuse of aid and humanitarian workers, and a lack of sufficient inclusion of Yemeni professionals. To address these problems, it is absolutely imperative that international organizations work to stamp out corruption, to reevaluate their strategies and practices, and to involve local partners and experts to a greater degree. Only by making these changes and by focusing on long-term solutions will these organizations be able to contribute to permanently resolving the humanitarian situation in Yemen. <br /><br /><br /><span style="font-size: x-large;">The Scale of the Current Humanitarian Crisis</span><div><br />The loss of livelihoods due to the ongoing conflict has led millions of Yemenis to <a href="https://fscluster.org/sites/default/files/documents/yseu_69-english_vesion.pdf">rely on humanitarian aid</a>, which is especially significant in a country that for decades prior to the conflict had been ranked as the poorest country in the Arab world. In 2017, the UN described Yemen as the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/mar/11/world-faces-worst-humanitarian-crisis-since-1945-says-un-official">world’s worst humanitarian crisis</a>, until Afghanistan was <a href="https://www.wfp.org/stories/afghanistan-climate-crisis-drought-wfp-hunger-cop26-ipc-un">named</a> in 2021 as being poised to take over that terrible title. Since the conflict began in Yemen, there have been steadily growing international humanitarian efforts, and the <a href="https://devinit.org/resources/global-humanitarian-assistance-report-2021/executive-summary/">2021 Global Humanitarian Assistance Report</a> lists Yemen as the world’s second highest recipient of international humanitarian assistance. Although Yemen still <a href="https://fts.unocha.org/">has not received</a> all of the funding that has been pledged, since 2015, billions of dollars have been delivered from international donors to fund the UN-led humanitarian response plan. <br /><br /><br />Nonetheless, the humanitarian situation remains dire. It is <a href="https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1155479/?iso3=YEM">estimated</a> that more than two million Yemeni children under the age of five will suffer from acute malnutrition in 2022, and that nearly 19 million people in Yemen will suffer from acute food insecurity, <a href="https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1152947/?iso3=YEM">compared to 13.5 million</a> in 2020. Children who suffer from severe malnutrition are at risk of <a href="https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/351911650316441159/pdf/Yemen-Country-Engagement-Note-for-the-Period-FY22-FY23.pdf">??irreversible damage</a> to their future health and brain development, including stunted growth. Meanwhile, the number of children <a href="https://www.unicef.org/mena/press-releases/shameful-milestone-yemen-10000-children-killed-or-maimed-fighting-began">dropping out of school</a> is on the rise, reaching over two million. More than eight million women and girls of childbearing age in Yemen desperately need access to <a href="https://yemen.unfpa.org/en/publications/situational-report-02-april-june-2022">reproductive health services</a>. And a staggering number of Yemenis—between 71 and 78 percent of the country’s nearly 30 million people—now live in poverty, according to a June 2022 <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/yemen/overview#1">World Bank report</a>.<div><br /><span style="font-size: x-large;">Weak Strategy</span><br /><br />Most international humanitarian and human rights groups working on issues related to Yemen know what they want to do, but fail to fully understand potential side effects of their work. That is to say that they are aware of their work mandate and strategy, but lack the ability to carry them out effectively without creating disadvantages for the Yemeni population.<br /><br />These organizations’ strategies tend to focus on implementing their own agendas, which typically have a temporary, short-term impact, and which mainly aim to satisfy donors and meet their expectations. But for many Yemenis these strategies are irrelevant, do not address the roots of the problem, and fail to provide long-term solutions to persistent issues. <br /><br /><br />A prime example of weak humanitarian aid strategy is the World Food Program’s (WFP) practices in Yemen. In September 2022, the WFP’s country director <a href="https://www.wfp.org/stories/yemen-looking-beyond-todays-hunger-crisis">said</a> about the organization’s work there that it was “able to keep people from starving—to keep famine at bay.” Keeping famine “at bay,” however, is a short-term solution, one that eventually creates a situation of foreign aid dependency. When the WFP <a href="https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/2020/press-release/">won the Nobel Peace Prize</a> in 2020, many Yemenis were shocked, especially given the WFP’s flawed work in the country. Again and again, the WFP has been accused of <a href="https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/hungry-people-hajjah-raid-wfp-warehouse-rotten-food">letting food rot</a> in local warehouses and of <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/20190101-yemen-rebels-slam-wfp-rotten-food-aid">sending rotten food</a> to Yemen, and possibly even <a href="https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/yemen-un-food-aid-government-supporters-rotten">doing so deliberately</a>. It is possible that the tragic results of the WFP’s food assistance program are due to the extremely difficult logistics of operating in Yemen. This, however, highlights another problem: the neutrality principle.<br /><br />As the conflict has continued, more armed militia groups have emerged and the war economy has flourished. In this context, international humanitarian organizations’ position of neutrality has translated into a tragic silence on armed groups’ abusive practices against humanitarian work and their obstruction of humanitarian assistance. Numerous media reports have shed light on abuses committed by the country’s warring parties against humanitarian aid. But despite even an in-depth Associated Press <a href="https://apnews.com/article/famine-bcf4e7595b554029bcd372cb129c49ab">investigation</a> detailing aid abuses carried out by all parties to the conflict, international humanitarian aid groups have failed to condemn these abuses.<br /><br />In April 2021, after three years of working as the UN Resident Coordinator and Humanitarian Coordinator in Yemen, Lise Grande <a href="https://www.foreign.senate.gov/hearings/us-policy-on-yemen-042121">spoke out</a> against the Houthi armed group’s violations of humanitarian aid assistance during a congressional subcommittee hearing. However, the UN’s own offices in Yemen have also been <a href="https://apnews.com/dcf8914d99af49ef902c56c84823e30c">accused</a> of major corruption. <br /><br /><br />What Yemenis need from international humanitarian aid workers while they are in their posts is the bravery that Grande demonstrated. They must name and shame armed groups that are responsible for making the humanitarian crisis worse. A potential starting point for this effort would be a condemnation of the Houthi armed group’s <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2022/09/yemen-huthis-suffocating-women-with-requirement-for-male-guardians/">restrictions on women</a>, including female humanitarian aid workers (both Yemenis and foreigners), whom the Houthis force to have a male guardian when traveling for work inside Yemen.<br /><br />International organizations’ weak strategies perhaps stem from a fear of losing funding, from a commitment to doing work by the book as their donors would like them to do, or from certain elements of orientalism. Unfortunately, satisfying donors comes as a top priority on their agenda. The social media pages of many international humanitarian groups working in Yemen contain many posts thanking specific donors for their funding, as if part of their work is to respond to donors’ need for recognition.<div><br /><span style="font-size: x-large;">Submission to Warlords</span><br /><br />Because the majority of Yemen’s population lives in areas controlled by the Houthi armed group, the majority of humanitarian work in the country is done in those areas. After Houthi leaders realized that international aid could be a powerful tool, they created in 2019 a <a href="https://www.scmcha.org/en/">Houthi-owned humanitarian body</a> called the Supreme Council for the Management and Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and International Cooperation (SCMCHA). This author asked numerous civil society actors and groups, including local humanitarian aid workers, about their thoughts on SCMCHA. Almost all of those questioned had the same response: SCMCHA’s main purpose is to deliver intelligence to senior Houthi officials about independent local humanitarian aid groups, to impose hundreds of restrictions on local and international aid organizations, and to tax or otherwise deduct money from international humanitarian aid funding. SCMCHA holds a monopoly over all Yemeni humanitarian aid work in areas under Houthi control, which means that any civil society groups trying to undertake aid work must abide by Houthi authorities’ rules and requirements, and must submit to total supervision.<br /><br />International humanitarian aid groups have only spoken out against SCMCHA’s violations on one occasion. In February 2020, the Associated Press <a href="https://apnews.com/article/united-nations-yemen-ap-top-news-international-news-weekend-reads-edb2cad767ccbf898c220e54c199b6d9">reported</a> on a dispute between the Houthis and UN agencies, which occurred after Houthi authorities demanded a tax of 2 percent on each of the UN’s humanitarian programs. As a result, international donors suspended aid to areas under Houthi control, which forced the Houthis to <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-51502992">put their taxation plan on hold</a>, thereby encouraging donors to resume aid. <br /><br /><br />However, Houthi authorities have found another method to make money off of humanitarian aid, namely by charging Yemenis themselves. During the month of Ramadan in 2022, for instance, Houthi authorities <a href="https://almasdaronline.com/articles/250645">issued an order</a> that has largely gone unmentioned outside of the country, and that stated that no one was allowed to donate food or aid outside of the group’s control or supervision and that doing so required a license. Because international humanitarian aid groups attempt to uphold impartiality in their work, they are very often submissive to the Houthis’ orders, which allows Houthi authorities to benefit from the aid that is meant for individuals and local organizations.<div><br /><span style="font-size: x-large;">Excluding Potential Local Partners</span><br /><br />All of these problems could be mitigated or fully solved if more Yemeni voices were involved, and if the advice these potential local partners have to give was heard. International organizations must include more Yemeni humanitarian aid workers in the efforts in Yemen. Yemenis, who have extensive local knowledge and an ear to the ground, are best able to identify the needs of their communities and to suggest possible solutions. Yemeni humanitarian professionals can promote the best possible tactics and strategies to both incentivize and pressure the Houthis and other armed groups to change their behavior.<br /><br />This is not to say that there are no Yemeni humanitarian professionals working at international humanitarian organizations, but rather to emphasize that there are not enough of them, especially at the decision-making level, among the teams that are actually designing humanitarian plans and programs.<br /><br /></div><div><span style="font-size: x-large;">Alternative Strategies</span><br /><br />After eight years of conflict, the humanitarian crisis in Yemen is no longer an emergency situation, but rather has transformed into a dire and long-lasting humanitarian situation, creating a <a href="https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/yemens-prospects-for-unity-are-uncertain-after-many-years-of-war/">complex war economy</a> that is proving all but impossible to dismantle. If the international humanitarian community truly aims to relieve human suffering, it is imperative that it take a comprehensive view and work to design strategies that provide long-term solutions and address both everyday needs and the roots of diverse problems.<br /><br />Some critics of international humanitarian aid groups operating in Yemen argue that their flawed performance has been counterproductive and that perhaps the humanitarian crisis would have improved were it not for extensive engagement from the international humanitarian aid community. In order to remedy the situation, international humanitarian aid groups should shift their strategies and approaches to development aid, which typically aims to address structural problems that contribute to human suffering. If development aid is not part of their mandate, they must at least establish close collaboration between humanitarian and development programs to address the underlying causes of humanitarian problems such as food insecurity and malnutrition.<br /><br />International humanitarian organizations in Yemen need to play a positive role and to remain open to learning from local partners, to listening to Yemenis’ demands, and to paying attention to Yemen experts when they warn about the damage the international humanitarian aid system intentionally or unintentionally creates.</div></div></div></div><br /><br /><i>*This policy analysis piece was written by <a href="https://twitter.com/Afrahnasser">Afrah Nasser </a>for the Arab Center, and it was published on AC's website on October 20, <a href="https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/the-flaws-and-failures-of-international-humanitarian-aid-to-yemen/">click here</a> to view the original version. </i>Afrah Nasser's Bloghttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05429782314834231913noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7866330248567333783.post-20855860317890082552022-09-18T15:42:00.000+02:002022-09-18T15:42:49.751+02:00A Year On, No Justice for a Yemeni Man Beaten to Death by Saudi Security Forces <div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEib3CF1X8Ej8h0AcOlhWnBb6vBW1np9sZFPWXfGx85pi5omL9rauAKf-okTlWKRvgtNJggih_CeOJZC0MCEbP90FsDL3f5vklY702kwR8A6WPES_Cmvrr5t4UcnbBNZCq5sWxF8i5_jrPZcQc55ggqbAndVvLQRs0H4jZ4_NmzftVfDgZH1Nlj7SFKO/s860/m-2.jpeg" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="860" data-original-width="342" height="640" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEib3CF1X8Ej8h0AcOlhWnBb6vBW1np9sZFPWXfGx85pi5omL9rauAKf-okTlWKRvgtNJggih_CeOJZC0MCEbP90FsDL3f5vklY702kwR8A6WPES_Cmvrr5t4UcnbBNZCq5sWxF8i5_jrPZcQc55ggqbAndVvLQRs0H4jZ4_NmzftVfDgZH1Nlj7SFKO/w254-h640/m-2.jpeg" width="254" /></a></div><br /><div>A year on, no justice for late Yemeni businessman, Abdul Samad Ismail al-Mohammadi who was beaten to death by Saudi security forces in Saudi Arabia. A few days ago, al-Mohammadi’s family launched a <a href="https://alwahdawi.net/index.php/news-26826">media campaign</a> calling for justice after all their pleas to the Saudi authorities to investigate the matter and refer the case to the Saudi judiciary fell on deaf ears. </div><div><br /></div><div>According to the family, the Saudi Ministry of Interior holds the case’s file, refuses to take any action against the perpetrators, and refuses to refer the case’s file to the Public Prosecution Office to initiate criminal investigation procedures.</div><br /><br />On September 9, 2021, around 25 Saudi security forces raided al-Mohammadi’s house in Sabya city, in Jizan, in Saudi Arabia, while al-Mohammadi was there, beat him, and arrested him on possession of money from drug trade charges. <div><br /></div><div>His wife says, “the security forces raided our house and scattered our belongings while searching all over the house. They kept asking, where’s the money? where’s the money? Then they threatened me, that if I did not reveal where were we hiding the 17 million Saudi riyals they claimed we owned, they would arrest me along with my daughters, and my son who has a disability." <br /><br /><br />The wife says that the Saudi security forces severely beat her husband, al-Mohammadi inside their house during the arrest. Al-Mohammadi’s brother says that when al-Mohammadi was taken to the prison, the prison’s guard refused to let al-Mohammadi into the prison and be put in one of the cells because al-Mohammadi was completely out of consciousness, as a result of the beating. Al-Mohammadi was instead transferred to Abi Arish أبي عريش hospital in Jizan city. On September 12, al-Mohammadi died from the injuries. Al-Mohammadi’s death certificate from the hospital said that the reason for his death was torture. </div><div><br /></div><div>The death certificate stated that al-Mohammadi suffered from fractures and cracks in nine ribs that led to the closure of the large pulmonary arteries in the lungs. Hence, al-Mohammadi suffered from a severe failure of blood circulation. </div><div><br /></div><div>Al-Mohammadi's family says that the security forces' inspection did not reveal any validity to the charges directed at al-Mohammadi. </div><div><div><br /><br /><div>In a media report by the Yemeni TV channel, al-Saeedah on November 9, 2021, Al-Mohammadi’s mother was interviewed during al-Mohammadi’s burial ceremony in Taiz. One of the points the mother mentioned was that the Saudi security forces confiscated al-Mohammadi’s daughters’ gold pieces of jewelry and money during the house raid. The mother is determined to get justice for her son. </div><div><br />
<iframe allow="accelerometer; autoplay; clipboard-write; encrypted-media; gyroscope; picture-in-picture" allowfullscreen="" frameborder="0" height="350" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/DilWiCuHMOI" title="YouTube video player" width="650"></iframe>
<br /><br /></div><div><br /></div><div>Al-Mohammadi, 47, had resided in Saudi Arabia for nearly 25 years. He was married and had six sons and two daughters. He owned and run one restaurant. Back in his hometown in Taiz, he was known for his philanthropic work inside Taiz city. <br /><div><br /></div><div>Al-Mohammadi’s family and their lawyers have been tirelessly trying to make the Saudi authorities investigate al-Mohammadi’s death and have those who tortured him to death be held accountable. The Saudi authorities till today continue to ignore the family’s pleas. </div></div><div><br /></div><div>Since last year, my WhatsApp has been getting messages from friends of al-Mohammadi calling on all Yemeni human rights defenders to speak against the obstruction of justice by the Saudi authorities. All the details mentioned in this post are based on a call I had with al-Mohammadi’s son yesterday and a statement al-Mohammadi’s friends along with his family wrote and distributed among Yemeni journalists and human rights defenders earlier this month.<br /><br /><br /></div></div></div>Afrah Nasser's Bloghttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05429782314834231913noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7866330248567333783.post-83619465252817405672022-07-28T17:25:00.018+02:002022-08-04T17:39:04.681+02:00Yemen’s Prospects for Unity Are Uncertain after Many Years of War<div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEgK4gWoF1jbQFImOzp4WBHfukBZdwRNf19zbsfwcGQsEEs1e-2_vuabc9aqgaJhLa68KLqoowdmDIWewclaXOw7RGNn-83Unfv3ToAiNWeoql4baKRhcsh15HkMyGPETwLnEoW2DWMCpAlQVlMmGpKsOZtT9y1TFEjOwa9JeAtGM2tCPWola647oWjZ" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img alt="" data-original-height="432" data-original-width="768" height="360" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEgK4gWoF1jbQFImOzp4WBHfukBZdwRNf19zbsfwcGQsEEs1e-2_vuabc9aqgaJhLa68KLqoowdmDIWewclaXOw7RGNn-83Unfv3ToAiNWeoql4baKRhcsh15HkMyGPETwLnEoW2DWMCpAlQVlMmGpKsOZtT9y1TFEjOwa9JeAtGM2tCPWola647oWjZ=w640-h360" width="640" /></a></div><br /><br /></div><br />*<a href="https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/yemens-prospects-for-unity-are-uncertain-after-many-years-of-war/" target="_blank">Arab Center Washington DC</a> - In 2018, the United Nations Security Council’s Panel of Experts on Yemen <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/letter-dated-26-january-2018-panel-experts-yemen-mandated-security-council-resolution">suggested</a> that the Yemeni State had begun to fragment as a result of a conflict that is now in its eighth year. “Yemen, as a State, has all but ceased to exist,” the panel wrote. “Instead of a single State there are warring statelets, and no one side has either the political support or the military strength to reunite the country or to achieve victory on the battlefield.” Over the course of the conflict, a number of statelets did indeed emerge in Yemen. These include the armed Houthi movement’s area of control, which stretches across most of the northern part of the country, and the internationally-recognized Yemeni government’s nominal dominion over the rest. Complicating this picture is the United Arab Emirates-backed Southern Transitional Council’s de facto control over most of southern Yemen, including the island of Socotra in the Indian Ocean. Meanwhile, in Yemen’s Marib Governorate, home to the country’s <a href="https://www.acaps.org/sites/acaps/files/products/files/20210726_acaps_yemen_analysis_hub_marib_scenario_0.pdf">largest oil fields</a>, the Yemeni government and Yemen’s Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated Islah Party have established a measure of shared control. And in eastern Yemen’s <a href="https://tcf.org/content/report/case-hadhramaut-can-local-efforts-transcend-wartime-divides-yemen/?agreed=1&session=1">Hadramawt Governorate</a>, the country’s largest governorate and producer of <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security-oil-idUSKCN1LM2C0">more than half</a> of Yemen’s oil output, a combination of local community leaders and the Yemeni government are in charge.<br /><br /><br />Eight years of conflict have effectively divided Yemen into many parts. And with each new day the Yemeni people lose more and more of the ties that used to unite them. Increased religionism, as well as sectarianism driven largely by Houthi politics, are dividing the nation, as are diverse economic, political, and military factors. But the international community still appears to have little desire to acknowledge Yemen’s growing fragmentation, clinging instead to the increasingly unlikely prospect of reuniting the country into a single state. And with few notable exceptions, the country’s deep and perhaps irremediable divisions continue to be swept under the rug during each one of the international community’s stakeholder meetings and negotiations about the conflict. What has been most tragically ignored is the fact that the political will to stitch the various fragments of Yemen back together still exists on the local level. In April 2022, the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) <a href="https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/yemens-presidential-leadership-council-offers-hope-amid-uncertainty/">was established</a> with the explicit goal of doing just that. But it is uncertain whether this initiative will succeed, or whether it is simply too late to remedy the situation. In the end, the country’s various factions may just decide to mark existing divisions with an official split. But whether a permanent fracture is inevitable, or if there is still time to reunite the entirety of Yemen under one flag and government still remains to be seen.<br /><br /><br /><h3 style="text-align: left;">Economic Division</h3><br />Yemen is riven by economic divisions that are felt by citizens across the country. The decision by former president, Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-cenbank/yemen-president-names-new-central-bank-governor-moves-hq-to-aden-idUSKCN11O0WB">to relocate</a> Yemen’s Central Bank from Sanaa to Aden in September 2016 eventually resulted in the existence of two central banks, one under Houthi control in the capital, which is the country’s main commercial and financial center, and one in Aden that is overseen by the Yemeni government, and that is struggling to receive deposits and donations from Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and other members of the international community. The two banks also implement different sets of monetary policies, which has helped increase the sense that there exist today two distinct Yemeni states. <br /><br /><br /><br />The splitting of the central bank has produced a domino effect across Yemen’s economic system. Today, the country’s various regions are governed by different customs regulations, revenue authorities, financial intelligence units, and telecommunications authorities, and by distinct laws and policies related to trade, banking, and taxes. For instance, the internationally-recognized Yemeni government has begun <a href="https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2022/02/divergent-currency-values-make-life-even-harder-yemen">printing currency</a> that is not accepted by the Houthis in the north, making travel and exchange between the north and south all the more difficult. This has also caused areas under Houthi control to face a major cash crunch, while the existence of excess currency notes in areas controlled by the Yemeni government has spurred inflation and the rapid depreciation of the rial’s exchange value. As of June 2022, one US dollar <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2022/6/28/yemeni-currency-devaluation-persists-unaffected-by-new-leaders">was equivalent to</a> roughly 550 rials in Houthi-controlled areas and 1,100 rials in the rest of the country—less than half the value.<br /><br />This dismal situation has done significant harm to the economies of both northern and southern Yemen, adversely impacting domestic trade and the prices of food, fuel, and other commodities, and also thoroughly undermining any sense of economic unity for the country. Indeed, the World Bank has <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/yemen/publication/yemen-economic-monitor-clearing-skies-over-yemen-spring-2022">stated</a> that, “The Yemeni economy has developed more and more into a de facto dual economy.” <br /><br /><h3 style="text-align: left;">Political Division </h3><br /><div>There are currently an abundance of distinct governments and authorities in Yemen, the most significant of which are the respective political structures of the Houthis, the Southern Transitional Council (STC), and, of course, the internationally-recognized Yemeni government. These groups have established parallel political systems of power in the country, with the Houthis and the Yemeni government having formed separate executive branches, ministries, parliaments, and state news agencies. Adding to the confusion, even though the international community only officially recognizes the Yemeni government, diplomats and NGOs continue to engage with the Houthi’s executive body, the Supreme Political Council.<br /><br />These political divisions are the most noticeable signs of the country’s fragmentation, both for Yemenis and for outside observers. For example, the existence of distinct sets of political policies has gravely affected mobility across the country. And the STC has even gone so far as to periodically engage in the deportation of citizens with northern origins from <a href="https://sanaacenter.org/ypf/the-other-side-of-aden/">Aden</a> and <a href="https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/yemen-socotra-saudi-arabia-stc-expel-northerners">Socotra</a> island. Meanwhile, the Houthis and the Yemeni government each assume the right to issue visas to visitors, which has led to <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/yemen-security-un-visa/u-n-says-houthis-refused-visa-to-head-of-human-rights-office-in-yemen-idINKBN1KV1M2">disruptions</a> for members of the international community working in the country.<br /><br /><br />On April 7, former President Hadi stepped down, marking not only a new phase in the conflict, but also the implicit end of the government he headed. From his base in Saudi Arabia, Hadi handed power to the newly-established PLC, which is composed of council chair Rashad al-Alimi and seven other members, all of whom possess distinct agendas. The circumstances under which the council was established also remain a constant source of suspicion, with many saying that Saudi Arabia <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/saudi-arabia-pushed-yemens-elected-president-to-step-aside-saudi-and-yemeni-officials-say-11650224802">pushed Hadi to resign</a>. The fact that the council most likely was not the outcome of a Yemeni-led decision, and was instead the product of foreign intervention, signals the persistent absence of a genuine vision among the country’s leaders to unite Yemen’s different factions. Nonetheless, the PLC has been internationally recognized. <br /><br />The role of the council remains undefined, but the body encompasses a wide spectrum of anti-Houthi groups, and could eventually play a role in peace negotiations with the Houthis at a later stage. In addition to al-Alimi, a former minister who was close to former President Ali Abdullah Saleh, members of the council <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/who-are-the-8-members-of-yemens-new-presidential-council/2558354">include</a>: Tareq Saleh, nephew of former President Saleh and a military commander who controls the majority of Yemen’s western coast; Sultan Ali al-Arada, a prominent politician and governor of the oil-rich Marib Governorate; Abdel-Rahman Abu Zaraa, the salafi military leader of the Giants Brigades, an armed group in the south that is supported and trained by the UAE; Abdullah al-Alimi Bawazeer, a Muslim Brotherhood leader who was close to former president Hadi; Othman Hussein Megally, a prominent politician from the Saada Governorate and a close ally of Saudi Arabia; Faraj Salmin al-Bahsani, a military commander and governor of Hadramawt; and Aidarus al-Zubaidi, president of the STC, which is based in Aden. <br /><br /><br />Yemen’s political divide is further emphasized by the fact that in Aden today there are essentially two main political powers: the STC and the PLC. In April 2020, the STC <a href="https://www.dohainstitute.org/ar/PoliticalStudies/Pages/The-Declaration-of-Self-Rule-in-South-Yemen-Background-and-Implications.aspx">declared</a> its autonomous administration of the south—an implicit declaration of separation—but after pressure from Saudi Arabia and the UAE, it quickly <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/7/29/yemen-separatists-abandon-self-rule-but-peace-deal-doubts-remain">abandoned</a> the position. But given the separationist ambitions it still harbors, it is nearly impossible to imagine the STC being merged into the PLC. What is more likely to happen is that as soon as the STC is given international political support, it will again attempt to break away.<br /><br />Meanwhile, a little more than 100 days after its formation, the PLC has failed to produce any of the significant changes that are necessary to fix the broken status quo, such as instituting political and economic reforms, finally paying civil servants’ unpaid salaries, and fixing Aden’s chronic electricity shortage. Meanwhile, the Houthis are pushing for the UN Security Council to recognize them as more than a de facto government, but instead as an official government of Yemen, a prospect the international community seems uninterested in considering.<br /><br /><br /><h3 style="text-align: left;">Military Division</h3><br />The Yemeni government’s army has been in constant disarray since the Houthis, allied with former President Ali Abdullah Saleh, stormed Sanaa in 2014, clashing with armed forces under the control of then President Hadi. The Houthis were able to capture the majority of the Yemeni Army’s missile stockpile, air defense system, and other weapons, thanks in part to Saleh’s assistance. Former President Hadi’s attempts to salvage the remnants of his army in Aden were in vain, due to the UAE’s <a href="https://www.mei.edu/publications/uae-may-have-withdrawn-yemen-its-influence-remains-strong">effort throughout the conflict</a> to create several armed groups in Yemen, which operate outside of the Yemeni government’s control. The UAE has provided these groups with weapons and training, as well as technical, financial, and logistical support. And recruits are often enticed into joining up by the promise of salaries that are often as much as five times those of soldiers in the Yemeni government’s army. However, the purpose behind the UAE’s intervention is unclear, since it has been supporting a mix of both separatist and non-separatist groups. <br /><br />Some UAE-sponsored armed groups have played a major role in shifting the trajectory of the conflict. For instance, in January 2022 the Giants Brigades <a href="https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/yemen-giants-brigades-uae-backed-who">stopped</a> Houthi forces from taking over Shabwa Governorate and part of <a href="https://www.arabnews.com/node/2002346/middle-east">Marib Governorate</a>, with aerial support provided by a Saudi- and UAE-led military coalition. The group is one of the country’s most powerful armed militias, and indeed, one could argue that UAE-backed armed forces are stronger today than the Yemeni government’s military. <br /><br /><br /><br />The UAE even challenged the Yemeni government for control of Socotra, and in 2018 <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/5/3/anger-erupts-on-yemens-socotra-as-uae-deploys-over-100-troops">invaded the island</a>, which it continues to use as a strategic base of operations for its economic and military outreach into mainland Yemen and East Africa. A year earlier, in a heated discussion with then Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi Mohammed bin Zayed, then President Hadi <a href="https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/exclusive-yemen-president-says-uae-acting-occupiers">accused</a> the UAE of behaving like an occupier in Yemen. <a href="https://responsiblestatecraft.org/2022/07/06/disputed-yemeni-island-could-host-elements-of-us-led-missile-defense-system/">Recent reporting</a> also linked the UAE, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the United States in a plan to use the island as an intelligence base and missile defense site for what could possibly become a military alliance in the Middle East.<br /><br />The fragmentation of the Yemeni Army and a growing number of armed groups that possess diverse allegiances is almost certain to frustrate any effort to return to and rebuild a united Yemen. How realistic, really, is the possibility of integrating numerous armed groups into one security sector after all the blood that has been shed? In seeking an answer to this question, all eyes are on the PLC’s newly-established Joint Military Committee, which has promised to restructure and unify all armed groups and security forces, as well as intelligence units belonging to the “anti-Houthi camp” within the PLC’s Defense Ministry. However, this committee is clearly facing an uphill battle, as are all of the individuals and organizations seeking to bridge the country’s ever-deepening divides.<div><br /><h3 style="text-align: left;">The Way Forward</h3><br />Imagining a future in which Yemen is united is impossible without first addressing the roots of the Yemeni State’s disintegration. But regardless, the current situation is so bad that at this point Yemen may be irrevocably divided. Ever since 2014, when the Houthis first captured nearly all of the state’s institutions, the group has been working tirelessly to consolidate its power. The Yemeni government, meanwhile, only exists due to the standing that comes with its having been recognized by the international community. But for citizens across Yemen, that government means next to nothing, since it has failed to meet its responsibilities to the Yemeni people.<br /><br />Both the Houthis and the Yemeni government aim to rule over an undivided Yemen, despite the fact that both groups have enacted major policies that deeply undermine prospects for unity. Meanwhile, the STC’s main objective has been and continues to be secession. And some experts <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/4/27/dividing-yemen-a-key-saudi-uae-objective-analyst-says?">argue</a> that Saudi Arabia and the UAE are planning to divide up Yemen according to the two countries’ economic and commercial interests. Many are recommending that steps be taken to prevent further divisions in Yemen. However, a far more fruitful avenue at this point would be for parties to the conflict and other relevant stakeholders, including those from the international community, to commit to an honest conversation and to face the reality of a divided Yemen, one whose cleavages have been carved by the country’s many belligerent factions. </div></div><div><br /></div><div><br /></div><div>*This policy analysis piece was written by <a href="https://twitter.com/Afrahnasser" target="_blank">Afrah Nasser </a>for the Arab Center, and it was published on AC's website on July 28, <a href="https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/yemens-prospects-for-unity-are-uncertain-after-many-years-of-war/" target="_blank">click here</a> to view the original version. </div>Afrah Nasser's Bloghttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05429782314834231913noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7866330248567333783.post-84097131568081986682022-04-18T18:58:00.006+02:002022-07-01T11:22:35.274+02:00Yemen: Latest Round of Saudi-UAE-Led Attacks Targets Civilians<h3 style="text-align: left;"><i>Killings Apparently Unlawful, Any Future Peace Talks Should Prioritize Justice</i></h3><div><i><br /></i></div><a href="#"><img src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEhXz_5CaALXkXo4ybKKyY9bmloAu9-rAJb7pX7Xj6Gh6wap6uN1eIutvt7PDiBz-LlAOD-y713tFZR_11oqNunz_4kMLZHS3rX_n8cp7EfVr09451yaDrOuCGxFLgHPXZKqUi7zpJZBKEv1SsVb6iw44VEAu2vLLK1C4us93HvNYaeBAYZ0QfdLJAyw=w640-h426" /></a><br /><i><span style="color: #444444;">Rescue members remove rubble covering victims of aerial attacks carried out by the Saudi and UAE-led coalition that targeted a detention facility in the Houthi strong-hold Saada governorate, in Yemen, on January 22, 2022. © 2022 Mohammed Hamoud/Getty Images </span></i><br /><br /><br /><br /><a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/04/18/yemen-latest-round-saudi-uae-led-attacks-targets-civilians" target="_blank">Human Rights Watch</a>: (Sanaa) – The <a href="https://www.hrw.org/middle-east/n-africa/saudi-arabia">Saudi</a> and <a href="https://www.hrw.org/middle-east/n-africa/united-arab-emirates">UAE</a>-led coalition carried out three attacks in <a href="https://www.hrw.org/middle-east/n-africa/yemen">Yemen</a> in late January 2022 in apparent violation of the laws of war that resulted in at least 80 apparently civilian deaths, including three children, and 156 injuries, including two children, Mwatana for Human Rights and Human Rights Watch said today.<br /><br />Following one of the strikes, where it appears to have used a Raytheon-made laser-guided missile kit on a detention facility in Saada, the Saudi and UAE-led coalition conducted an investigation that stated that the attack was on a military facility. However, Mwatana for Human Rights and Human Rights Watch found no evidence to support that claim. Houthi forces guarding the facility also shot at detainees trying to flee, witnesses said, killing and injuring dozens. The coalition attacks were in apparent retaliation for Houthi attacks on the United Arab Emirates (UAE) on January 17.<br /><br />“After eight years of conflict that has turned life for Yemen’s civilians into a disaster zone, the situation only seems to get worse,” said <a href="#">Afrah Nasser</a>, Yemen researcher at Human Rights Watch. “For UN-backed peace negotiations to be successful, the results need to be durable, which requires placing justice for past atrocities at the core of any peace agreement.”<br /><br />On April 1, the UN <a href="https://osesgy.unmissions.org/press-statement-un-special-envoy-yemen-hans-grundberg-two-month-truce">announced</a> that it had brokered an agreement between the Houthi armed group and the Saudi and UAE-led coalition that includes a two-month ceasefire coinciding with the start of Ramadan. On April 7, President Abdo Rabbu Mansour Hadi <a href="https://www.sabanew.net/story/ar/85336">transferred</a> his presidential authority to a presidential leadership council with Rashad al-Alimi, a Yemeni politician as the president of the council and seven other council members. The two-month ceasefire announcement is leading to momentum for <a href="https://osesgy.unmissions.org/special-envoy-hans-grundberg-opening-remarks-press">peace</a> talks, with the coalition and the <a href="https://www.saba.ye/ar/news3181915.htm">Houthi</a>s acknowledging it as a step toward a political agreement to end the conflict.<br /><br />The recent attacks underscore the urgent need to pursue accountability for human rights violations and war crimes in Yemen through prosecutions, Mwatana for Human Rights and Human Rights Watch said. A new international commission of inquiry is needed to replace the United Nations-mandated investigation shut down in October 2021.<br /><br />Any upcoming negotiations and agreements should include the creation of a credible international mechanism to ensure accountability for abuses by all parties to the conflict and should avoid endorsing any amnesties for serious international crimes. Under <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/Publications/Amnesties_en.pdf">United Nations policies</a>, it cannot endorse peace agreements that promise amnesty for genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, or gross violations of human rights. Its peace negotiators and field office staff are required not to encourage or condone amnesties that prevent prosecution of those responsible for serious crimes. The mechanism created should provide a path toward prosecuting those responsible for laws-of-war violations and provide appropriate compensation to victims.<br /><br />On January 17, Houthi forces attacked the Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC) in the Musaffah area of Abu Dhabi and the Abu Dhabi international airport. Local <a href="https://www.thenationalnews.com/uae/2022/01/18/timeline-of-the-deadly-abu-dhabi-attack-by-houthi-terrorists/">media reported</a> that the attacks took place at approximately <a href="https://www.thenationalnews.com/uae/2022/01/18/timeline-of-the-deadly-abu-dhabi-attack-by-houthi-terrorists/">10 a.m</a>. The attack on the oil company struck three petroleum tankers and killed <a href="https://www.adpolice.gov.ae/ar/media/news/Pages/1701202201.aspx">three people and injured six others</a>. The attack on the airport resulted in a small fire.<br /><br />The Houthi military spokesperson, Yahya Sare’e, <a href="https://www.almasirah.news/post/204374/%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%A9-%D9%84%D9%84%D9%83%D8%B4%D9%81-%D8%B9%D9%86-%D8%B9%D9%85%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%AF%D9%81%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D9%85%D9%82-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%8A-17-01-2022">announced</a> the attacks and targets in a televised speech that day, noting that Houthi forces launched five “ballistic and winged missiles” as well as drones targeting “the airports of Dubai and Abu Dhabi, the oil refinery in Mussafah in Abu Dhabi, and a number of important and sensitive Emirati sites and facilities.” Attacks targeting civilian objects and indiscriminate attacks that do not distinguish between civilian and military targets are prohibited under the law of armed conflict.<br /><br />Following those attacks, on January 17, coalition airstrikes destroyed two residential buildings, including the home of Houthi <a href="https://www.saba.ye/ar/news3172328.htm">Brigadier General Abdullah al-Junid</a>, director of the College of Aviation and Air Defense in Yemen’s capital, Sanaa, and damaged four adjacent residential buildings. A survivor and two other witnesses told Human Rights Watch that the airstrikes killed<a href="https://www.saba.ye/ar/news3172328.htm"> al-Junid</a> and nine other people, including two women, who they said were civilians. The survivor said nine other civilians were also injured, including three women.<br /><br />In the following days, the coalition launched other airstrikes across north Yemen that did not result in civilian casualties. On January 18, Houthi media reported that airstrikes targeted the <a href="https://www.saba.ye/ar/news3172292.htm">Military College and Parliament buildings</a> in Sanaa. On January 19, Houthi media reported that airstrikes targeted <a href="https://www.saba.ye/ar/news3172418.htm">Sana’a Airport</a> and its surroundings. On January 20, Houthi media <a href="https://www.saba.ye/ar/news3172543.htm">reported</a> that airstrikes targeted the area surrounding Sanaa Airport, a food storage hangar in Al-Tahreer area, and al-Safiah area, damaging homes.<br /><br />On January 20, at 10:15 p.m., a coalition airstrike hit a telecommunications building in Hodeidah, destroying it, in an apparently disproportionate attack targeting critical infrastructure. Internet monitoring tools reported that from approximately 1 a.m. on January 21 until January 25 there was a near-total internet blackout in Yemen. The attack killed five civilians who were nearby, including three children, and injured 20 others, including two children, according to relatives of victims who spoke with Mwatana for Human Rights.<br /><br /><br />On January 21, coalition airstrikes targeted a Houthi-controlled detention facility in Saada governorate. A Yemeni journalist who visited the attack site showed Human Rights Watch a photograph of a remnant from one of the munitions used in the attack, which included markings indicating that it was manufactured by the US defense contractor Raytheon.<br /><br />The Joint Incident Assessment Team (JIAT) established by the coalition to investigate violations <a href="https://english.aawsat.com/home/article/3462536/arab-coalition-refutes-houthi-allegations-regarding-saada-prison">said</a> on February 8 that the strike in Saada targeted a “Special Security Camp … which is a legitimate military target” but evidence gathered by Human Rights Watch and Mwatana for Human Rights consistently reflected that the facility targeted was a detention center.<br /><br />Following the airstrikes on the detention facility, according to witnesses, Houthi forces guarding it shot at detainees trying to flee from the site. Medical workers from the hospitals receiving casualties told Mwatana for Human Rights that they treated 162 injured people and received bodies of another 82 killed people. According to the medical workers, 16 of those killed and 35 of those injured had sustained gunshot wounds. A detainee who survived the attack and assisted in the rescue operation told Mwatana for Human Rights that three children were injured. The detainee stated that the detention facility had a section for child detainees.<br /><br />Under international humanitarian law, or the laws of war, warring parties may target only military objectives. They must take all feasible precautions to minimize harm to civilians, including by providing effective advance warnings of attacks. Deliberate attacks on civilians and civilian objects are prohibited. The laws of war also prohibit indiscriminate attacks, which include attacks that do not distinguish between civilians and military targets or do not target a military objective. Attacks in which the expected harm to civilians and civilian property is disproportionate to the anticipated military gain are also prohibited. Individuals who commit serious violations of the laws of war with criminal intent – that is, deliberately or recklessly– are responsible for war crimes.<br /><br />The US, the UK, France, and others should suspend all weapon sales to Saudi Arabia and the UAE until they not only curtail their unlawful airstrikes in Yemen but also credibly investigate alleged violations. Warring parties should refrain from using explosive munitions with wide-area effects in populated areas because they cause both immediate and long-term harm to the civilian population. Governments should also support a strong political declaration that addresses the harm that explosive weapons cause to civilians and commits states to avoid using those with wide-area effects in populated areas.<br /><br />There is no international investigative body currently documenting human rights violations and unlawful attacks by parties to the conflict in Yemen. In October 2021, under heavy pressure from Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, the UN Human Rights Council narrowly voted to end the mandate of the UN Group of Eminent International and Regional Experts on Yemen, shuttering the only international, independent body investigating abuses by all parties to the conflict in Yemen.<br /><br />Coalition airstrikes increased after that, <a href="https://mailchi.mp/7af91bc30aee/january2022-yemen-data-project-update-13429404">according to Yemen Data Project</a>, a website publishing statistics on coalition airstrikes, with civilian casualties reaching their highest monthly rate in more than two years. Mwatana for Human Rights and Human Rights Watch urged the United Nations, either via the General Assembly or the Human Rights Council, to quickly establish an investigative mechanism to gather evidence of possible war crimes by all sides and prepare cases for future criminal prosecutions.<br /><br />“Killing and wounding of civilians in such bloody attacks and the targeting the country’s vital infrastructure are a natural consequence of impunity for war crimes in Yemen,” said Radhya Al-Mutawakel, the chairperson of Mwatana for Human Rights. “UN member states can promote accountability by establishing a new international accountability investigative mechanism with a mandate to assess potential criminal responsibility.”<div><br /><br /><h3 style="text-align: left;">Houthi Attacks on the UAE, Saudi Arabia</h3><div><br /></div>The attacks on the UAE on January 17 are the latest indiscriminate Houthi attacks on the UAE and Saudi Arabia. Houthi forces have repeatedly <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/11/07/yemen-houthi-strike-saudi-airport-likely-war-crime">launched</a> <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/06/14/yemen-attack-saudi-airport-apparent-war-crime">missiles</a> toward civilian airports in Saudi Arabia in what constitute apparent war crimes. Most recently, on February 10, a <a href="https://www.spa.gov.sa/viewfullstory.php?lang=ar&newsid=2328371">Houthi drone attack on Abha</a> International Airport in southern Saudi Arabia injured 12 people. Abha International Airport is a civilian airport 110 kilometers from the Saudi border with Yemen and 15 kilometers west of King Khalid Air Base, one of Saudi Arabia’s largest military airbases. Houthi authorities have <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/06/14/yemen-attack-saudi-airport-apparent-war-crime">indicated</a> on numerous occasions that they consider civilian airports, incorrectly, to be valid targets.<br /><br /><br /></div><div><h3 style="text-align: left;">January 17 Coalition Attack on Residential Area in Sanaa</h3><div><br /></div>On January 17, the coalition conducted airstrikes on a crowded residential neighborhood in Sanaa. Witnesses said there were two airstrikes at about 9:30 p.m. Satellite imagery confirms that the attack took place between 9:41 a.m. on January 17 and 9:42 a.m. on January 18. A video filmed at night, posted to Telegram by Ansar Allah Media Center on January 18 at 12:48 a.m., shows rescue workers and residents sorting through debris and carrying a body through the site. Another <a href="https://t.me/AlmasirahVideos/43263">video</a>, also filmed at night, posted to Telegram on January 18 by Al Masirah, Houthi-owned media, also shows human remains being gathered by a Yemen Red Crescent Society rescue worker. The Al Masirah reporter interviews a man at the site who says “two rockets hit the place,” consistent with witness accounts. <br /><br /><br />Human Rights Watch and Mwatana for Human Rights interviewed one person whose home was struck and two neighbors who heard and felt the strikes and were at the attack site the next morning. Mwatana for Human Rights researchers visited the site on January 18 and observed the damage and rescue operations. Human Rights Watch also analyzed satellite imagery, four photographs, and eight videos of the attack’s aftermath.<br /><br />Two witnesses told Mwatana for Human Rights that the attack involved two strikes two to five minutes apart. The airstrikes hit the home of Brigadier General Abdullah al-Junid, director of the College of Aviation and Air Defense, killing him and nine others, including his wife, his adult son, and two neighbors who had come to the scene to assist survivors of the first strike.<br /><br />One of al-Junid’s adult daughters, who was in the home during the attack, said that her brother was 25 and had just returned to Yemen from Malaysia, where he was studying International Relations. She said nine other civilians were injured, including three women:<br /><br />When the first airstrike hit, I bent down to protect my little 2-month-old daughter. That lasted for 10 seconds. Then, when I lifted my head up to see what happened, I saw the ceiling and the wall all destroyed. I waited for anyone to come and help me. Then, two people – later I found out they were our neighbors – wearing lights on their heads appeared coming to help and screaming, asking if there were any survivors. Then the second airstrike hit. I couldn’t know where it hit but the house shook more and another part of the room fell off. I didn’t move when the second airstrike hit. Later, I found out that the two neighbors I saw survived but another two neighbors who came to help got killed by the second airstrike.<br /><br />The people interviewed said the airstrikes flattened al-Junid’s residence and caused significant damage to five neighboring buildings. None of the witnesses said they had received or heard about any warnings to evacuate before the strikes.<br /><br />Human Rights Watch reviewed satellite imagery collected before and after the attack. At least two residential multi-story buildings appear to have been destroyed on a satellite image acquired on January 18. At least four additional residential neighboring buildings seem to have been damaged as a result of the attack. Drone footage filmed by Houthi media on January 18 also shows damage to at least six buildings.<br /><br /><br />
<iframe allow="accelerometer; autoplay; clipboard-write; encrypted-media; gyroscope; picture-in-picture" allowfullscreen="" frameborder="0" height="350" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/zqCI8tYsstQ" title="YouTube video player" width="650"></iframe> </div><div><br /></div><div><br /></div><div>In its satellite imagery analysis, Human Rights Watch also identified a military target 15 meters away, the 1st Armored Division base, across the street from the residences that were struck. The base, which has been under Houthi <a href="https://www.bbc.com/arabic/interactivity/2014/09/140924_comments_yemen_houthi_overtaken_sanaa">control</a> since 2014, was not struck or damaged.<br /><br />On March 14, Human Rights Watch wrote to the coalition seeking information about the attack, any coalition investigation to assess resulting civilian harm, and any steps the coalition has taken to ensure accountability and provide redress. The coalition did not respond and has not otherwise shown that the anticipated military gain from the attacks exceeded the expected harm to civilians and civilian property.<br /><br />An investigation into the attack should consider whether coalition forces targeted a military objective, and, if there was a legitimate military objective, whether all feasible precautions were taken to minimize civilian harm, and whether the expected military gain outweighed the anticipated loss of civilian life. An attack that was unlawful and was carried out with criminal intent – deliberately or recklessly – would be a war crime.<br /><br /><h3 style="text-align: left;">January 20 Coalition Attack on Telecommunications Facility in Hodeidah</h3><div><br /></div>On January 20, at about 10:15 p.m., residents said, a coalition airstrike struck the Public Telecommunications Corporation (PTC) building, controlled by the Houthi authorities, in a densely populated area in Hodeidah city. Mwatana for Human Rights researchers visited the site the morning of January 21 and observed the damage. Human Rights Watch also analyzed satellite imagery, photographs, and videos of the attack’s aftermath.<br /><br />Satellite imagery recorded on January 23 shows multiple impact sites on the telecommunications compound. The roof and northern facade are clearly damaged, A mosque 10 meters east shows damage to the roof, and a section of the wall located on the right side of the main gate also seems affected. Additional impact sites and debris are also visible in the telecommunications compound.<br /><br />Following the attack, residents said, they had significant difficulties accessing telecommunications networks. The interruption of mobile networks and internet affected service across almost the entire country for four days, affecting virtually every aspect of life, including emergency rescue operations, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/yemens-internet-service-returns-after-four-day-outage-following-air-strike-2022-01-25/">money transfers</a>, and humanitarian work.<br /><br />Human Rights Watch spoke on March 22 with two Yemeni aid workers from different organizations working in Taiz and Marib governorates who said that the mobile and internet interruptions affected their ability to communicate, including with other colleagues and donors. The disruptions delayed projects and disrupted urgent humanitarian activities, exacerbating the humanitarian needs of affected groups, they said. The importance of communications for the health and well-being of the civilian population may have made the attack disproportionate.<br /><br />Internet Outage Detection and Analysis (<a href="https://ioda.caida.org/ioda/dashboard#view=inspect&entity=country/YE&lastView=overview&from=1642606037&until=1643210837">IODA</a>), a network traffic measurement tool, reported that between 1 a.m. local time on January 21 and early on January 25 there was an internet blackout in Yemen. The internet monitor group <a href="https://netblocks.org/reports/internet-connectivity-knocked-out-in-yemen-after-airstrike-PAYbNoBe">NetBlocks</a> also reported that at around 1 a.m. local time on January 21, internet users lost connectivity and Yemen experienced a “near total internet blackout” for four days. <a href="https://transparencyreport.google.com/traffic/overview?fraction_traffic=start:1642636800000;end:1643068799999;product:19;region:YE&lu=fraction_traffic">Google Transparency Report</a>, a service that tracks traffic from Google’s products and services, also reported a disruption in traffic at approximately 12:30 a.m. local time on January 21 until approximately 12:30 a.m. on January 25.<br /><br /><br />Two witnesses who spoke with Mwatana for Human Rights said that the attack killed 5 civilians, including 3 children, and injured 20 civilians, including 2 children, who had gathered in an open area in front of the complex to play football. This open area, approximately 20 meters from the building, is frequently used for football games, some attracting hundreds of spectators. A photograph posted to Twitter on January 30 shows children are again playing football in front of the destroyed building. <br /><br /><br /><table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEgSQAc3yQbC1JkZdp3lSVdB_R-JMUrCk_0tJFVfSKbGiE_XDDqWeZkcoBLGqJp4c8ZEkWNR9PC72IvRbQa1MBIHne7GOqlaHTqvrk9es_Hvqzh-UU9gnF_BKOM36Cz0lNEzeKMvl8Nc2Ty7lD6DxBPNAAEW9gEPW1N0BjUb7amO16s5ysBiiMrwPM-r" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img alt="" data-original-height="489" data-original-width="870" height="360" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEgSQAc3yQbC1JkZdp3lSVdB_R-JMUrCk_0tJFVfSKbGiE_XDDqWeZkcoBLGqJp4c8ZEkWNR9PC72IvRbQa1MBIHne7GOqlaHTqvrk9es_Hvqzh-UU9gnF_BKOM36Cz0lNEzeKMvl8Nc2Ty7lD6DxBPNAAEW9gEPW1N0BjUb7amO16s5ysBiiMrwPM-r=w640-h360" width="640" /></a></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption"><i><span style="color: #444444;">Photograph posted to Twitter on January 30, 2022, apparently showing part of the aftermath of Saudi and UAE-led coalition airstrike, targeting a telecommunications building in Hodeidah governorate on January 20, and children playing football, along with spectators sitting. The attack killed five civilians, including three children, and injured 20 others, including two children, who had gathered in an open area in front of the complex to play football. Photograph courtesy of Nabil Abdullah, 2022.</span></i></td></tr></tbody></table><br /><br />Human Rights Watch and Mwatana for Human Rights interviewed four relatives of three children who were killed, and two relatives of two children who were wounded, including two who witnessed the strikes and their aftermath. A man whose 8-year-old son was killed and who was himself injured, said:<br /><br />That evening, my son asked me to take him to watch the football match happening in the yard next to the telecommunications building, and we went. After the match ended, and we were about to leave, suddenly, as I was speaking with the security guard at the yard’s exit, a massive explosion made me fall down and I couldn’t hear because the explosion was huge.... The whole building fell down on the children and on me and pieces of the building reached the pavement at the other side.<br /><br />I got up unable to see because of the dust and it was completely dark. Then, I started to look for my son. I found several children injured under the rubble. I rescued them while my right leg was injured and two fingers of my left hand were cut.... After about one hour of searching for my son, I was told that my son was found on the other sidewalk. I ran with my broken right leg to the hospital to check on my son, but he was killed at the same moment of the attack.<br /><br />Another witness, whose 10-year-old brother was killed in the attack, said:<br /><br />My brother was playing football when the airstrike hit. I fell down from the huge pressure of the explosion, and I was unable to hear or see due to the intensity of the dust that covered the street. I didn’t know what happened to my brother until my father went to the hospital. My father was told that my brother was transferred to the hospital and passed away due to injuries he suffered on his head and stomach. My mother collapsed when she heard the news.<br /><br />Human Rights Watch verified nine photographs and five videos posted to Twitter, Facebook, or Telegram between 10:48 p.m. on January 20 and 3:03 a.m. on January 21 that showed the aftermath of the attack and videos filmed from inside a hospital. Two of these videos and two photographs show the body of an adult being pulled from the rubble, eight injured adults including at least two older people, the body of a boy, and five injured boys.<br /><br />In a photograph posted to Twitter at 10:48 p.m. local time on January 20, a large smoke plume is visible near the PTC building which is consistent with the accounts from witnesses.<br /><br />These photographs and videos analyzed by Human Rights Watch are consistent with the damage seen by satellite imagery. They show the destroyed three-story PTC building and damage to the roof of the nearby mosque.<br /><br />Human Rights Watch and Mwatana for Human Rights found no evidence of a military target at or near the site of the strikes during their investigation. An attack that is not directed at a specific military objective is unlawful. The coalition has not provided information that would justify the attack.<br /><br />On March 11, Human Rights Watch wrote to the coalition seeking information about the attack, any investigation the coalition has undertaken to assess resulting civilian harm, and any steps the coalition has taken to ensure accountability and provide redress. The coalition did not respond and has not issued any statements regarding the attack or shown that the anticipated military gain from the attacks exceeded the expected harm to civilians and civilian property.<br /><br />The attack is one of <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/saudi-led-coalition-asks-civilians-yemeni-ministries-sanaa-evacuate-state-media-2022-02-13/">several</a> coalition airstrikes against telecommunication facilities across Yemen in January.<br /><br />PTC, under Houthi control, provides cellular communications, including voice, text, and mobile internet services, to the population in nearly all areas in Yemen. Telecommunications networks used by armed forces and armed groups are military objectives subject to attack.<br /><br />While dual-use objects such as communications facilities are generally legitimate targets in war, Human Rights Watch and Mwatana for Human Rights found that the attack on the Hodeidah telecommunications building may have been disproportionate – that is, the anticipated civilian harm appears to have been excessive in relation to the expected military advantage.<br /><br /><br />An investigation of the attack should consider whether all feasible precautions were taken to minimize civilian harm, and whether the expected military gain outweighed the anticipated loss of civilian life and other harm to civilians.<br /><br /><table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEipQ6Mn7ABoDNdDvIYmTmn4w8YizQ-LMWKmZKk9Io425teXjxtHwlE3nRfOxGMRW-2oZjvF9aFghvzy6NVU08JbvoHQkiJeuWH5EmvqlSJ3NqJMXGR3K0s9k3V6wtKyqU2T7LuGiY6RjhgOEvgB36Q29s90AniBLQbo4kyNfbIuF6aTfl4sQ0KPu9Uz" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img alt="" data-original-height="580" data-original-width="870" height="426" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEipQ6Mn7ABoDNdDvIYmTmn4w8YizQ-LMWKmZKk9Io425teXjxtHwlE3nRfOxGMRW-2oZjvF9aFghvzy6NVU08JbvoHQkiJeuWH5EmvqlSJ3NqJMXGR3K0s9k3V6wtKyqU2T7LuGiY6RjhgOEvgB36Q29s90AniBLQbo4kyNfbIuF6aTfl4sQ0KPu9Uz=w640-h426" width="640" /></a></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption"><i><span style="color: #444444;">View of bulldozers and people inspecting a demolished Houthi-controlled pre-trial detention facility in Saada governorate. On January 21, Saudi and UAE-led coalition airstrikes targeted the facility, killing 66 people and injuring 127. © 2022 Mohammed Hamoud/Getty Images</span></i></td></tr></tbody></table><br /><h3 style="text-align: left;">January 21 Coalition Attack on Detention Facility in Saada</h3><div><br /></div>On January 21, coalition forces conducted airstrikes on a Houthi-controlled pretrial detention center in Saada city in northern Yemen. Witnesses said the airstrikes were at about 2:40 a.m. Satellite imagery confirms that the attack was between 10:11 a.m. January 20 and 10:34 a.m. on January 21.<br /><br />Satellite imagery recorded afterward shows at least two distinct destroyed buildings on the eastern side of the detention center. One of the buildings appears to have undergone a “pancake collapse,” in which the floors collapse vertically on top of one another. This is visible in drone footage posted to the Al Masirah Telegram channel on January 21.<br /><br />On the western side, three additional impacts are visible on satellite image, one of them affecting the roof and the western facade of one of the buildings and an additional one, adjacent to it, damaging the roof and the eastern façade and the courtyard. The imagery suggests that the facility was struck at least five times. Imagery from January 18 reflects previous damage to the facility, from an attack in 2016. <br /><br /><table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEjFp5F_IIpYujARtsYklQhTWbOHeTkZCvFbpFgkuWXI8H_M195rO-5pXLDbbe_fSB3gkf2nHcopxwYQ0f6T8lgBZJjuCZfjAlkRD4nQwDLF2_QnzWXu5EdoAey2Rmx6CC2J9CGzSawLh21f3Gsf0PZrj0kTJuFMKQ6lQWl9ZNImhURw60llDg9bxu59" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img alt="" data-original-height="489" data-original-width="870" height="360" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEjFp5F_IIpYujARtsYklQhTWbOHeTkZCvFbpFgkuWXI8H_M195rO-5pXLDbbe_fSB3gkf2nHcopxwYQ0f6T8lgBZJjuCZfjAlkRD4nQwDLF2_QnzWXu5EdoAey2Rmx6CC2J9CGzSawLh21f3Gsf0PZrj0kTJuFMKQ6lQWl9ZNImhURw60llDg9bxu59=w640-h360" width="640" /></a></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption"><i><span style="color: #444444;">Satellite imagery recorded on January 28, analyzed by Human Rights Watch showing a Houthi-controlled pre-trial detention facility in Saada governorate. On January 21, Saudi and UAE-led coalition airstrikes targeted the facility. The annotated satellite image shows two destroyed buildings, damage to the yard of the detention center, and two impacted wards, illustrated by stills from videos and a photograph taken at the scene. Satellite imagery: © 2022 Maxar Technologies. Source: Google Earth. Image stills on the left of image: Courtesy of Al Masirah, 2022. Photograph on the right of image: Mohammed Hamoud/Getty Images, 2022</span></i></td></tr></tbody></table><br /><br />Mwatana for Human Rights researchers visited the site at 10 a.m. on January 21 and observed the damage. Mwatana for Human Rights also went to the site several times in the days following the strike to interview injured people, victims’ family members, and witnesses. A Mwatana for Human Rights researcher took photographs of the destruction and observed rescue operations during which bodies and injured people were taken to local hospitals.<br /><br />On January 24, Mwatana for Human Rights researchers interviewed a detainee who survived the attack, a nurse working at the emergency department in a hospital located near the attack site, and a former administrative employee at a hospital in Saada. On January 25, researchers interviewed a doctor who treated victims, and a father whose son was a detainee killed in the attack.<br /><br />Human Rights Watch also interviewed a local journalist and humanitarian workers and analyzed satellite imagery, six photographs, and seven videos of the attack’s aftermath. The journalist provided <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?app=desktop&v=RFRDMsQgS-A">a photo</a> he took at the strike site of a weapon remnant he said he found there.<br /><br />Human Rights Watch verified a video posted to the Al Masirah Telegram channel at 10:07 a.m. local time on January 21. The video, filmed at night, shows rescue workers, a crane, and excavating equipment with large spotlights. The video corroborates the witnesses’ statements that the attack took place at night. In the video at least two bodies are seen, and rescue workers dig at least one injured person out of the rubble.<br /><br />Houthi media posted a <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?app=desktop&v=RFRDMsQgS-A">video</a> on January 22 to YouTube from the site following the attack, showing the destruction, men searching for dead bodies, men in rescue workers’ uniforms pulling bodies from rubble of the collapsed building, an interview with one of the rescue workers explaining the rescue operation, and a man showing a weapon remnant and identifying it as US-made.<br /><br />Following the airstrikes, Houthi forces guarding the detention center shot at detainees trying to flee, said a detainee who witnessed the shooting. Medical workers from the hospitals receiving casualties told Mwatana for Human Rights that they treated 162 injured and that another 82 people were killed. They identified 64 of those killed and 143 of those injured by name. According to the medical workers 16 of those killed and 35 of those injured had been shot.<br /><br />Approximately 50 bodies were laid out and covered in white sheets on a street outside a Saada cemetery three kilometers from the detention facility, as seen in a video posted to Telegram on January 25.<br /><br />The man who was detained at the center who survived the strikes also told Mwatana for Human Rights that three children were among the injured. The Houthi Ministry of Health <a href="https://www.saba.ye/ar/news3172997.htm">reported</a> that 91 detainees were killed and another 236 were injured.</div><div><br />The detainee who survived said:<br /><br />[After the first strike] the sound of the explosion shook the place, opened the windows, and made the glass fly....We began to run and after two minutes and a half, another airstrike struck, and we all ran to the opposite side ... but I stopped for a bit and went to join the rescue operation – I couldn’t just leave with that scene.<br /><br />The detainee described hearing detainees screaming after a third strike that brought the ceiling down on top of them: “Around 50 bodies were cut into pieces and scattered around and you could smell bodies’ burned skin.”<br /><br />He said that the actions of forces on the ground increased the casualties:<br /><br />The tragedy was that after the third airstrike there was live fire by the prison’s security guards targeting ones who were escaping for nearly two hours.…They were shooting deliberately at them, targeting their heads or legs. More than 50 detainees were targeted, some of them were climbing the wall so [the gunfire] made them fall down and die because the wall is really tall ... many children were injured who were kept in the children’s prison, which held 40 children.<br /><br />The coalition <a href="https://www.spa.gov.sa/viewfullstory.php?lang=ar&newsid=2324781">issued a statement</a> on January 28 claiming that the attacks on the facility were legitimate and noted that the UN and international nongovernmental organizations did not submit the coordinates of the facility to the coalition’s list of sites not to attack. The coalition’s spokesperson, Colonel Turki bin Saleh Al-Malki, said the nearest prison to the strike site was 1.8 kilometers away and that the strikes targeted the “Special Security Camp” in Saada, which he said was a legitimate military target and that it was used by the Houthis to support their military efforts.<br /><br />Al-Malki also <a href="https://www.spa.gov.sa/viewfullstory.php?lang=ar&newsid=2324781">said</a> that the coalition had initiated an investigation and that it would share their findings with the Joint Incident Assessment Team, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs in Yemen, and the International Committee of the Red Cross. According to <a href="https://www.arabnews.com/node/2013671/middle-east">media reports</a> from January 28, the Joint Incident Assessment Team concluded that the strike in Saada targeted a “Special Security Camp … which is a legitimate military target.” <br /><br /><br />Several people Human Rights Watch and Mwatana for Human Rights interviewed disputed the coalition’s claim, asserting that the site was a detention facility. Humanitarian workers said that the detention center was formerly used as a military camp by the Houthi central security forces (Special Security Forces) but had been transformed into a detention center in 2020. The doctor interviewed by Mwatana for Human Rights also said the facility had been converted into a prison a year and a half ago.<br /><br />The doctor, who has worked in Saada for 13 years, said, “I am shocked that this prison was targeted [given that] it’s well-known to international humanitarian organizations...” He also that the hospital where he works has implemented new security measures fearing that it could be targeted by a coalition airstrike. The ICRC also issued a <a href="https://www.icrc.org/en/document/yemen-icrc-expresses-deep-concern-about-human-toll-caused-escalating-violence">report on January 21 noting that </a>the facility was a detention center.<br /><br />On January 28, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/press-briefing-notes-yemen-28-january-2022-enar">said</a> that “During our recent visit, we saw no signs indicating that this site, formerly a barracks, continues to have a military function.” Human Rights watch also spoke with a local journalist who investigated the strikes and said that while he was at the strike site on January 22, a child showed him a weapon remnant, which he photographed. He said the child found the remnant near the prison’s bakery. The same munition remnant later appeared in <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?app=desktop&v=RFRDMsQgS-A">a video posted</a> by Houthi media.<br /><br />Human Rights Watch identified the remnant as part of a guidance fin of a GBU-12 laser guided 500-pound bomb. The item was factory-marked with a unique numerical manufacturers code identifying it as a Paveway laser guidance kit produced by the US weapons manufacturer Raytheon. Human Rights Watch sent a letter to Raytheon on March 10, seeking information about findings. Raytheon has not responded. Human Rights Watch wrote to the coalition on March 11 seeking information about the attack and whether it is assessing the resulting civilian harm, and asking about any steps the coalition has taken to ensure accountability and provide redress. The coalition has not responded.<br /><br />The Joint Incident Assessment Team, established by the coalition in 2016, has <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2018/08/24/hiding-behind-coalition/failure-credibly-investigate-and-provide-redress-unlawful">fallen short</a> of international standards regarding transparency, impartiality, and independence, underscoring the need for an international investigative body to document human rights violations and unlawful attacks by parties to the conflict in Yemen.<br /><br />Human Rights Watch and Mwatana for Human Rights found no evidence of a military target at or near the site of the strikes. An attack that is not directed at a specific military objective is unlawful. The coalition has not provided information that would justify the attack. </div>Afrah Nasser's Bloghttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05429782314834231913noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7866330248567333783.post-11335294047582307012022-04-07T14:39:00.002+02:002022-04-12T15:00:45.204+02:00US Assistance to Saudi-Led Coalition Risks Complicity in War Crimes<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEhDjIUdhc829EzB-Q2ohqEwiw7yaO3BZLvZG-Nul2rEcRA3PK8L2kEGNzYHS_yUGkPKDLWL9Vd92Ypum2bLZQ2IWUnZHehtYVW-lgOAKk1r4c9S5rNdcaD4cKNwGjrfTRAIcdrhxxtSGEUE8BlyFOr_v9nTCMd4Qx0xGSNQwSwx5VMIiRQVAGeofqTV" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img alt="" data-original-height="580" data-original-width="870" height="426" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEhDjIUdhc829EzB-Q2ohqEwiw7yaO3BZLvZG-Nul2rEcRA3PK8L2kEGNzYHS_yUGkPKDLWL9Vd92Ypum2bLZQ2IWUnZHehtYVW-lgOAKk1r4c9S5rNdcaD4cKNwGjrfTRAIcdrhxxtSGEUE8BlyFOr_v9nTCMd4Qx0xGSNQwSwx5VMIiRQVAGeofqTV=w640-h426" width="640" /></a></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><i>People inspect a damaged building at the site of a Saudi-led airstrike on Sanaa, Yemen.<br /> © 2022 Hani Al-Ansi/picture-alliance/dpa/AP Images</i></td></tr></tbody></table><br /><br /><br /><div>*The protracted conflict in Yemen has killed almost <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-humanitarian-needs-overview-2021-february-2021-enar">a quarter of a million people</a> directly or indirectly due to inadequate food, health care, and infrastructure. It has included unlawful attack after unlawful attack, with homes, hospitals, schools, and bridges among the <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/civilians-yemen-remain-stuck-between-warring-parties-and-waiting-justice-enar">civilian objects that the warring parties have targeted</a>. Fighting has internally displaced more than <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-humanitarian-needs-overview-2021-february-2021-enar">4 million</a> people from their homes. Food insecurity is on the rise.<br /><br />The conflict that began in 2014 between the Houthi armed group and the government of President Abdo Rabbu Mansour Hadi morphed in 2015 into a conflict between the Houthis and the US-backed coalition led by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Today the fighting includes <a href="https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2022-01/yemen-38.php">nearly 50 other battlefronts</a>.<br /><br />The UN Security Council <a href="https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/S_2022_50.pdf">panel of experts has reported</a> for several years that Iran continues to supply the Houthis with weapons. The US has <a href="https://www.un.org/press/en/2015/sc11859.doc.htm">also supported</a> the Saudi and UAE-led coalition politically, particularly by shielding the coalition from criticism and enabling the United Nations Security Council to focus its scrutiny only on the Houthis, as seen in <a href="https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_res_2216.pdf">Resolution 2216</a>, drafted by the United Kingdom in 2015.<br /><br />Since 2015, the <a href="https://www.sipri.org/media/press-release/2020/usa-and-france-dramatically-increase-major-arms-exports-saudi-arabia-largest-arms-importer-says">United States has supplied</a> Saudi Arabia and the UAE with billions of dollars’ worth of weapons, training and logistical support, including <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-yemen-refueling/u-s-halting-refueling-of-saudi-led-coalition-aircraft-in-yemens-war-idUSKCN1NE2LJ">aerial refueling until 2018</a>, as the coalition conducts its aerial bombing campaigns. <a href="https://www.hrw.org/middle-east/n-africa/yemen">Human Rights Watch</a> has <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/11/29/us-suspend-saudi-arms-sales">documented</a> the coalition’s use of US-manufactured weapons in <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/11/29/us-suspend-saudi-arms-sales">at least 21 apparently</a> unlawful attacks under the laws of war. These attacks include the March 15, 2016, <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/04/08/yemen-us-bombs-used-deadliest-market-strike">attack on a market in the village of Mastaba</a> in northwestern Yemen, which killed at least 97 civilians, and the attack on October 13, 2016, <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/10/13/yemen-saudi-led-funeral-attack-apparent-war-crime">on a funeral ceremony</a> in Yemen’s capital, Sana’a, which killed at least 100 people and wounded more than 500, including children.<br /><br /><a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/un-group-eminent-international-and-regional-experts-yemen-presents-its-fourth-report#:~:text=GENEVA%20%2F%20ADDIS%20ABABA%20(14%20September,to%20the%20conflict%20in%20Yemen">Mounting evidence</a> shows that parties to the conflict, the coalition as well as the Houthi armed group, continue to commit serious violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law. On January 21, coalition warplanes struck a detention center in Sa’ada governorate, northern Yemen, resulting in dozens of casualties. According to a local nongovernmental group, Mwatana for Human Rights, some detainees who survived the strikes were then <a href="https://mwatana.org/en/brief-before-the-un/">gunned down</a> by Houthi forces on the ground while they tried to flee.<br /><br /><br />The Houthi armed group also continues to <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/11/24/yemen-houthi-forces-attack-displace-villagers">launch indiscriminate attacks</a> into populated areas, including into internally displaced people’s camps in Yemen’s Marib governorate. Despite the ongoing toll on civilians, the US continues to sell weapons and <a href="https://www.vox.com/2021/4/27/22403579/biden-saudi-yemen-war-pentagon">provide training and logistical support</a> to the coalition.<br /><br />One recent sale approved by the Biden administration happened in December, when Raytheon, a leading US defense company, sold $650 million of <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/us-state-dept-okays-650-million-potential-air-to-air-missile-deal-saudi-arabia-2021-11-04/">air-to-air missiles and associated equipment to Saudi Arabia</a>. In response to a Human Rights Watch 2018 inquiry about the steps Raytheon takes to ensure protection of civilians, Raytheon’s vice president, Timothy F. Schultz, wrote that “Raytheon sales of munitions to Saudi Arabia have been and remain in compliance with US law and do not violate US or international legal requirements applicable to the company.”<br /><br /><br />Raytheon and other US companies operating in the weapons sector have responsibilities under the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development <a href="https://www.oecd.org/corporate/mne/">Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises</a> and the UN <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/publications/guidingprinciplesbusinesshr_en.pdf">Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights</a> to assess the impacts of their operations, sales and services, based on international human rights requirements and the laws of war. While the United States government facilitates the company’s weapons sales, the company says it <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2019/02/16/raytheon-exec-on-sales-to-saudi-arabia-we-dont-make-policy.html">complies with US law</a> and policies. There are still serious concerns that Raytheon is not meeting its human rights responsibilities as its munitions continue to be used to commit violations of international humanitarian law.<br /><br />Even though the US government is aware of credible allegations that US-made weapons are being used in violation of international humanitarian law, the US has possibly <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/04/06/q-conflict-yemen-and-international-law">violated its own obligations</a> by continuing arms sales to the coalition. Government officials could be <a href="https://www.justsecurity.org/40518/officials-risk-complicity-war-crimes-yemen/">legally liable</a> for war crimes in Yemen, a consideration raised in a State Department Inspector General report <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/14/us/politics/us-war-crimes-yemen-saudi-arabia.html">in 2020</a>. <br /><br /><br />The US condemns likely war crimes committed in other armed conflicts, such as <a href="https://thehill.com/policy/international/598690-biden-raises-stakes-with-allegations-of-russian-war-crimes">those by Russia in Ukraine</a>, but continues to support the coalition that is committing similar violations in Yemen. Yemeni civilians have also told Human Rights Watch that by supplying weapons used to target them, the US has contributed to antagonism, pain and resentment. Yemenis say that they are well aware that some of the bombs that fall on their homes and heads are made in the US, as weapon remnants found at strike sites by <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/aug/19/us-supplied-bomb-that-killed-40-children-school-bus-yemen">journalists</a>, <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/12/08/yemen-us-made-bombs-used-unlawful-airstrikes">researchers</a> and others have repeatedly shown.<br /><br />The US continues to show an inadequate commitment to ensuring accountability for the possible crimes of its allies, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, and for its own role. After seven years of ignoring rights groups’ warnings of potential US complicity in serious crimes in Yemen, Washington needs to reverse course and take concrete steps to end its complicity, including by suspending weapon sales to Saudi Arabia and the UAE until they curtail unlawful airstrikes. The US should also pursue credible investigations and prosecutions into previous alleged violations. </div><div><br /></div><div><br /></div><div><i>*Article was written by Afrah Nasser, and published first on <a href="https://sanaacenter.org/the-yemen-review/march-2022/17316" target="_blank">Sana'a Center's website</a>, and later on <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/04/07/us-assistance-saudi-led-coalition-risks-complicity-war-crimes" target="_blank">Human Rights Watch's website</a>. </i></div><div><br /></div>Afrah Nasser's Bloghttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05429782314834231913noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7866330248567333783.post-37203558275478246462022-02-02T16:25:00.006+01:002022-02-05T16:32:36.936+01:00Yemen Talk with Sen. Chris Murphy <p>I co-discussed the conflict and the humanitarian situation in Yemen with Sen. Chris Murphy & Oxfam's Scott Paul. You may press play & watch the talk below: </p><p> </p><blockquote class="twitter-tweet"><p dir="ltr" lang="en">Tune in as <a href="https://twitter.com/OxfamAmerica?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw">@OxfamAmerica</a>'s <a href="https://twitter.com/ScottTPaul?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw">@ScottTPaul</a>, <a href="https://twitter.com/hrw?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw">@hrw</a>'s <a href="https://twitter.com/Afrahnasser?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw">@Afrahnasser</a>, and I discuss the humanitarian crisis in Yemen – and why re-designating the Houthis as a foreign terrorist organization would set things back. <a href="https://t.co/Pqul9alb8I">https://t.co/Pqul9alb8I</a></p>— Chris Murphy (@ChrisMurphyCT) <a href="https://twitter.com/ChrisMurphyCT/status/1488974665716432898?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw">February 2, 2022</a></blockquote> <script async="" charset="utf-8" src="https://platform.twitter.com/widgets.js"></script>Afrah Nasser's Bloghttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05429782314834231913noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7866330248567333783.post-79897948692098263322022-02-02T15:57:00.001+01:002022-02-05T16:18:06.928+01:00Yemen War Victims Beyond the Headlines<p> </p><table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEgc8CctJSxCBtJRZodNO0yWeHc0xogEfJyOvHqcpCmTSd1aq1yTbf_9p6VrGurPtCkwMFEwyMN9KRGdorkiqmjKCiAK2TmZtRssEujgLwwBTtli0YShfymNRb3X9q1YWuZPiDIBb1dvUchHkT_aEK9aswXXVrBSiqZsVhF3A-UZSiENa9rhqWum6bCe" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img alt="" data-original-height="580" data-original-width="870" height="426" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEgc8CctJSxCBtJRZodNO0yWeHc0xogEfJyOvHqcpCmTSd1aq1yTbf_9p6VrGurPtCkwMFEwyMN9KRGdorkiqmjKCiAK2TmZtRssEujgLwwBTtli0YShfymNRb3X9q1YWuZPiDIBb1dvUchHkT_aEK9aswXXVrBSiqZsVhF3A-UZSiENa9rhqWum6bCe=w640-h426" width="640" /></a></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: x-small;"><i>People inspect a damaged building at the site of a Saudi-led airstrike on Sanaa, Yemen. <br />© 2022 Hani Al-Ansi/picture-alliance/dpa/AP Images</i></span></td></tr></tbody></table><br /><i>Published on <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/02/02/yemen-war-victims-beyond-headlines" target="_blank">Human Rights Watch's website</a>, February 2: </i><br /><p></p><p>While the dramatic escalation of fighting in Yemen since mid-January has renewed international attention, the day-to-day reality beyond the ballistic missiles and airstrikes rarely gets the same attention and scrutiny. Beyond the headlines, civilians in Yemen have been caught between hammer and anvil for years.</p><br />Civilians in Yemen are routinely subjected to injustices by all parties to the conflict, not just one side. For instance, while the Saudi and UAE-led coalition is responsible for <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/12/07/yemen-coalition-blockade-imperils-civilians">a naval and air blockade</a> on Yemen, and has a sordid record of unlawful attacks, <a href="https://mailchi.mp/7af91bc30aee/january2022-yemen-data-project-update-13429404?e=f566619a0e">targeting civilians and civilian infrastructure</a> in areas held by the Houthi armed group, Houthi forces have also been committing serious abuses. The Houthis’ record of abuses and war crimes is long and growing, including holding people arbitrarily, forcibly disappearing them, and torture. The group also <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/05/28/yemen-keeps-religious-minority-members-locked">abuses religious minority groups</a>, <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/11/06/yemen-jailed-journalists-face-abuse-death-penalty">wrongfully convicts journalists and threatens to execute them</a>, unlawfully <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/03/23/yemen-houthis-attacking-displaced-peoples-camps">shells</a> internally displaced people, and forcibly <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/11/24/yemen-houthi-forces-attack-displace-villagers">displaces</a> civilians. Houthi authorities have <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/06/01/yemen-houthis-risk-civilians-health-covid-19">spread disinformation</a> about the Covid-19 pandemic, subjecting civilians and <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/07/07/health-workers-abandoned-yemens-covid-19-fight">health workers</a> to risks. And the list goes on.<br /><br /><br />At the same time, Saudi Arabia and the UAE’s role in Yemen goes well beyond just airstrikes. Saudi Arabi’s recent decision to not renew work contracts for Yemeni professions could result in a <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/08/31/saudi-arabia-yemeni-workers-risk-mass-forced-returns">mass forced return of Yemeni workers</a>, a move that would devastate Yemen’s collapsing economy by cutting off at least two million Yemenis’ remittances sent to their families in Yemen.<br /><br />Likewise, despite removing its ground forces from southern Yemen in late 2019, <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/10/28/expo-2020-dubai-how-would-honest-yemen-pavilion-look">the UAE</a> continues to support <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/06/22/yemen-uae-backs-abusive-local-forces#:~:text=(Beirut)%20%E2%80%93%20The%20UAE%20supports,Human%20Rights%20Watch%20said%20today.&text=At%20least%2038%20appear%20to,by%20UAE%2Dbacked%20security%20forces">abusive local forces</a> that have arbitrarily detained, forcibly disappeared, tortured, and abused dozens of people during security operations, including by <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2019/02/yemen-uae-recklessly-supplying-militias-with-windfall-of-western-arms/">transferring weapons to these forces</a>.<br /><br />The war in Yemen isn’t a football match where one gets to cheer for one side over the other. Behind the headlines about the escalation, there are human victims who have suffered these abuses long enough.<br /><br />There is no magic bullet for solving Yemen’s problems, but there is no doubt that the path forward should include accountability and redress measures for all abuses, no matter whether they are committed by states, armed groups, or others.Afrah Nasser's Bloghttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05429782314834231913noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7866330248567333783.post-39679129850775263492022-01-26T16:03:00.001+01:002022-01-26T16:03:12.396+01:00Al Jazeera: Has a dangerous new phase of the war in Yemen begun? <iframe allow="accelerometer; autoplay; clipboard-write; encrypted-media; gyroscope; picture-in-picture" allowfullscreen="" frameborder="0" height="350" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/8_eXXCl0Wxs" title="YouTube video player" width="630"></iframe><div><br /></div><div>I co-discussed Yemen on AJE's Inside Story program yesterday. </div>Afrah Nasser's Bloghttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05429782314834231913noreply@blogger.com